Stepan BANDERA

Stepan BANDERA was born 1 January 1909 in Trosťianc, near Stryj, Austro-Hungary, the son of a Greek Catholic priest. He was still in high school in Stryj when he became a member of the UVO, a veterans' organization of Ukrainian nationalists from World War I days. He graduated from high school in 1928 and went on to the Polytechnic in Lvov where he studied agriculture.

BANDERA's parents were killed by the NKVD and his two brothers were murdered in Auschwitz in 1943.

In 1933 BANDERA became a member of the homeland executive committee of the GUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists). He was arrested in June 1934 by the Polish police and condemned to death with two other Ukrainians for alleged complicity in the assassination of the Polish Minister of Interior, B. PLEBACHY, in Warsaw. His sentence later was commuted to life imprisonment. He remained in jail until 1939 when he escaped and resumed the GUN leadership. BANDERA became chief of the greater part of the organization in the summer of 1940 when the GUN split, and on 30 June 1941, under his direction, the GUN proclaimed the restoration of an independent Ukrainian government. BANDERA was soon taken to Berlin by the Germans and imprisoned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp. He later escaped from the Germans and disappeared.

BANDERA lived in Western Germany since 1945 as head of the foreign unit of the GUN, (Zoh/OUN/B) the largest Ukrainian emigre group. He was found dead on the stairs of his Munich residence on 15 October 1959, a victim of foul play.
Stepan Bandera was born in 1909 in the town of Terebovlia, near Tryj. His father was a Greek Catholic priest. He attended elementary school in local and high school in Tryj. While still in high school he became a member of UO, a veteran organization of Ukrainian nationalists from the First World War. In 1929 he graduated from the high school and went on to the Polytechnic in L'vov where he studied agriculture. In 1929 he did not attend the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Vienna which brought about the consolidation of UO and three other major nationalist groups. UO was born at this Congress. By late 1932 or early 1933 Bandera had become head of the homeland executive committee of the UO. Mykola Levko was the overall chief of UO at this time, although he was in the emigration. This was the period in Eastern Poland (1929-1934) when the younger generation of Ukrainian students took over most of the prominent positions in this homeland OUN. In June 1934, one day after the assassination of the Polish Minister of Interior, Pocztowy, BANDERA was arrested. He was first sentenced to death and then the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. His trial took place in 1935 after which he was committed to the Holy Cross jail where he remained until 1939. It is alleged that his sentence was commuted to avoid an uprising of Ukrainian nationalists in Eastern Poland and the Ukraine. BANDERA's closest collaborators during this period were YAROSLAV KULBAS, YAROSLAV YERMAK, and YAROSLAV YURCHUK. The circumstances surrounding BANDERA's escape or release from Polish prison in 1939 are not clearly known. Once free, BANDERA resumed his leadership of UO in the homeland. Officially Gen. Andriy KIERNAT had succeeded to the title held by BANDERA until the latter's assassination. KIERNAT, however, was in the emigration and BANDERA in Cracow. BANDERA was offered a position in KIERNAT'S newly formed Provisional National Council (VSN). This offer BANDERA turned down since it would have placed him in a position subordinate to KIERNAT. In early summer 1940 the OUN split and BANDERA became the overall chief of the greater part of the organization. During 1940 OUN organized those western regions occupied by the Germans and set up councils and organizers into the eastern Ukraine. When the Germans attacked Russia, many members of the OUN followed the Germans' advance eastward. BANDERA remained in Cracow. The Gestapo invited BANDERA for a conference which apparently was a ruse to arrest him. At any rate, BANDERA was taken to Berlin and placed under house arrest there. He was shortly transferred to the Prinz Albrechtstrasse Gestapo jail reserved for important political prisoners. ( honodyiv, KIERNAT, now a member of the St. Ulus, was also in this jail at the same time as BANDERA.) In 1942 BANDERA was transferred to the Russian concentration camps. In 1944 he was brought to Berlin where the Germans attempted to negotiate with him. BANDERA was however adamant and the negotiations came to nothing. He refused to collaborate with the Germans and the fact that the Germans had dissolved the independent Ukrainian government proclaimed at L'vov in June 1941. Partly through the intervention of Lysenko and HAVELKA, BANDERA, exonerated from the crime and disapproved. At the end of the war he was in the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1945 he came to southern Bavaria where he has since been living ever since this time.
In 1929 Požar was married. His family is 4th in our group. He is said to have three or possibly four sons.

Former friends of Babić characterize him as follows: self-important, clever, fond of jokes, socially very sensitive, unenthusiastic, unadventurous as an actor, and unacquainted with problems of power politics in the migration.

The breakdown of Babić's official titles would go something as follows:

- 1934-39 Chief of the homeland executive of DNO
- 1937-August 1945 - President (leader) of DNO and Chairman of the Provid
- 1946-49 unofficially Providnik
- 1945-51 Providnik of the foreign elements of DNO (2NO)

It will be noted that Babić has never held any official title or membership in DNO or the UNR. His claim to membership in the "Council of Three" (DNO Provid) has been rejected by the homeland on the grounds that the DNO Provid ceased to exist in 1945, after the death of two of its original members (Babić and Babić). It should also be noted that the title Providnik (officially) went out of existence in 1943, when it has decided that all policy matters concerning a party would henceforth be decided by a council of seven (a Provid) instead of by a single leader. The evolution of the Homeland underground in the last five years in the direction of decentralization of executive power has not been fully accepted by DNO, who has since unstable evidence that he desired to return to the status quo of 1941, when he held the unchallenged position of "Führer".
Stepan Bandera
Chief of 7/B

He was born in 1907 and came from a Galician peasant family. When he finished his secondary studies he consecrated his life to politics and joined the organization of Gen. Józef Piłsudski, the Żmigród, which later (1928) became the 7/B. Bandera remained in the homeland and became the active leader of the organization there. Between 1930 and 1931, the Polish government began a brutal pacification among the Ukrainian terrorists who were responsible for the murder and outrages against Polish officials and political leaders. Traced by the Polish police, Bandera escaped to Germany in 1934 and went into hiding. In the meantime (1934) the Polish Minister of the Interior, Władysław Bartoszewski, was assassinated in the streets of Warsaw. Poland had just concluded a pact of non-aggression and friendship with the Third Reich and now demanded the extradition of Bandera and other Ukrainian terrorists. The Poles, however, failed to secure the extradition of the Ukrainian leaders, and even those who did not escape were arrested. In 1939, Bandera succeeded in making his escape and returned to the homeland. During the ensuing occupation of Poland by the Third Reich, the three leaders were arrested and tried in Warsaw and condemed to death, but Pres. Ignacy Mościcki and Józef Pilsudski both appealed to the president of Poland and in contrast their sentences to fifteen years imprisonment. During World War II in Poland in 1939, Bandera succeeded in making his escape and returned to the homeland. During the ensuing occupation of Galicia by the Soviets he remained commander in chief in Poland. The youth of Poland proclaimed him a national hero and a hero of the party. It was this fact which made it possible for him to take charge of the opposition which had been created in the UN against the Poles and his Directorate in the spring of 1941. Bandera successfully split the UN.

Since that time, he has been the nominal chief of the 7/B but has played a small role in the organization. He was arrested by the Germans in September 1941, and held in concentration camps until October 1944. While he was held by the Germans in popularity did not diminish and all of the anti-German and anti-Soviet revolutionary factions operated under the name of Banderaists, and it was 7/B which later created UPA and VOB. It has even been said that one could meet Bandera in the extreme north of Russia who had absolutely no connection, nor anything in common with the Ukraine, who went under the designation of Banderaists, as a symbol of revolution and liberty.

The Germans were anxious to capitalize on Bandera's popularity and therefore released him in October 1944. The Germans decided to change their political positions towards the Ukraine and under the instigation of NSZ, offered the leaders of the four chief political factions an opportunity to form a Ukrainian National Committee (or Council) which the Germans would recognize as the de facto government of the Ukraine. The four leaders consulted were Józef Piłsudski, Władysław Bartoszewski, and Bandera. Bandera refused to enter into his German plot, and because of his authority over the Trilogy, his refusal to join caused the plan to fall through.
Today BAVIERA lives in retirement in Bavaria (after having lived in the vicinity of Innsbruck). He does not take a direct part in the decisions of JUVB but his friends still continue to monopolize on the popularity of his name.
14 October 1946

Ref: C 3rd Section

Stefan Ryzhesi: Ukrainian Nationalist leader

1. Reference MID 1707 from requesting any information on Ryzhesi. Also, Reference MID 1602 and MID 196.

2. Attached is a copy of a report on Stefan Ryzhesi, Ukrainian Nationalist leader, prepared by Section V 12-10.

3. This report came to us on 7 October 1946 with the statement that it might be of interest to General Zawin Sibert; and a request from the British for any information which our organization has on General Zibert, 1-10. Unfortunatly, nothing we are able to supply concerning Ryzhesi's present whereabouts.

Distribution: Washington (2 attachments)

GER (2)

Amerika (1)

Czech (1)

Files (5)
According to our information, BANIA was originally a member of the Galician Ukrainian General Organization, Ukrainisch-Volkslands Organisation (U.V.O.). The organization was anti-Soviet but initially directed against the Polish authorities. In 1937 the Headquarters of the leader, Colonel HAUFLER, were in Berlin, where he was reported to have been arrested by the Gestapo.

BANIA was arrested by the Gestapo in 1938 for his part in the murder of the Polish minister, PELCZESKI. He is said to have been released with other Ukrainian terrorists when the Germans occupied Russia in 1941.

Colonel HAUFLER, the leader of the U.V.O., had in the meantime been murdered and BANIA appears to have assumed the leadership of U.V.O. (the National Ukrainian Union), a loosely joint organization designed to coordinate the activities of the principal Ukrainian nationalist organizations.

According to one report, BANIA was sent, on his release, to the Soviet-occupied Polish Ukraine there he acted as a military envoy and prepared the ground for a national claim to coincide with the forthcoming Soviet attack on the Polish. In return for the organization of a rising, the German Government expected previous promises to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. However, after the capture of Lvov, it became clear that the German Government had no intention of implementing these promises and BANIA himself deserted to his organization as hostile to the German occupying forces. He himself was arrested but a number of his staff escaped.

After BANIA's arrest the U.V.O. always held by internal enmities, disintegrated further. The two main organizations which emerged were ZOBOTSKY's NEAR movement and the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Again information, which depends upon a single report believed to be generally inaccurate, shows that BANIA, although still anti-Soviet, accepted conditional release from the Germans on an agreement that he should organize an armistice demonstratively for war against the Russian partition. It appears however that BANIA actually used his unit to fight the Polish partisans whilst at the same time collaborating with Russian partisan bands against the German administration in the Ukraine.

BANIA's whereabouts during the inter-war period of the war are unknown, but it appears that his bands were scattered, engaged against the Red Army during the period of Soviet reoccupation of the Ukraine in 1944. A regimental order of the KILOPOV Rifle Regiment of 10 January 1944 states that the regiment was sent into contact with anti-Soviet elements, the bands of BANIA, and "must be prepared in the near future for a role in terrorism."

Another order of January 1944 addressed to the Senior Commander of 345th Regiment from the Chief of the Divisional Counter-Espionage Section, "SHLEDER", instructs him to examine carefully replacements to the regiment in certain districts as it is not impossible that amongst the new replacement soldiers the BANIA could infiltrate into our ranks.

According to the Polish report, RECPOROPOGI, No. 10, dated 13.0.46, Stefan BANIA is one of the Ukrainian terrorists hiding under the mask of displaced persons in one of the occupation zones. CS COPY

ATT TO XATE - 11-71
SOURCE KIENST (sub-source KAHN)

1. UNR is the only Ukrainian organization created on national soil which has contact with the homeland. It is headed by its founder as a provisional national assembly. Its organ are the UNR - Ukrainian resistance army, fighting in the Ukraine, and the General Secretariat which is the executive organ abroad. The General Secretariat is headed by Nicholas LEHEZ, also in Rome under the name of Roman SAMIJOVIC, Via Mirone 4, Int. 14. LEBHEZ was born in November 1909 in Polish Ukraine. He was sentenced to death in Warsaw in 1931 for espionage. He was commuted to life imprisonment and in 1945 he was liberated by amnesty. LEHEZ and Ivan HRUSNOV, a Greek-Catholic Ukrainian priest, organized further fighting for Ukrainian independence. He left Ukraine before the Russians took Lemberg, going to Germany where he went into hiding. LEHEZ arrived in Rome in August 1945 from a transit camp in Flagenfurt.

2. UNR has representatives in Munich, Innsbruck, Paris, Rennes, Strasbourg, Rome, London, Shanghai, Switzerland and will have representatives in United States shortly. At present UNR is not in contact with its representatives in America. They are officers in UNR's army and UNR does not have a state presence in America. They have representatives in Shanghai because of the number of Ukrainians in the Red Army and the many Ukrainians that have recently settled in Shanghai.

3. UNR has its own Intelligence Center doing all types of operations. The main purpose of their center (located in Munich) is to protect not only UNR but other Ukrainian organizations from Soviet penetration. UNR has agents in B.P. camps and in national movements. Their association with A.D. in Belorussia and the Ukrainian nationalist bloc of Nations is only for propaganda purposes. They do not share the results of their intelligence work with any other organization.

4. For the last five months negotiations have taken place between UNR and other Ukrainian organizations abroad. Last of these discussions were concerned with the UNR, headed by HRYVYNS and GUS group headed by GUS. GUS, UNR has been the nucleus of the Ukrainian government since 1875. Its two cold War leaders, was and the UNR representative sign an agreement on behalf of each. UNR's representative in Paris. Source was called by GUS for this purpose.
5. Sources and watchlists are in contact with UFSR intelligence and are using it to convey requests on its activities. Certain agents are detained and interrogated, and some are used to gather intelligence both from the Internal passport offices in Warsaw and from abroad. Agents are also used in cooperation with other agencies.

6. The UFSR's financial support is composed of monthly financial aid (including salaries and other expenses) from the Ukrainian authorities in Warsaw, the Polish authorities in Warsaw, and other sources in Poland. The total sum received by the UFSR in 1946 was about 100,000 Polish marks.

7. HRMA (in Munich) and LEBED (in Rome) were top leaders, very capable, and willing to:
   a. give the names of their representatives;
   b. cooperate in every possible way to spot Soviet agents (this is already working);
   c. collect intelligence in Ukraine, Poland, and other states and deliver it promptly;
   d. penetrate Red Army where Ukrainian nationals hold important posts;
   e. attempt to approach high Soviet officials or to work for them, either as agents provocateurs or as moles in the official apparatus. (For example, TLASHNYCZK)
   f. to help uncover Soviet agents of Ukrainian origin in the United States and Canada or try to convert them if there is an indication of such a possibility. (For instance, TLASHEIVICH, a portion of the Soviet Ukrainian delegation in Canada.)
   g. to continue the fighting in Ukraine through UPA.

8. UPA is not headed by HAJDUR, but by the local group in Ukraine. HAJDUR is a man about 35 years old and a former fighter in the Polish army. Since the groups organized by the local group are the most active within the UPA, NEVOD has been trying to contact them. But he failed to satisfy them and was sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, but later liberated.

   All reports which arrived in June 1946 via courier from UPA via UPA to Ukraine were presented to sources. These reports showed evidence of an active military organization. Their greatest problems are:
   a. to get medical supplies;
   b. to spot Soviet penetration into their ranks.

9. HAJDUR and LEBED are interested in getting some kind of support for their fight from the UPA. In their opinion, a great change will come into place among the displaced persons throughout Europe. The Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, etc., are deeply disillusioned and many of them are ready to go back and serve Soviet rule if their personal safety is guaranteed. After two such revolutions, these people have reached the limit of their patience and cannot again accept Soviet rule.

10. Mr. Vasyl LUKYAN, vice president of UFLM, is not involved in intelligence activity. He is president of the Ukrainian Relief in Germany and is in touch with sources and with his late-comrade.
MGR. HUKO, Ukrainian Catholic Bishop, is sponsoring LESK Program. He is not involved in intelligence. BAINTON and LESK are using him as a contact and contact to get Vatican support if necessary. MGR is an opponent of the Jesuits and violently anti-Jesuit. He is willing to use information which originates from Jesuit sources. MGR not only works for the welfare of Ukrainians in Rome but tries to handicap the Vatican's pro-Russian policies everywhere in the world.

11. Father DONALDH, previously mentioned, is out of the picture. Father ID. HUKO, formerly used by source as a lead, left bureau for the United States.
TO: AB-43, Munich
FROM: AB-51, Amzon
SUBJECT: Stefan BANDERA
REP: R-6064; LTS 746

1) As you know, the purpose of Colonel ANTONIUK's recent visit to USFET was to aid the U.S. authorities in the detection of BANDERA's whereabouts. Source Josephine reports that ANTONIUK is now devoting all his energies to the accomplishment of this aim and, needless to emphasize, BANDERA's delivery into the Soviet hands would be the crowning success in ANTONIUK's career as an intelligence officer. We should, therefore, not underrate the determination of the Soviets to bring this to pass. The attached report was passed by ANTONIUK to G-2, USFET. It is of considerable interest (inasmuch as it lists one STETSKO, Yaroslav, (also spelled STECHKO, STECZKO and STECZO) who is about to be arrested in Munich and brought to HISC, Oberursel, for interrogation. The following comment upon likely implications of STETSKO's arrest, offered by our USFET representative, can be accepted as inspired by official USFET sources.

2) "If STETSKO reveals BANDERA's hideouts, G-2 officially will probably try to pick him up and deliver him to the Soviets. I think, however, that they would wink at BANDERA's being tipped off. Some people here are worried about the possibility that STETSKO may be a Soviet penetration agent who will report to the NSS all information given to HISC, so they are bound to go ahead on whatever information he gives. If BANDERA is found the Political Adviser, Mr. Muscio would undoubtedly concur in his delivery to the Soviets."

3) In view of the serious compromise which no doubt would result to American interests in any form of collaboration with UHR, should BANDERA be turned over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities and, on the other hand, considering the equally serious effects on Soviet-American relations likely to ensue from open U.S. connivance in the unhindered continuance of his anti-Soviet activities on German soil, we should take special pains at steering a judicious
middle-course. The following course suggests itself as best suited to avoid neither pitfall.

4) You should contact the Lynx group and, referring back to your last meeting when you made an abortive attempt at drawing them out regarding BANDERA’s present whereabouts, point out that the secrecy surrounding his movements would in the long view create more harm than good. You would point out that rather than asking a direct question and courting another rebuff, you preferred to place yourself squarely on record as greatly concerned as regards BANDERA’s security but equally unable to materially contribute to its preservation, because you had not been taken into the complete confidence of the UHVR. You did not share the view that irreparable damage would be caused by BANDERA’s extradition, although it would doubtless constitute a heavy blow to the prestige of the Ukrainian movement. Your main concern was, however, to establish a perfect understanding with the UHVR that BANDERA, once captured, would inevitably be handed over to the Soviets by the U.S. authorities. It would then be too late to intervene and planning protests would be absolutely to no avail. The UHVR would only have to blame itself in that case. Any demands made on you for a specific undertaking to guarantee BANDERA’s security, via a via the U.S. authorities, should be declined, even if UHVR sees fit to fortify you in your efforts of that whereabouts.

5) In case STEKSKO should come forward with information containing a lead to BANDERA’s hiding place, we shall try to inform you on time. If we have reason to believe that coverage of that lead is likely to result in BANDERA’s capture, we shall have to lay out our course of action in the light of our conflicting interests in the matter. Tipping off BANDERA, if this should be decided upon, would have to be done with utmost discretion obviating the remotest possibility that his escape is traced back to a U.S. agency. In anticipation of such contingency, you should now cast about for secure means of passing such information, taking into account, of course, that should any intimation of our connivance in BANDERA’s escape reach the ears of the UHVR, we could expect with certainty that the Soviets would learn about it sooner or later. This dilemma could best be avoided, we believe, if the tip-off be launched into UHVR channels through an elaborate chain of fictional and/or actual cutouts.

Distribution: 1 - AB-41, Munich (Attach) 1 - BESF Det. 1 - SC, Washington (Attach) 1 - Registry 1 - Ops 1 - SC
BANDOVA, Stanislav—born in 1909, in the village Tresimony, Bulatov region, Stanislavsky District, Buryat.

Distinguishing marks: height above medium, nave nose, bald head, dark hair. The subject is a war criminal of the Soviet Union and the Allies, 1941-45. During the war period 1941-45 he headed and directed bands of German-Criminationalists. On 30 June 1941, during the period of occupation of the city of Ulan Ude by the Germans, he followed, the directives of the German Patriote, announced the creation of an 'Independent Buryatian Power' and organized the so-called government.

During the war 1941-45 he sat as a spy and sabotage groups to the rear of the Red Army upon the directives of the German Intelligence Service.

Following the retreat of the Fascist Germany in a 1941-45 war, Bandova's status has become illegal and he went into hiding in the US Zone of Germany of occupation. At is known that B. M. was been hiding together with a close friend in the town of Ulan Ude, in the Zone of Germany of occupation in Buryat-Mongol, Ulan Bator, Krechim, and Manchuria. Moreover, his visits to the so-called 'Regional Committee of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists' in the towns of Ulan Ude, Ingolstadt, one of his hiding that he has been recorded.

Banda's regime has continued to the leaders of the so-called "Regional Committee in the above-named towns through special messengers.

The following persons knew Bandova's address and whereabouts:

1. ZHOROZH Inyamlov—alias Kozlov, 34 years of age, local, bald at 175 cm, wear glasses, one hand amputated at the wrist, Kiev, Buryat.

2. KORBEV Inyamlov—alias 18 years of age, broad face, short, oval face, right eye, wear glasses. Kiev in Buryat.

3. ZHORZH Annam—alias 181 cm, bald at 175 cm, dark hair, bald head, broad nose, wears glasses, speaks Russian, is married to a German woman, North. He was a member of the so-called government created in the city of Ulan Ude in 1941.

4. ZHORZH Izak—38 years of age; wife 1.8 years; live in Munich at Leopoldstr. 84.

5. ZHOROHK Inyam—37 years, bald, at 1.75 cm, dark hair, black eyes. A close friend of Bandova, live in Munich.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2004-2006
6. MALTIREN Nikolai--alias "Diy", height 1.7 m, blond, blue eyes, oval face, hair combed back. Lives in Munich (Ober-Honing).

7. ILTAYIT Komsan--35-39 yrs of age, height 1.75 m, thin, blond. Lives in Munich 2 km from Nürenberg.

8. KARYUS--editor of the newspaper "GERMANIA" (1st LIVE). Lives in Nuremberg.

9. KARYUS--leader of the regional committee of Ukrainian Nazi saboteurs. Lives in Munich.

Besides the above named persons the whereabouts of Haders are known to his wife MARUSHA, who, with her daughter Natalia, has been living in Munich for the last six years.

4. MARUSHA receives WBPA food ration through a Ukrainian Camp.
TO: SC Washington
FROM: SC Amos
SUBJECT: Search for BANDERA, Leader of the UUN
REF: LEX-767, Wash 4545

1) The risk of compromise in attempting to help BANDERA either directly or indirectly has been kept down to the absolute minimum. G-2 USFET is definitely loath to comply with the Soviet request to find BANDERA and to repatriate him as a "war criminal". This, we have been given to understand unofficially of course, and we can be reasonably sure that a warning passed to a UHVR representative will not be considered as an act of bad faith on our part if, by a remote chance, G-2 USFET should learn about it.

2) As far as compromising ourselves vis-à-vis the Soviets is concerned, we have taken pains not to let this warning appear in the light of an official "tip-off", but rather in the nature of a general observation. Once BANDERA has been apprehended we would decline to be in any way connected with the case, a point we stressed in IDS 767. In this connection we should like to mention as an interesting side-light that Lt Col Dasher recently expressed to AB 52 his disappointment that G-2 USFET has failed to honor its pledge to Colonel ANTONIUK to make every conceivable effort to locate BANDERA.

3) Your question whether there are compelling reasons for us to help BANDERA directly or indirectly, can be answered in the affirmative if you accept the premise that we are definitely interested in cautiously cultivating our contacts with the UHVR if not along lines of active cooperation, then with at least the objective to keep ourselves informed on what its plans are and to what extent it has succeeded in building up and servicing cells in the Ukraine. We asked KIKIENNY how our relationship with the UHVR, at present and in the future, would be affected if the Americans were to lend a hand in the capture and repatriation of BANDERA to the Soviets. He said he could answer this question in one word: FINITO. In order to enable you to appraise the importance of BANDERA in the hierarchy of Ukrainian Underground leaders - and we are thinking here of the Ukrainian movement as a whole...
irrespective of its many factions who differ in methods rather than in the main objective - we have requested KILKENNY to prepare a study which you will find attached herewith.

4) In attempting to visualize the effects of the loss of BANDERA through American connivance, there is one more consideration which should be brought to your attention. The UHRV is avowedly a terrorist organization, determined to accomplish its objectives by terrorist means. (That appears to be one of the main reasons for the pre-occupation of the Soviet-Intelligence with Ukrainian rather than other dissident groups like e.g., the Caucasians.) It should therefore not be ruled out that the UHRV would want to retaliate by terrorist means and that its suspicions would fasten on the American representatives with whom they have been exclusively dealing.

Distribution:

2 - Wash
1 - AB 43
1 - AB 59
1 - Assist
1 - C
1 - ups
1 - Registry
1) It is evident that the group with which we are in contact is the group of Bandera.

2) Most of the leading members of this group are old-time confederates of Bandera's particularly those who were imprisoned and received the death sentence together with him in 1954 for the assassination of the Polish Minister of Interior Pieracki.

3) Lebed, one of the overt leaders of this group, is the man closest to Bandera.

4) Although Bandera is not as active as before and during the war, his authority certainly exists.

5) Leaders of the group (UWIR) never mention that they are acting on Bandera's behalf, for UWIR is not Bandera's private organization. In spite of this fact, they regard him with the greatest respect as the leader for Ukrainian independence.

6) Bandera is still the leader of the secret Ukrainian nationalist organization OUN, which controls UWIR, ASN, and GFA. Bandera is considered as a successor to Konovalets. Mrzljak is the head of a small group of disident OUN elements, mostly formerly pro-German. Bandera and his group are certainly animated by a profound hatred against all the enemies of Ukrainian independence, Poles, Russians, and Germans. To that effect, he might be a "terrorist", but it seems also evident that when successful, even moderate and conservative Ukrainians applaud and accept the successes.

7) The group sponsored by Bandera is considered by such Ukrainian politicians as the very influential Mudryj and Shulgyn Sen as the avant garde of their nation.

8) Because of the close personal, ideological and official connection between the leaders of the group and Bandera, there can be very little doubt as to what would happen in case the American authorities should deliver Bandera to the Soviet.

9) It would imply to the Ukrainians that we as an organization are unable to protect them, i.e., we have no authority. In such a case, there is not any reason or sense for them to cooperate with us.
10) No Ukrainian nationalist movement would be hamstrung through the arrest and repatriation of BANDERA, because new leaders would step into his place and they would act exactly the same way as BANDERA did. This is not a baseless prophecy, but (a) evident from the history of their movement, and (b) evident from their statements Sources.

11) One of the reasons why full cooperation between the U.S.V.R. and our organization has not developed yet is the suspicion of these leaders that we will ultimately "betray" them.

12) From the very beginning they complained that Americans have no real interest in them and that Communist-penetrated USA officers or officials will trade them to Russia. This belief was shared by both the BANDERA people and the conservative Ukrainians.

13) My personal feeling and conviction is that in case of BANDERA's arrest, it would immediately put an end to operations Bella Donna and Lynx.

14) If it should be decided not to use these people and their organization for intelligence purposes, it would be better to arrest not only BANDERA, but all the leaders whose names and whereabouts are known to us.
Subject: Stefan BANDERA

1. Stefan BANDERA, who since the beginning of his political career has been anti-Russian and anti-Polish, is probably the most important Ukrainian nationalist leader today, together with Andrei MELNYK. He was a member of the terrorist organization OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and was involved in the assassination of (fnm) PIERACKI, the Polish Minister of the Interior. When Col. Eugene KONOWALCYZ was murdered by the NKVD in Rotterdam, BANDERA did not accept the nomination of MELNYK as head of all Ukrainian nationalist organizations throughout the world.

2. In 1941 with the occupation of Lwow by the Germans, BANDERA split with the OUN and began such an intensive fight against it that it resulted in the murder of (fnm) SCIBORSKI, MELNYK's representative in Zhitomir. Shortly thereafter BANDERA proclaimed in Lwow the "Independent Western Ukrainian Republic," appointing himself its president and naming STECHKO (STEFKO) Prime Minister. This move met with the approval of a large majority of Ukrainians including the head of the Greek Catholic Church, Archbishop (fnm) SZEPTYCKI, and it was believed that it would also meet with the approval of the Germans as was the case in Slovakia with the TISZ0 government.

3. However, 48 hours after his proclamation BANDERA was arrested by the Germans and placed in a concentration camp. There he met many Poles, among them Gen. GROT-ROWESKI. While imprisoned, BANDERA realized that it would be necessary to cooperate with the Poles in order to fight German as well as Soviet imperialism. BANDERA's organization continued to exist during his imprisonment, and it was during this period that the UPA, Ukrainian guerrilla organization, was formed to fight against German and Soviet troops.

4. When BANDERA regained his freedom, he resumed leadership of his organization, and he soon formed the Ukrainian Council of National Liberation which worked underground. Under BANDERA this organization had a Foreign Department to which Rostislav SHULGIN (CHOUUL-CHUIN) and (fnm) BERAN belonged. Its address is 11 Rue Chante-poulet, Geneva, Switzerland. BANDERA also activated an "anti-Bolshevik bloc of nations" in order to cooperate with other nationalities under Russian domination.

5. Groups of "BanderoVtsy" are still active in Soviet-dominated Europe. In Argentina some BANDERA followers are members of "Prosvita" which is located at Calle Soler 5039, Buenos Aires.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2004 2006
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
TO: HEAD
ACTION: INTESTIBLE
INFORMATION: 1050 (1-2), 1051 (2), 2052 (4), 10-95, 1092 (2), FSB (2)

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 51 (1) 60A AR. 380-5.

SECRET

TO: HEAD
INFO: VAMP, VMI
CITE:
REL 3161.

1. RE XX 12615 OF 11 OCTOBER 1946 CONCERNING STEPHEN BANDERA.
2. AN-5 REPORT THAT G-A CIB USFET HAVE SENT REPORT TO INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SHOWING BANDERA NO LONGER IN CONTACT WITH AMERICANS OR BRITISH, IS WORKING FOR SOVIETS BUT METRES HE STILL TO BE ANTI-SOVET.
3. REPORT CONTINUES BANDERA PRESENTLY IN VIENNA FROM WHICH HE FREQUENTLY TRAVELS TO CINARIN. ALSO STATES HE ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE TRIP TO LONDON.
4. BRITISH ANXIOUS TO KNOW ANYTHING WE CAN FURNISH REFERENCE TO BANDERA'S PRESENT WHEREABOUTS, ACTIVITIES AND ANYTHING WE CAN ADD TO ABOVE REFERENCE WHICH CAME FROM AN-6.
5. OUR LAST NEWS TO HEAD 2621 (19 L5235) AND WAS LATER WITHINED CONTROL.

TID COPY

INTelligence
FEB 16 1951
INTEGRATION DIVISION

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3928 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

FROM: H.7.1DHMT12.G
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ACTION: L
INFORMATION: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 51 (11 604 AR-380-5).
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Chief, CIC Liaison Section

WANDERNA Files

1. CIC has offered us copies of the WANDERNA files which consist of a voluminous variety of uncoordinated notes and reports and are currently being translated by one of the regions. Translating is expected to take another year.

2. For the price of the photostating paper, we can have copies of the files in (a) the original text, (b) the translation (which will not be ready for sometime), or (c) both. CIC states that some of the material seems to be chaff. Therefore, would we want CIC to use its own judgment in selecting the material to be photostatted or would we want the works?

3. We have been unable to get an estimate of the cost of the project. However, are we interested? If so, what photostats are desired? Also, would we prefer to furnish (a) paper or (b) money to buy the paper?
Our positive information files "AB" (Intelligence Section) January 1951

1. Enclosed herewith are photostatic copies of positive information obtained from the files of the "AB Intelligence Section".

2. In accordance with the request previously received from your detachment the file used in making the photographic reproductions has also been included.

3. It is requested that the photographic file be returned to this detachment when it has served your purpose.

By Order of Colonel Turner:

Richard D. Smith
Colonel, Infantry

INCL

1-OAC AB, IOC Bag XII, file XII-235.61 Subj: positive Intelligence (Ukraine, SSR) dated 22 Jan 51
2-OAC AB, IOC Bag XII, file XIII-332.61 Subj: Positive Intelligence (Ukraine, USSR) dated 22 Jan 51
3-Exhibit "A", 15 pg (photostatic) copy of positive info from AB files
4-Exhibit "B", negatives of Exhibit "A"

Major Roadmap/file/20/997-683/073

Distribution:

2-MOB with
1-Dis
1-ML
1-File

For coordination with US Army

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3920 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

To: NESOF STUTF
From: KARLF 1402
Confirmation: FRA
Information: STUT CC

Date: 8 MARCH 1951
Precedence: ROUTINE
Message Out Numbers: 
Typist's Initials: JTC

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET.
Correspondence per Para. 81 (2) 60.6 AR-60-5.

REQUEST TRACES ON ROMAN I SMOK, VICE PRESIDENT OF UNITED UKRAINIAN AMERICAN RELIEF COMMITTEE, ABBREVIATED IN UKRAINIAN "ZUDAK".

MNA-9246
MGTA 3417
NO TRACE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 1950 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006

CORRIGEATING OFFICERS: TOD: 08/11202
AUTHORIZING OFFICERS

IT IS PROHIBITED TO MAKE OR POUCH COPIES OF THIS CABLE
DANIERA, Stepan

Head, radical faction of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (OUN) in command of units of the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UPA). At secret press interview held in Warsaw, Poland, stated his willingness to fight alongside Western powers in exchange of support of his movement and promise of independence for the Ukraine.

Nationalist

Personal Data:
Born 1903. Alleged son of a Greek Catholic priest who was killed by Nazis during World War II. Two of his sisters were killed by Nazis during World War II. He later joined the OUN in 1939 and fought against the Soviets in the Ukraine.

Activities:
Active in anti-Soviet and anti-Polish terrorist organizations since 1922. Arrested in 1939 for complicity in the assassination of General Konstantin Rokossovsky of the Wehrmacht. He was sentenced to death with two other defendants. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment under a general amnesty and released by the Wehrmacht in 1959.

fascist or radical? He's been called both

(2)
NOTES FROM THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS
(f: office use only)

Ukrainian April 21, 1954

BANDERA'S NATIONALIST GROUP SPLITS OVER HIS REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO ALLEGED DIRECTIVES FROM "HOMELAND"

The controversy between Stepan Bandera, head of the "Leadership" of the Foreign Section of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement (OUN), and the two-man "Collegium of Plenipotentiaries," Dr. Lev Rebet and Zynovi Matla—who last February 12th, by exercising authority allegedly granted by the OUN underground in the Ukraine, declared that they were disbanding the Foreign Section's Leadership and releasing its adherents from allegiance to it—brought about a split in that organization. After the German court recognized the licensee Modest Ripecky, a Rebet-Matla man, as the owner of the Munich OUN organ, "Ukrains'ky Samostivnyk," the pro-Bandera "Leadership" had to start its own publication, "Shlyakh Peremohy" (The Way to Victory). The formation of new Foreign Section's organs by the Rebet-Matla "Collegium" to replace those controlled by Bandera created a similar duplication in the organization's apparatus. Finally, the exiled OUN units in various countries and their papers began to choose sides in the quarrel, thus carrying the split into the membership.

As reflected in the press, the momentary situation in the OUN crisis leaves the impression that the anti-Bandera coup d'état—the source of which is seen in the rival Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UAWR)—found considerable support among OUN elements in Munich, including some of Bandera's close
associates. However, outside of Germany the OUN units seem to have been unpleasantly surprised by these events and are mostly rallying behind the Bandera leadership against a threat of a possible chaos. Thus, the Paris pro-Melnyk Ukrainske Slovo of April 4th appraises the situation as follows:

"Today the Bandera camp is absolutely on an offensive. It is hard to decide today which side is stronger, but it seems that more of the rank-and-file cadres remained with Bandera. At present, it is difficult to predict how it will be tomorrow."

Bandera's Disobedience to the "Law of the Homeland" Condemned

The March 7th Ukrainskyi Samostiynyk carries several statements issued by Rebet and Matla as the two-man "Collegium" informing the OUN membership in exile how Stepan Bandera "disobeyed" the orders of the "homeland" and attempted "to create a diversion within the OUN ranks." The series of documents begins with a "decision of the OUN Leadership in the Ukraine" of last Summer, by which a committee of three, including Rebet, Matla and Bandera, was instructed to carry out a "reorganization" of the OUN Foreign Section in accordance with the directives of the "Leadership" at home. It reveals how Bandera, after prolonged negotiations, consented last December to participate in the work of the committee and helped to formulate its program, only to leave it shortly afterwards. This fact, it is said, forced the other two members to proclaim themselves as a two-man "Collegium of Plenipotentiaries" in order to carry out the homeland's instructions without Bandera. The last of the documents, signed by Y. Lemish, alleged to be the "Head of the OUN Leadership in the Ukrainian Lands," declares that Bandera "is not the OUN Leader either formally or actually," and urges him to "discontinue his disruptive actions."
An editorial comment, headlined "Obedience to the Law," stresses these noteworthy points:

(1) that Bandera ceased to be the Head of the OUN in 1943, when he resigned from that office, and that later on, in June, 1953, the Fourth Conference of the OUN Foreign Section took the stand that the OUN Leadership existed in the Ukraine;

(2) that, accordingly, the OUN Leadership in the homeland has "complete authority" to decide all matters pertaining to the OUN Foreign Section, whose Leadership is obligated to carry out the homeland's decisions without reservation;

(3) that for a long time there was a state of conflict between "a part of the Foreign Section's Leadership" and "the so-called internal opposition," and this situation caused the Leadership in the Ukraine to order a reorganization of the Foreign Section by a three-member committee;

(4) that, after a short period of cooperation with the other two members of the committee, Bandera and "a part of the Foreign Section's Leadership" began to insist upon their "autonomy" and to proceed with a reorganization on their own by removing members of the Leadership and by making other changes independently of the committee of three;

(5) that this behavior of Bandera forced the two other members of the committee to take upon themselves the continuation of the reorganization work as a two-man "collegium" with the understanding that Bandera would be free to return whenever he chose to do so.

Commenting on Lemish's statement which denies that Bandera is the OUN Leader and condemns his disruptive actions, the weekly
AV-493

observes:

"The above document of the OUN Leadership in the Homeland reveals that for a long time the homeland took critical attitude toward what was being done by Bandera in exile. There were many attempts to correct this. Even an internal opposition movement emerged from these circumstances and made efforts to influence from within Bandera’s policy, backed faithfully and stimulated by Yaroslav Stetsko...Various methods were used: long debates were conducted, during which Bandera’s old-time friends and political co-workers sought to change his mind. Nevertheless, Bandera held to his position. He stubbornly continued to proceed along his course disregarding the opinions of homeland and of the leading OUN members in exile."

Cooperation with UMVR Established

Ukrainski Samostlyvak of March 14th carries a communique of the Rebet-Matla "Collegium" announcing the appointment of a new Political Council of the OUN Foreign Section. The list of its members includes such well-known Supreme Liberation Council (UMVR) leaders as Rev. Ivan Hrynioch and Vladimir Stachiw, together with some Bandera opponents from the OUN outfit. Another communique of the same issue, signed by UMVR representatives and the two-member "Collegium," as well as the representatives of the new OUN Foreign Section’s organs, discloses that the UMVR Foreign Representation and the OUN Foreign Section entered into an agreement of cooperation.

The communique quotes the text of a message from the OUN organs addressed to Mykola Lebed, the UMVR’s foreign secretary, in which the authority of the UMVR Foreign Representation is recognized in all matters in which it was denied till now by the Bandera-led OUN organs. These are:

"(1) to represent abroad the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UMVR), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), the Ukrainian Liberation Underground and the entire liberation movement in the Ukraine;

"(2) to conduct political-diplomatic and propaganda actions abroad along the lines of the Ukrainian liberation movement at home."

I
Welcoming the OUN-UHVR agreement, the weekly comments:

“For the first time since the UHVR came to life, that is to say, since its foreign representation began to act, the latter was assured of the OUN Foreign Section's support in such a clear manner. Till now, it was not so. Formally, the Foreign Section of the OUN recognized the Foreign Representation of the UHVR, but it never backed its words by deeds. Since 1945, these two formations of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement were involved in bitter quarrels over the authority, particularly over the role of the Foreign Representation... As a matter of fact, the Foreign Representation never had any support from the Foreign Section and was mostly forced to fight with it for its prestige.”

The paper states that, in accordance with the 1950 suggestion of the homeland's OUN Leadership, the UHVR Foreign Representation was to represent the Ukrainian liberation movement abroad, take care of diplomatic and foreign-political activities, also organize actions in support of the liberation movement at home, while the OUN Foreign Section was to devote itself to political education of its membership and the exiled community in general, as well as to propagandizing the liberation movement abroad. It hints that the present cooperation will be effected along these lines.

"Foreign" Hand in Rebet-Matla Action-Hinted

While all moves of the Rebet-Matla "Collegium" apparently aim at confronting Bandera and his followers with a new OUN apparatus abroad, dominated by an alliance of the OUN opposition elements with the UHVR leaders, popularly known as the "Lebed-ists," the Bandera camp, on its part, concentrates mainly on efforts to preserve the continued loyalty of the exiled OUN membership by exposing the rival action as an illegal "diversionist intrigue" undertaken in the interests of "foreign factors." The task is aided by the fact that the majorities in the Leadership and in the OUN Supreme Council
apparently remain loyal to Bandera.

As already reported, the February 16th communique of the Foreign Section's Leadership branded the action of the "Collegium" as "illegal" and "contrary to the will of the OUN authorities in the homeland." A similar message to the OUN membership abroad, issued on February 24th by the Foreign Section's Supreme Council, condemned the "wilful" action of Rebet and Matla as "aiding foreign, non-Ukrainian factors hostile to the Ukrainian liberation cause."

Another argument used by the pro-Bandera camp is its claim that the UHVR leaders with whom Rebet and Matla made a deal are "pro-Marxist" and agents of foreign, particularly American, intelligence. Accusations against the UHVR men of pro-Marxist tendencies, appearing often in pro-Bandera publications, are mainly based on the editorial policies of the Munich Suchasna Ukraina, the UHVR organ, which accepts certain economic and social features of the Soviet system. The charge is also raised in the February 26th resolution of the OUN District Leadership in Great Britain, where it is said:

"On the basis of certain current facts, in particular the writing of Suchasna Ukraina, we conclude that the Foreign Representation of the UHVR takes a pro-Marxist position and propagates it, thus harming the Ukrainian liberation movement. In view of this apparent fact, the two-man committee was forced...to admit certain 'errors' of the UHVR Foreign Representation and its organ, but it did not condemn them..."

The most recent contribution to the campaign of compromising the Bandera opponents by discrediting their UHVR allies as agents of foreign intelligence is the publication in the March 28th issues of the Paris Ukrainets-Chas and the Munich Shlyakh Peremohy of an "Open Letter" from the Paris weekly's editor, Danylo Chaykovsky, to Zenon...
Pelensky of the Munich Ukrainskyi Samostiyvnyk. Pelensky remained with that weekly after its publisher threw his support to the Rebet-Matia "Collegium" against Bandera. The "open letter" consists mostly of quotations from Pelensky's letters sent to Chaykovsky during the last five years, in which the writer repeatedly expressed his indignation over UHVR's receipt of "sewer money" for its alleged services for U.S. intelligence. For example, a letter by Pelensky of February 17, 1952, is quoted by Chaykovsky thus:

"Personally, I have no doubts that the entire UHVR Foreign Representation receives sewer money. In particular, I do not believe and will never believe that the $7,000 received from the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America would be sufficient to cover all their expenses. They ate up that money a long time ago, and they did not receive any new money from the Congress Committee. If not for their sewer obligations, even such characters as Wreciona, "Captain" Martinec and Hrynich would not dare to consent to recruiting parachutists for the Americans from amidst university students. But they consented to it and took part in recruiting men for such a 'legion'."

Pelensky answered Chaykovski with a statement in Ukrainskyi Samostiyvnyk of March 28th, in which he branded his friend's revelations as "indecent falsification." The charge was repudiated by Chaykovsky in Ukrainets-Chas of April 4th, where he accepted Pelensky's challenge that the matter be submitted to arbitration. Chaykovsky added that, should Pelensky fail to substantiate his charges of "falsification" in the course of the next three months, he would publish Pelensky's letters in their entirety so that the Ukrainian community could draw its own conclusions.
Comment on Bandera's Appearance

"The Voice of America (nonparty), carries an article discussing the news that Stepan Bandera, the notorious Ukrainian fascist, the spiritual leader of the UPA (Ukrainian insurgent army), enemy of the death of tens of thousands of Poles, has come out of hiding near Munich in Bavaria. The author of the article discusses Bandera's talk with the so-called representatives of the Western press. In this talk Bandera stated that he was willing to give his support and help to the Western Powers if, of course, the Western Powers abandon their attempt to maintain lawful relations with Russia."

"Commenting on this, the author of the article states: 'Gen. Guderian, the same man who thoroughly destroyed Warsaw, is now reorganizing the General Staff of the U.S. Army. Stepan Bandera, an obedient agent of Hitler's and traitor to the Ukrainian Nation, the murderer of tens of thousands of Poles, comes out into the open with the permission of the U.S. authorities."

"Of course, I am mystified why the Voice of America has not yet broadcast the news in Polish, the news of the career of the Nazi general, Heinz Guderian, and the Nazi, Stepan Bandera. Is it that the Voice of America is ignoring the appeal of President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson to spread the truth about the news and her policy?"
Zycie Warszawy announces that Stefan Bandera has appeared in the Western Germany "with the permission of the U.S. authorities" and couples this "notorious Ukrainian fascist" with Gen. Guderian, the destroyer of Warsaw, who is now "reorganizing the general staff of the U.S. Army." The paper wonders why the Voice of America has not broadcast this news to Poland, in line with President Truman's appeal that the truth about American policy be spread abroad.
Ukrainian Rebel Hides Again

After Brief Talk in Germany

By the Associated Press

HEIDELBERG, Germany— A reputed leader of a Ukrainian guerrilla movement, against the Soviet Union has vanished again in Germany as suddenly as he appeared.

American intelligence authorities said they had no idea where to find Stepan Bandera, a mystery fighter wholifetime to be the military chief of anti-Bolshevik Ukrainians.

Bandera came out of hiding long enough recently to appeal to western allied support for an underground movement fighting the Soviet regime in eastern Europe.

He talked to five news correspondents in a secret rendezvous. Then, telling the newspapermen to wait 10 minutes, he disappeared with a group of armed bodyguards.

Whereabouts Unknown

The United States Army announced officially:

"We know nothing about the presence of Bandera in the United States zone."

The United States High Commissioner's intelligence division said:

"It was not known to us that Bandera was in Germany. The first we heard of it was from you." Bandera took extreme precautions in coming out of hiding.

The selected group of correspondents left immediately afterward from the Ukrainian National Committee, a group representing Ukrainian displaced persons in Germany.

The correspondents were told to go to a Munich café. There they were met by a member of the Ukrainian committee and packed into two cars. Outside Munich they changed cars and drivers and wound up in a tiny inn at Grunwald, a suburb of Munich. Several men with bulging pockets guarded the café. "Bandera will report," the correspondents were told.

He did so after about 15 minutes. He gave his interview, and then left as mysteriously as he came.

Bandera refused to say how long he had been in Germany, or how he moved around. He said his guests always accompanied him. He said he had no connection with the United States Army counterintelligence service.

The American intelligence authorities had been informed that Bandera, a reputed leader of a Ukrainian guerrilla movement against the Soviet Union, had vanished again in Germany as suddenly as he appeared.

"We know nothing about the presence of Bandera in Germany," the United States Army said. The first they heard of it was from the correspondent of the New York Times who had been in contact with Bandera in Germany.

"It was not known to us that Bandera was in Germany," the United States High Commissioner's intelligence division said.

The correspondent of the New York Times had been in contact with Bandera in Germany. The first they heard of it was from the correspondent of the New York Times who had been in contact with Bandera in Germany.

"We know nothing about the presence of Bandera in the United States zone," the United States Army said.
was taking no chances. Reporters who wanted to see him last week were screened and taken from a Munich cafe to another point in the city. They were made to change cars and taken to a nearby village. An equal of heavy, armed bodyguards stood by while Bandera spoke through an interpreter.

"There will be," he said, "a blood revolution everywhere that Communists exist. A blood revolution everywhere that Communists exist."

Three months ago the middle-class man's idea of an independent Ukraine has been long dead. He has been the centre of a series of Eastern European plots in the past 10 years. Today, while he is in hiding near Munich with his wife, three children and a few faithful followers, his purity bands operate around Lvov. Spreading his fight against both Russia and Fascism in 1921, Bandera was but recently until 1944. He emerged in a Warsaw jail until the Nazis freed him in 1939. German propaganda against the Ukrainian free bands were using him as a tool. Since 1939, his main enemy has been Russia itself. Now he describes himself as a middle-class man's idea of an independent Ukraine.
Ukrainian Rebel Urges West To Help Overthrow Kremlin

MUNICH, Germany

Stepan Bandera, reputed leader of an anti-Communist underground in the Soviet Ukraine, came out of hiding March 31 and a secret rendezvous. During the journey they changed cars twice to throw off any possible shadowers.

Bandera, who said he was not in the Soviet Union, said he had intelligence reports from inside Russia telling of mobilization for total war. These reports, he said, probably found their way into the hands of the American Counter Intelligence Corps. He added he did not collaborate with the CIC.

1. Urged the western powers to quit trying to deal “legally” with Russia and instead to begin supporting the revolutionary anti-Communist movement within Russia and its satellite.

2. Promised that the Ukrainians would support the western powers in any combat against Russia if assured their national independence.

3. Predicted an eventual revolt within the Soviet Union which would overthrow the Communist dictatorship. The Ukraine is a vast area in western Russia which is now one of the 15 so-called republics in the Soviet Union. Mr. Bandera said he was 49 years old at the time of the interview. His group has fought since 1926 for national independence.

At the height of its power in 1945, Mr. Bandera said, his organization had more than 200,000 armed men and engaged several divisions of Soviet troops in combat. Now, he said, the Soviet Army has reduced the insurgents to small scattered bands waging a guerrilla war of sabotage and retribution. But, he announced, there are 4,000,000 Ukrainians who will rally in revolt against this force “when the time is ripe.”
BAHNERS, Stephan... U.S.S.R.

Intelligence has not been received from several sources, including KGB, which indicates a partial answer to the reference letter. It is not clear whether the surrender of the 15 persons mentioned earlier by the KGB on January 27th was real or not. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 1998, has reported however that only in the case of one individual, Stephan Manders, several of the Soviet military figures directly requested his extradition in letters to US military authorities. Such a letter was dated 17 October from Colonel General COLONEL to Colonel Stephan Manders, according to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 1998.

Concerning the investigation of the particular cases, US intelligence reports that information only on two of the 15 individuals mentioned by the KGB was furnished to the US military authorities. However, in its report to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 1998, the KGB furnished to the US military authorities the location of Stephan Manders, but were unable to submit any information concerning the location of the other 13.

The Soviet allocation that US military authorities had prevented to leave the USSR during January 1947, was given him an opportunity to escape in Poland. Extensive and aggressive search begun during November 1946 for Stephan Manders. Copies of the photograph and the more or less complete description furnished by the Soviets were furnished to all agents in the field. Weekly progress reports as well as special reports were prepared. From the region of Stephan Manders' position, an operation began to bring an operational unit to the vicinity of Stephan Manders' position. He was seen to move prior to the operation, and during this time, he was apprehended. All were followed to their conclusion. During the time, that had been the search for Stephan Manders, 15 persons had been given top priority by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 1998. In July 1947, the search was continued and a still was found.

3. USA has been reported to have been in a U.S. Army

MANN, a Czech Catholic cardinal in 1944, was killed by the Soviets. The photograph furnished by the Soviets was furnished by the photograph furnished by the Soviets. The photograph furnished by the Soviets was furnished by the photograph furnished by the Soviets. The photograph furnished by the Soviets was furnished by the photograph furnished by the Soviets. The photograph furnished by the Soviets was furnished by the photograph furnished by the Soviets.
FRANKFURT, NOVEMBER 21, 1947.

SECRET

NO. 390

SUBJECT: Offer of Assistance to the United States Against the USSR on the Part of Dissident Ukrainians

The Honorable
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch no. 294 of July 16, 1947 entitled "Offer of Assistance to the United States Against the USSR on the Part of Dissident Ukrainians", I have the honor to inform the Department that the same man, whose name is now given as Major Bulla MURIN, is presently laying plans, according to a recent intelligence report, for the formation of a Ukrainian National Guard (UNGA). According to this report, while the Ukrainian National People's Army (UNPA) would still be the military arm of the Ukrainian National Republic (URN) (the "government-in-exile" of Andrej Levicki or Levitsky), the UNG would be a small, well-organized, select outfit to serve as a nucleus for an expanded army in the event of future conflict. Its personnel would consist of persons with military background including former members of the Red Army who were forcibly inducted when the Soviets occupied the Ukraine.

While the relationship between UNGA and UNG is not clear from the report, nor indeed the function of the latter in view of the existence of the former, it is stated that the fact of the UNG is intended "to be secret except to top-level officers, and all transactions will be carried on under the cloak of UNGA." Structure, strength and methods of operation are unknown at present but further reports are expected.

The report concludes with the following paragraph comparing the UNGA and the so-called UPA of Stefan BANDERA.

"UNGA and his UNGA appeared to be inactive over a period of more than six months. During that period, the rival UPA, the military arm of UVR, the Ukrainian..."
faction headed by Stefan BANDERA appeared to be more active. Previous information indicated that LVI...G's government intends to effect independence of the UKRAINE through cooperation with a greater power, and to refrain from efforts in that direction until such a power becomes belligerent against the SOVIET UNION. BANDERA, on the other hand, advocates action now, and cooperation with another power only on equal terms, and not as a subordinate ally.

Respectfully yours,

For the Political Adviser:

Robert V. Corrigan
Acting Political Officer

In triplicate to the Department
Copy for CE-Mr. Bean
Copies to:
American Embassy, Moscow
American Embassy, London
(For Ambassador Murphy’s Office)

File No.: 820.02a
EP-Corriganke,
A certified copy
of this deed
was
SECRET
Generalissimo and Commander in Chief of the UPA (Ukrainska Poratalseka Armija - organized by B. from his former Hanraovic and has been fighting as an organized unit since May 1944) and possible President of the UHR (Ukrainska Holowia Visseralnia Rada - Ukrainian Free People's Regime) is in both the Polish and Russian Ukraine looked upon as the spiritual leader and national hero of all Ukrainians. Yet, he sometimes approaches the status of a mythical figure, for there are but few Ukrainians who can actually lay claim to having ever seen him. Both The Priority A target of the MVD and the Polish Political police, hated by many of his own Ukrainians jealous of his power and hold over his nationals, he is constantly on route, frequently in disguise, always protected by a stalwart wall of SS men, and never at any time one location for more than a few days. Occasionally he is reported to have appeared for brief, unannounced visits before Ukrainian groups throughout Europe, or for brief inspections among UPA troops in the Ukraine, but his route for these trips is always very carefully guarded secret known only to a very few high UHR officials. A description of him is almost impossible to obtain.

* Ukrainian Partisan Army

Source: Enclosure to Despatch 869, October 8, 1947, Frankfurt. SECRET
35 Anti-Red Ukrainians
Are Seized in U. S. Zone

FRANKFURT, Sept. 12. (AP) — Thirty-five armed and uniformed men who professed to be anti-Communist Ukrainians were arrested by United States Constabulary troopers yesterday after illegally crossing the border from Austria into American-occupied Germany near Passau, United States Army officials said today.

Some of the captured men expressed fear they would be executed if caught in Russia or Poland. They described themselves as an advance party of a large group fleeing from the Ukraine and eastern Poland. Constabulary troops have been alerted to watch for others.

The captured men, wearing uniforms described as Russian and Polish, said they came through Czechoslovakia and the Russian zone of Austria on their journey to the American zone. They surrendered without resistance to the Americans.

All carried rifles and some were reported to have machine guns and grenades. Some described themselves as "Menderas," and said they were followers of a White Russian anti-Soviet group named Bendera.

"They were armed and Ill-dressed as any illegal border crossers," a high Army official said. "Their ultimate disposition has yet to be determined."
BANLERA, Stepan Andreevich alias: Petr Borovsky

Soldier-politician. Member, later chief of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of
(ABN) Left the Ukraine for Germany about 1930-1933. Lives in West
Nations, since 1950. Formerly Assistant Chief of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists in Poland and in charge of its Propaganda Department, 1932-1935.

Tried and sentenced in a Warsaw Court in 1935; imprisoned until
1939; freed by the Germans and headed OUN/Å after a split with the Melnik
faction since 1939. Took part in the proclamation of Ukrainian independence
at Lvow, 1941. Imprisoned by the Germans, 1941-1944. Joined the Ukrainian
Partisan Army (UPA), 1944; resumed anti-Soviet struggle for Ukrainian independence.
Handera, Stepan Andreyevich

SECRET CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

1. Place and date of birth: Born 1909, at Ugrinov, Kalushki region, Stanislav
District, Ukraine. The son of a Greek Catholic priest.

2. Residence: Munich, Germany.

3. Education and profession: Educated at the University of Krakow, Poland.

4. Occupations:
   - 1932: Chief of propaganda of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
   - 1932-1935: Assistant chief of OUN and leader of its activities in Poland.
   - 1935-1939: Sentenced by the Warsaw Court to eight years in prison for illegal
     political activities in 1935; freed by the Germans in 1939.
   - 1939-date: After split with Malik faction of OUN, headed Organization of
     Ukrainian Nationalist Revolutionists (OUN-R).
   - 1941: Associated with the proclamation of Ukrainian independence at Lvov;
     afterwards his organization was reported to be engaged in bloody
     fights with other Ukrainian resistance groups, notably those of
     Zoroeds, as well as with Russians, Poles and Germans.
   - 1941-1944: Imprisoned by the Germans in Klein Sachsenhausen concentration
     camp for resisting German restrictions on Ukrainian nationalists.
   - 1944-1945: Joined the Ukrainian Resistance Army (URR) and resumed anti-German
     struggle for Ukrainian independence.
   - 1945-date: Living in the vicinity of Munich, conducting the operations of the
     organizations discussed below.

5. Political affiliations:
   a. Ukrainian Democratic Republic (UDR), and
   b. Ukrainian National Council (UNR).

   Handers's organization constitutes the only opposition group in the
   UNR, since they refused the invitation to join the executive organ. They
   had failed to obtain from the UNR recognition for the UHFR as charged
   with the liberation fight in Ukrainian territory. According to another
   source, disagreement arose from the desires of Bandera to fight all Russians
   everywhere and to split Russia into numerous small independent units, while
   the UNR is opposed to a premature determination of Russia's future.

   c. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and
   d. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist Revolutionists (OUN-R) (Bandera).

   The OUN, established in 1923, broke into two wings about 1940, the
   one headed by Malik, former chief of the whole organization, and the
   other led by Bandera. The dispute in OUN was said to be due to Bandera's
   determination to hold fast to the principles of dictatorship and conspiracy
   and to permit no democratic control of financial expenditures. Ideologi-
   cally, OUN-R was reported to support the concept of permanent revolution by
   the Ukrainian people and a permanent fight against Communist occupation.
   Bandera was accused of working conspiratorially in the DP camps to build up
   military formations. The samesource alleged that Bandera's personal appeared
   to be working for American, English and even French intelligence services.

   Negotiations for a reunion of OUN were carried on between November 1949
   and February 1950 at the apartment of Yaroslav Stasiw in Munich, with the

SECRET CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
Bandera, Stepan Andriyovych  

2. Political affiliations (continued)

Bandera security officer, K. Kononenko acting for his chief. The breakdown of the negotiations was said to be Bandera's fear of losing his dictatorial powers over his party.10/ CUNRA now comes under the jurisdiction of the UHVR.11/ 

e. Ukrainian Resistance Army (URA)

The Galician Ukrainians originated the guerrilla forces which make up the Bandera movement.12/ URA claimed to have had one million members in 1943, but at the end of 1949, according to one source, its numbers had fallen to 150,000.11/ In March 1950 its strength was estimated as about twenty thousand men.15/ 
f. Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) (Ukrainische Hohe Volksrepubluk)

Organized in November 1943 to unite all elements in the struggle for Ukrainian independence, the UHVR claims jurisdiction over CUN and the UPA, which it claims to represent politically. Only the Bandera faction of CUN recognizes its leadership.11/ UHVR acts as governing body for the Ukrainian nationalist groups. The Council consisted of General Yaroslav Shupryzinka, as Commander-in-Chief of UPA; Yaroslav Stetsko, responsible for Foreign Politics and Propaganda; and the Chairman, Bandera.6/ After Shupryzinka's death (March 1950), Colonel Vasyl Koval replaced him as commander of UPA.11/ 
g. Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN)

ABN was founded to combine the struggles of the various nationalities within the USSR in order to overthrow Bolshevism and to establish new national states within the ethnic borders of each nationality. The activities of UPA are said to be integrated closely with the underground work of ABN.11/ ABN has a dual role: to support the guerrilla warfare in the Ukraine and to conduct propaganda abroad. Its chairman is Stetsko.6/ ABN excludes Russian emigres, and has not included Polish members because of the territorial question. It has no Czech members.6/ It has been rumored that Bandera's administrative organ would move to England, where the British would give it financial support to keep the leaders "on ice" for future emergencies.6/ 
h. Union of Ukrainian Youth (SUM)

This organization is said to be of prime importance for its support of the Bandera movement. SUM's activities are carried on under the camouflage of physical education and sports, but have as their function the carrying on of political education related to its political aspirations for future Ukraine. SUM is reported to be pro-US and anti-Soviet. It is said to have groups in every Ukrainian community, especially in the Ukrainian DP camps in Germany.12/ 

Sources:

1/ State, D-595, Berlin, 13 May 1949, Restricted.  
2/ CIA, 80-1265x, 4 August 1950, Secret/Control-US Officials Only.  
3/ Army, SUM, S-Memo, 7 October 1946, Secret/Control.  
4/ CIA, D-412793, 1 August 1950, Confidential.
PANDER, Stepan Andreyevich

Sources (continued)

8/ Air Force, IL-79-51, Wiesbaden, 7 May 1951, Confidential.
9/ CIA, 02-B-12788, 13 January 1950, Confidential/US Officials Only.
10/ CIA, 00-44962e, 4 August 1950, Secret/Control-US Officials Only.
12/ CIA, 02-B-27664, 14 February 1951, Confidential/US Officials Only.
13/ CIA, 02-B-23299, 8 November 1950, Confidential/US Officials Only.


SECRET-CONTROL U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
BANDERA, Stepan

Banda is the son of a Greek-Catholic priest, Andre Bander. He was born in the Western Ukraine in 1909. His energetic character revealed itself in his earliest days; his intelligence was brilliant, and he qualified in husbandry. During his studies he always belonged to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and became the chief mouthpiece of the Western Ukrainians. During this period and during the occupation of his country by the Bolsheviks, that is, in 1939, his task was to organize the revolutionary movement in Ukraine against the oppressors. After the occupation of the Western Ukraine, Bander organized the Army of Resistance, and created the famous force which became, and still is, the U.N.R.W., the Underground Army, with General Taras Izchapyk as its leader.

When, in 1941, war broke out between Germany and the U.S.S.R., Bander, to thwart the plans of the Germans as well as the Bolsheviks, proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine. At the head of the Government he placed his chief collaborator, Taras Stetsko, who is President of A.B.N. (the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). This act surprised the Germans, exposing as it did their actual position in the East, and, in particular, Ukraine. The Germans liquidated the new Government by force, and Bander, along with Stetsko and their colleagues, were sent to the concentration camp at Orenienburg. There they were detained till 1944.

In July 1944 there was established, under the impetus given by Bander, "The Supreme Council of Ukrainian Liberation" (U.A.W.R.), in which he became one of the leading figures. The Council of U.A.W.R. is today the nucleus of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement.
The head of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement who has been active since before the commencement of the World War II in 1939 is Stefan Bandera. He is about five feet, four inches tall and was born around the year 1903. He is the son of a Greek Catholic priest who was exiled by the Soviets to the Solovki Islands located in the Arctic regions of European U.S.S.R. Stefan Bandera's father was exiled on 15 May 1941 while two of his three sisters were taken to Siberia. The third sister, who is hunchbacked, still remained in the PrzerwiStanislaw Tarnopol Area up to several months ago.

When in 1933 Eugeniusz Korzeniowski was killed by a time-bomb in Katvaria, Poland, while conducting underground activities for an independent Ukraine, Stefan Bandera assumed the leadership of the movement within the Katvaria. When the Germans entered Poland they made overtures to Bandera but he refused to join them. He was then imprisoned by the Germans who produced a Ukrainian puppet in August 1942 in the figure of Mikołaj Polnick. Mink was then imprisoned by the Germans who sponsored him; consequently when the Soviets drove the Germans back to Europe Polnick disappeared from the horizon. In the meantime Bandera was freed from prison and commenced his underground activities immediately. Since 1941, the year that his father was arrested and sent to Northern Russia and his sisters were sent to Siberia, his hatred for the Communists increased. He continued his activities in organizing the Ukrainians in the area that was acquired by the U.S.S.R. after the partition of Poland by Germany and Russia.

When the final boundary between Russia and Poland was decided upon and confirmed through arrangements commencing on 1946.

Distribution by Originator:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>4/23/46</td>
<td>Bandera</td>
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SECRET

The Volga and Don basins were the scene of a large-scale operation of the Red Army on 3 August 1942. The Germans found themselves facing a determined defense of the Don basin. In an effort to facilitate the withdrawal of the German forces and to ensure the protection of the Volga basin, the Supreme Command issued an order to the Volga basin. The order stated that the Volga basin would be defended at all costs.

The Volga basin was defended by the Red Army, which is called the UPA. These units were equipped with modern weapons and equipment.

At the present time, the Volga basin is under the control. This action is for the safety of the country.

Source: Personal contact with the subject of secret personnel and military aspects.

SECRET
1. According to repatriated persons, a virtual "reign of terror" exists East of the Curzon line. A great number of Ukrainians in this area have organized themselves into "partisan" units, under the overall leadership of Bandera. These bands seem to enjoy in particular the terrorization of such Poles as remain in the neighborhood. According to one Pole who returned from this area, a "partisan" band attacked his village one night, burned it and killed over fifty persons and about five hundred head of cattle. Among Poles, the mere mention of the name "Bandera" invariably brings curses and imprecations. (See Mulviel, Germany: According to information received from another reliable informant, Bandera is a young and violent student who some five years ago began opposing the elderly Lemnik as leader of the OUN Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). In 1941 he went to Lemberg and proclaimed himself head of an Ukrainian State, supposedly with the approval of the German General Staff. This caused the Germans great embarrassment, and he was instructed to desist from further political activities unless given official approval. However, he and his followers began a campaign of terrorism, directed mainly against the followers of Lemnik, which resulted in his arrest and confinement at Klein-Sachsonhausen. Lemnik was also arrested. Both were later released, however, when the Wehrmacht and German High Command attempted to build up a strong Ukraine. Bandera can be regarded as both anti-Soviet and anti-German. He appears to be continuing his campaign of violence since the German withdrawal from the Ukraine.)
From: SM
To: TAC

Not coded, c/o.

JAN 26 1948

Airgram

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

Germany
On 30 June 1941, the Ukrainian fascist and Hitler's professional spy, Stepan A. Bandera (according to his German appellation, "Consul II"), proclaimed in L'vov, then occupied by the Germans, the resurrection of the Ukrainian State in Western Ukraine. The same day a government was formed under the designation of the "State Government" with Yaroslav Stetsko, Bandera's deputy, as premier.

Stepan A. Bandera appeared on the Ukrainian political horizon in June 1934, when, as leader of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) in Western Ukraine, he gave the order to kill the Polish Minister of the Interior, Paracki. It is worth noting that, although the perpetrator of the act, Grigory Netsenko, had not been arrested, the Polish police had immediately in its possession sufficient data to start a case against the leaders of the OUN, with Bandera at the head of the list. This indicates that the evidence and data bearing on the revolutionary and terrorist activities of the OUN had not been received from the murderer but from some other source.

The courageous deportment of the 23-year-old Bandera during the trial in Warsaw in 1935 gave him a halo of heroism and made him the hero of the Ukrainian nationalists in the Western Ukraine and among the emigres. Bandera behaved at the time like a fanatical revolutionary nationalist.

However, many changes took place during the intervening 16 years.

In 1940, when the Germans occupied Warsaw, Bandera was released and assumed a role of greater scope, no longer on an oblast scale, but as one of the principal leaders of the OUN, which already existed on German territory.

Petro Yarovyy
As is well known, Col. Andrey Mel'nik, a Ukrainian, had replaced Col. E. Konovalets, chief leader of the OUN, who was killed by a Bolshevik agent, Valyukh, in Rotterdam in 1938. Thus, in his struggle for domination within the OUN, Bandera came face to face with Mel'nik from the start.

It was then that a new facet of Bandera's personality was revealed -- not that of a revolutionary, even of a fascist type, but a provocateur and Hitler agent.

The German occupation forces at the time needed agents and informers who were conversant with conditions in Poland and could help the Hitlerite invaders. They could find no better men for the job than Bandera and his followers.

Bandera proceeded with great zeal to carry out Hitler's assignments, under the guidance of a man who was at once one of the chief directors of Hitler's spy system, a prominent leader of the OUN, and -- as became known only in 1945 -- an important Soviet agent. His name was Riko Yary. He was an extremely odd individual, completely unknown to non-Ukrainian readers, but he played a prominent role in the Ukrainian national movement. I shall have to write about him separately at some other time.

While working under the direction of Riko Yary and trying to strengthen his position among the German invaders, Bandera launched the campaign which was to make him master of the OUN. To achieve this, he found it necessary, first, to compromise the old leadership headed by Mel'nik. His first act was to prefer charges against the 'Polish and Soviet spies' allegedly ensconced in the Main Administration of the OUN. Yaroslav Narosok, accused of 'Polish espionage' on the basis of documents allegedly found in Polish archives by Riko Yary, was the first victim of the campaign. Next came Col. M. Stashovskiy and squadron leader O. Semik-Gribovski, who were accused of having 'connections with Soviet agents.'

Bandera produced no proof of any kind. What had been published on the subject appeared obviously unconvincing, even to the layman. However, no one demanded proof. Bandera's master, the Gestapo, on one hand, and the Soviet agency in the person of Riko Yary, on the other, gave him a free hand. A simple denunciation to the Gestapo was sufficient to cause persons objectionable to Bandera to be arrested and liquidated at his order. This was the case, for instance, with Turash, oblast leader of the OUN in Western Ukraine, who had come to occupied Poland to establish connections with the Main Administration of the OUN.

At the same time, Bandera worked feverishly to get hold of the leadership of the Ukrainian nationalist underground organizations, created in 1939 for the struggle against the Bolsheviks during the Soviet occupation.

Bandera succeeded in all his enterprises. He seized the reins of the OUN and became the acknowledged favorite of the Hitlerite authorities, who, preparing for a war in the Ukraine, were sufficiently far-sighted to take into account the help that Bandera could render them there.

It was not Bandera's espionage that was important to Hitler's gaueliters. They needed him as an agent, who could undermine the Ukrainian national liberation movement, or as an obedient police dictator who could suppress the nationalist movements among minorities of Western Ukraine. (He was of no use in the central and eastern oblasts because he was completely unknown there.)

The Hitlerites made no mistake in their calculations. Bandera played his part to perfection. And when he had done his duty, he and some of his assistants were dispatched to a concentration camp. The Gestapo had its own candidates for the posts of gaueliters and governors of the Ukraine.
Bandera stayed at the camp from summer 1941 to fall 1944, when he was freed by the Germans and sent to spy for them during their retreat from the Ukraine. (One could tell a good deal about this period of Bandera's activities.)

Let us return, however, to the "Ukrainian State," founded by Bandera on 30 June 1941. The proclamation of the "state" took place in an atmosphere of great solemnity, with Hitler's representatives participating. However, no solemn speeches could hide the shameful fact, which will remain a black spot on the history of the Ukrainian movement, that the first act of the "State Government," headed by Stets'ko, was an expression of deepest gratitude to Hitler. Even the Norwegian, Quisling, whose name has become a synonym for traitor, did not go so far.

Since the support of the OUN alone, or, rather, of those groups in the OUN which followed Bandera, was not sufficient to bestow the government of the "Ukrainian State" with the necessary authority, the Bandera falsifiers resorted to the fabrication of two fake documents: One of these was produced through the convocation in Krakow, on the eve of the war, of a special conference of prominent Ukrainian leaders, and was given the grandiloquent title of "The Consolidation of All Ukrainian Political Tendencies and Common Action for the Resurrection of the Ukrainian State." With such a platform, it is no wonder that the Banderaists were able to obtain the necessary signatures, and the adopted declaration was presented to the nation as an acknowledgment by all political parties of the right of the Bandera group to direct the government of the future state.

The second falsified document was obtained from the generally respected Metropolitan A. Shupititsky. He was shown the declaration and persuaded to issue an appeal to the people calling for support of the "generally recognized authorities." (Later, the Metropolitan became convinced that he had been deceived and retracted his appeal.)

What was the Banderaist "resurrected Ukraine" like at the time? It is hard to find an adequate definition for the "mongrel state" created by Bandera and Stets'ko under the scornful name of the Ukrainian State. If one were to judge this brainchild of Bandera even by totalitarian standards, one would find that the elements of law and legality, which are present even in totalitarian states, were absent there. However bad and cruel these laws are, they still contain some elements of right and order. There was nothing of the kind in the "kingdom" of Stets'ko and Bandera. Bloody chaos, utter lawlessness, and the wildest and most vicious excesses in the treatment of the Ukrainian population and the national minorities prevailed. Unbridled terrorism was used to force dissenters to submit to the "leaders." Thousands of people were killed without trial, without investigation, and often, without any apparent cause.

During the first days of Bandera's rule, terror was directed primarily against the organization headed by A. Mel'nik. The greater part of the leaders of this organization were killed, openly or secretly. The brothers Prishlyak, and many others were brutally murdered in Podgaiaty; the above-named Semik and Stasiborsky, in Zhitomir. The assassin was Stepan Kostyly Lyubachev, a Ukrainian Communist, and at the same time one of the leaders of Bandera's combat detachments. Then came the turn of all Bandera's opponents among the Ukrainian people in general. Finally, the national minorities in the Western Ukraine, the Poles and the Jews, were subjected to bloody persecution. It is difficult to estimate how many Poles were killed, but some data has been preserved concerning the number of Jews who perished. Over 10,000 Jews were destroyed in a single "operation" at the border of the Carpathian Ukraine. The Hungarian gendarmerie drove these Jews out from the area which had been occupied by Hungary with Hitler's consent. At the border, they were received by "special" elements of the Bandera militia, which drove them to unknown parts, destroying all of them on route. Altogether, during the 5 weeks of its existence, the Bandera "state" destroyed over 5,000 Ukrainians, 15,000 Jews, and several thousand Poles.
The "Ukrainian State" of Stepan Bandera ended its short but ignominious existence in August 1941, when it was announced in L'vov that Western Ukraine had been incorporated as the "District of Galicia" in the "General Governorship" (occupied Poland). And then a "new order," Hitler style, began to be introduced in the Ukraine.

This is, in short, the story of Bandera's "one-day holiday," which his followers, relying on people's forgetfulness, now try to present as a glorious and heroic page in the history of the Ukrainian liberation movement. In reality, it would be best, especially for the supporters of a free Ukraine, to erase from the history of their movement this infamous Hitlerite, fascist episode, which brought nothing but shame and sorrow to the Ukraine.

- E N D -
Ukrainian Groups

"From another source, it was reported that small secret fighting groups appeared in Eastern Austria and tried to fight themselves through to the American occupation zone in Upper Austria or Bavaria. These people call themselves 'Banderovi' and form a part of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army. Their operational territory comprises Ukrainian, Polish, and Slovak areas. Their leader is Stefan Bandera, a fanatical revolutionary. He has spent many years in Polish prisons and was liberated only by the advance of the German Wehrmacht. However, as the Germans did not keep their promises made to the Ukrainians, Bandera organized anti-German groups.

"On Hitler's order, he was arrested after a meeting with the German High Command and deported to Allenstein in East Prussia, where he was kept until the end of the war. THE EXCHANGE PRESS reported that Stefan Bandera arrived these days under secret circumstances in Bavaria in order to urge the Western Powers to support the Ukrainian revolutionaries. In case the Western Powers would be ready to promise independence for the Ukraine, Bandera's partisans would fight alongside the West against the Soviets. During the interview, Bandera was guarded by heavily armed bodyguards. Bandera is 41 years old. Nobody knows his whereabouts or the movements of his car. It is possible that Bandera is by now in the United States,"

BAUNDA, Stefan

POL, June 1, 1950

USSR
STEFAN BANDERA is the leader of the Bandera group. He resides at present in the American zone in Germany.

He is very active.

Subject says that he is the leader of an Ukrainian underground movement, but this is held not to be correct. Konavaritz, the earlier underground leader, was killed in Rotterdam on route to the United States. He left a testament asking that Melnik be made his successor, because the latter was a reasonable, moderate man. Source says that the German Nazis gave Bandera money and instructions and made him the leader. So there has since been a fight between Bandera and Melnik.

Subject is today chief of the ABN, Anti-Communist Bloc of Nations, with branches in Germany, England (London), and the United States. This is of course a rightist group.

Bandera is about 45, and speaks German, Polish, and Ukrainian. When a student in the University at Lvov, he belonged to the Ukrainian underground organization which killed Polish minister Paryvsky. He fled to Germany sometime during the years 1926-31.
TO: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
FROM: Chief, HLS
DATE: 29 October 1951

SUBJECT: Operational
SPECIFIC: Alert of U.S. Border Units to Possible Arrivals from Ukraine

REFERENCE: WSK-A-33857

For your request, ID EUCOM transmitted the following priority cable to 7th Army on 23 October 1951:

"THIS DIVISION INTERESTED IN GROUP SANDERA ADHERENTS MAKING WAY FROM UKRAINE TO GERMANY VIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA ID DESIRE BORDER UNITS BE ON ALERT FOR THEIR ARRIVAL AND IF GROUP CROSSES BORDER THIS DIVISION BE NOTIFIED ON PRIORITY BASIS FD ALSO DESIRE EVERY EFFORT BE MADE NOT TO EXPOSE GROUP TO GERMAN CUSTODY OR CONTACT BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS FD"

E&M Note to 7TH:

The foregoing was done as a result of par 2, 1951-5581. Now that your UNM-5581 advises actual arrival of presumably the same group, may we tell ID EUCOM to cancel their alert?

Dist: 0 - COS
2 - MGB (Regenz-1)
1 - GP
1 - HLS
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As well known, Col. Andrey Mel'nik (in Ukrainian, Andry Mel'nyk) had replaced Col. E. Honovalets, chief leader of the OUN, who was killed by a Bolshevik agent, Valyukh, in Rotterdam in 1938. Thus, in his struggle for dominance within the OUN, Bandera came face to face with Mel'nik from the start.

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- 2 -
Benders stayed at the camp from summer 1941 to fall 1944, when he was freed by the German camp staff to spy for them during their retreat from the Ukraine.

Let us return, however, to the "Ukrainian State," founded by Bandera on 20 June 1941. The proclamation of the "state" took place in an atmosphere of great solemnity, with Hitler's representatives participating. However, no solemn speeches could hide the shameful fact, which has remained a black spot on the history of the Ukrainian movement, that the first act of the "State Government" headed by Steets'ko was an expression of deepest gratitude to Hitler. Even the Norwegian, Quisling, whose name has become a synonym for traitor, did not go so far.

Since the support of the UN alone, or, rather, of those groups in the UN which were not satisfied to invest the government of the "Ukrainian State" with the necessary authority, the Bandera falsifiers resorted to the fabrication of two false documents. One of these was produced through the convocation in Krakow on the eve of the war of a special conference of prominent Ukrainian leaders, and was given the grandiloquent title of "The Consolidation of All Ukrainian Political Tendencies and Common Action for the Resurrection of the Ukrainian State." With such a platform, it is no wonder that the Banderaists were able to obtain the necessary signatures, and the adopted declaration was presented to the nation as an acknowledgment by all political parties of the right of the Bandera group to direct the government of the future state.

The second falsified document was obtained from the generally respected Metropolitan of Sheptytsky. He was shown the declaration and persuaded to issue an appeal to the people calling for support of the "generally recognized authorities." (Later, the Metropolitan became convinced that he had been deceived and retracted his appeal.)

What was the Banderaist "resurrected Ukraine" like at the time? It is hard to find an adequate definition for the "monstrosity" created by Bandera and Steets'ko under the sorrowful name of the Ukrainian State. If one were to judge this brain child of Bandera even by totalitarian standards, one would find that the elements of law and legality, which are present even in totalitarian states, were absent there. However bad and cruel these laws are, they still contain some elements of right and order. There was nothing of the kind in the "kingdom" of Steets'ko and Bandera. Bloody chaos, utter lawlessness, and the wildest and most vicious excesses in the treatment of the Ukrainian population and the national minorities prevailed. Unbridled terrorism was used to force dissenters to submit to the "leaders." Thousands of people were killed without trial, without investigation, and often, without any apparent cause.

During the first days of Bandera's rule, terror was directed primarily against the organization headed by A. Mel'nik. The greater part of the leaders of this organization were killed, openly or secretly. The brothers Prishlyak and many others were brutally murdered in Pechrayt; the above-named Senik and Stashiborsky, in Eltsov.

The assasins, were Stephanovy of Lyubchov, a Ukrainian Communist, and at the same time one of the leaders of Bandera's combat detachments. Then came the turn of all Bandera's opponents among the Ukrainian people in general. Finally, the national minorities in the Western Ukraine, the Poles and the Jews, were subjected to bloody persecution. It is difficult to estimate how many Poles were killed, but some data has been preserved concerning the number of Jews who perished. Over 10,000 Jews were destroyed in a single "operation" at the border of the Carpathian Ukraine. The Hungarian gendarmes drove these Jews out from the area which had been occupied by Hungary with Hitler's consent. At the border, they were received by "special" elements of the Bandera militia, which drove them to unknown parts, destroying all of them en route. Altogether, during the 5 weeks of its existence, the Bandera "state" destroyed over 5,000 Ukrainians, 15,000 Jews, and several thousand Poles.
The "Ukrainian State" of Stepan Bandera ended its short but ignominious existence in August 1941, when it was announced in L'vov that Western Ukraine had been incorporated as the "District of Galicia" in the "General Governorship" (occupied Poland). And then a "new order," Hitler style, began to be introduced in the area.

This is, in short, the story of Bandera's "one-day holiday," which his followers, relying on people's forgetfulness, now try to present as a glorious and heroic page in the history of the Ukrainian liberation movement. In reality, it would be best, especially for the supporters of a free Ukraine, to erase from the history of their movement this infamous Hitlerite, fascist episode, which brought nothing but shame and sorrow to the Ukraine.

END
ATTN: Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Operational/CAPELIT

SECRET
February 1952

Ref: 1942-1-0620, CGP 707

1. I asked me to investigate paragraph 2 of the quotation included in paragraph 1 of CGP 707. The question arising, how did this story get into the hands of FIDEKONT? Obviously, there is not a bit of truth to the story, but we are intrigued at the name of a name and the exploitation of this incident to show him as unfriendly to the Ukrainian cause.

2. Any light you can throw on this will be appreciated.

Dist:
2-DEOB
1-ZAGACTUS
1-ZARGO, London
1-DOS, Berlin
1-DEOS, Brussels

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008
Subject: Contacts in New York City on 3 and 4 May 1952

1. As soon as the undersigned arrived in New York City at 1940, after having procured a hotel room, he went to lower east side - 7th street, to be more precise - in order to see what, if anything, the Ukrainians were doing. Walking down E. 7th street, between 2nd and 3rd avenues, seemed rather strange since the street and sidewalks were filled with individuals all speaking Ukrainian. They were predominantly young men, although there were numbers of young women also. It should be noted that at the middle of the block, between 2nd and 3rd avenues on 7th street, there is a Ukrainian Catholic Church, St. George's. Perhaps there were some sort of services going on, or possibly these people were attending the Ukrainian Center housed next to the church. There must have been over 100 young people between 20 and 30 years old who would be good current-operations material. It would appear, however, that most of these young people are oriented on Coun ideology or are even members of the Coun. That being the case, if anyone of these were recruited there is little doubt that Stor would learn about it in a very short period of time. For that reason, at the present time it would not be advisable to recruit in this particular area nor from the Greek Catholic ranks. We will probably not be able to do this until such a time that there is an agreement between Coun and Coun.

2. The undersigned headed for the Ukrainian Bookstore "Hoverla" almost directly across the street from the church. Here he hoped to look over the stock of books and perhaps pick up some useful materials, and he did to the tune of $17.50. This, however, was a good investment for two reasons: First because of the background material purchased, and secondly, because he met up with the owner of the bookstore, Dr. Yatsky Stor, Ph. D. It seemed that the bookstore was deserted so that the undersigned was able to enter into a conversation with the owner. In the conversation the undersigned mentioned that he was a teacher of history (in Ukrainian it sounds more pompous because the high-sounding title "professor" is used). Stor became immediately interested for he would like to see more Americans learn something about the Ukrainian problem. It is apparent that Stor is well versed in Ukrainian politics, at least, insofar as the US is concerned.
During the conversation he revealed:

a. The RKNZ/RESHA split in UN occurred because of the fact that BANDERA and his supporters, who were, of course, during the period 1938 and 1941 in the Homeland (either in jail or out) wanted to have KROMER, who had been in the emigration from the time that KROMER was killed, investigate the death of KROMER. The BANDERA group believed that KROMER, who was supposed to have been serving as KROMER's bodyguard, had not conducted his duty since he had not been in Rotterdam during the time that KROMER was assassinated. This was the issue that BANDERA wanted cleared up but UNPA procrastinated and eventually it got to a point where the actual split occurred. The above information seems to be quite logical, although it does not present the complete picture. It is, however, an addition to the information which we already possess.

b. It will be recalled that BANDERA had joined the UNRada in 1946 and after a few months in this organisation he removed his representation. The exact reasons for his withdrawal were never clear to this office but the following information was given by Dr. SYDOR and it seems fairly logical:

(1) UNR representation was based on parity, but, in fact, BANDERA's group was the strongest of all and BANDERA did not feel that the other less important organizations should have parity with his own organisation.

(2) KUCHAR insisted that the UNRada cancel the so-called Warsaw Treaty of 1920. It will be recalled that when Simeon PILSUDSKI agreed on this treaty with PILSUDSKI, he gave up the western oblasts to Poland in return for PILSUDSKI's support against the Bolsheviks. That treaty, of course, is technically in effect at this time. (Naturally, this is de jure and not de facto). Since the leaders of the UNRada were the leaders of the PILSUDSKI Republic they were, therefore, the very people who concluded this treaty. BANDERA, then, insisted that they rescind this treaty by a formal note to the Polish government. It appears that UNPA procrastinated and said that since this treaty was concluded such a long time ago it was not de facto in effect; therefore, there was no necessity of sending this note of abrogation to the Polish government-in-exile. ANGUS, however, put the matter in the hands of some jurists who considered the question and came up with the verdict that in actuality, this treaty had de jure effect. Since the UNRada did not
recognize this decision was another reason for the BARUKA withdrawal.

(3) Another demand that ZEHOUU put on the UNR was the recognition of UHVR as the supreme council in the homeland and that the UNR’s bailiwick would be the supreme representation in the emigration.

This, however, UNR did not accept.

The undersigned cannot vouch that the above is gospel truth but it seems to be a reasonable and fairly complete analysis of the BANURA/UNR split.

c. According to ZEHOR, those in the emigration who are interested realize the exact relationship between the UNR in the homeland and the UHVR, as is also the projection of this very same relationship to the UHVR and UHVR relations in the emigration. It is also evident that the emigration is aware of the fact that ZEHOR is the Secretary General of the UHVR and that he is “directing” carrier contact with the “outside”. It is also apparent that the UHVR upheld the UHVR in the UHVR-UHVR differences. It would appear that the emigration does not know the whereabouts of ZEHOR but believes him to be in Washington.

d. ZEHOR is a man seemingly in his late 30’s or early 40’s, a revolutionary, and an ex-member of the UPA. That endeared the undersigned to him was the fact that the undersigned bought a book called From the Star to Krimya (a story of one of the Pokhidni Group) which, by good chance, happened to be written by ZEHOR, a Commander of one of these detachments. ZEHOR, realizing the “good taste” of the undersigned, became warmed up to the subject and talked freely—for three hours, to be exact.

e. There is another book that Dr. ZEHOR is in the process of writing, this time in English. He became so friendly with the undersigned that he begged that the undersigned proof-read and correct this book before publication, which the undersigned will gladly do, and photostat it in the process. Suffice it to say that ZEHOR and the undersigned parted “boshom budov”.

3. The following day, Sunday, the undersigned decided to see what the eastern Ukrainians had to offer in agent potential so he went to the Orthodox Church on 16th Street for services. This was rather disappointing since there were very very few young people, although the fairly large church was packed full. Those of the young men who were there appeared to be married, since they had come with women and children. This is not to say that there are no agent-type individuals in New York because it may have happened that they just did not attend.
services and this could be for three possible reasons: (a) they are not particularly religious and, therefore, do not attend services, or (b) there may have been a dance the previous night and having stayed out late they didn't attend this particular Sunday, or (c) there are no young, well-dressed people. This last, however, seems somewhat difficult to believe.

A. During the JSN rally the undersigned met with an old friend of his, one Dennis PIRITULAK. At one time, PIRITULAK was a fanatic supporter of the revolutionary ideals to the point that he would have been willing to participate in any type of activity which would eventually lead to the independence of Ukraine. After 4 or 5 hours together, however, the undersigned became convinced that the ravages of American capitalistic economy have had their effects on this young man, he is now far more tempered, far less fanatic, and quite satisfied, in a rather depressed sort of way, with his status quo. He is unhappy that as an intellectual he has to work at physical tasks, but it would appear that the money he earns is sufficient to keep him moderately satisfied. In the ideal, he supports his former theories, providing someone else does the dirty work. This is brought out in order to point out that many of the young individuals who a short two or three years ago would have been willing to lay down their lives for their cause, are now more interested in their physical well being since they have tasted American living. PIRITULAK is apparently close to the center of JSN activity. He assured the undersigned that the JSN is financed by itself and not by any external factors. He also mentioned that "two influential Americans" had gone to Canada in an attempt to bring KAT to the U.S. But they were not successful. The undersigned was unable to elicit any real information from this man, either because PIRITULAK did not know or because he did not wish to disclose any information. The undersigned believes that the cause for this was the former.

COMMENTS

A. The ZCHON has a wealth of operational assets, at least in New York City and surrounding areas. These assets cannot be utilized by us until there is some sort of political and operational rapprochement between ZCHON and ZHUR.

B. It is possible that current type personnel from eastern oblasts may be more difficult to procure than originally anticipated.

D. Lyola SYDN is a potential well of political information and should, therefore, be cultivated.
All Ukrainian newspapers in Europe reported the following communique issued by the Supreme Council of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and dated September 12, 1952:

"The Secretariat of the Supreme Council of the OUN Units Abroad is authorized to communicate the following:

"Beginning September 22, 1952 Stepan Bandera has resigned his post as head of the Supreme Council of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and relegated these functions to the head of the Supreme Council of the OUN in Ukraine until the election of the new head of the Supreme Council of the OUN.

"After the resignation of Stepan Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko, head of the Supreme Council of the OUN Units Abroad who was elected at the last conference, offered his post suggesting that Stepan Bandera decline to accept the proposal, but agreed to become a member of the Supreme Council of the OUN Units Abroad under the direction of its present head."

This brief and somewhat vague communique brings to the fore something that was long expected in various Ukrainian political circles. Stepan Bandera, one of the most known leaders of the OUN, has been associated with the Ukrainian liberation movement for almost two decades. Controversial as he was, his organization is one of the largest, numerically speaking, Ukrainian political groups and has a mass following, especially among the youth, in Western Europe, Great Britain, Canada, South America and the United States. The OUN under his leadership claims a vast underground resistance network in Ukraine. Not so long ago, namely, on July 2, 1951 Pravda of Moscow, in casting "nationalist deviations" in Ukrainian literature, singled him out as an "enemy" of the Soviet Union and an "agent of American imperialists," and compared him to Simon Petliura, the leader of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian forces, who was assassinated by a communist agent in Paris in 1926.

It is reliably reported that the resignation of Bandera from the post of the head of the Supreme Council of the OUN was forced by the growing opposition to his leadership among his top-ranking nationalist leaders, who opposed him on the ground of his totalitarian tactics, and particularly the use of his secret SB organization (Sluzhba Bezpeky—Security Service) as an instrument of intra-party policies among the Ukrainian political exiles.

Among the top-notch OUN-B leadership who are in opposition to Bandera and possibly to his close lieutenant, Yaroslav Stetsko,
are known to be such veteran OUN leaders as Lenkavsky, Kordiuk, Matla, Pidhayny and Ilnytsky.

Bander's resignation might in some way facilitate the speed of the consolidation among the Ukrainian political groups in Europe, although Stetsko's virtual leadership in the OUN would still be a stumbling block on the road to the much-craved-for Ukrainian political consolidation.
TO: SMUNI
INFO: SFRAI, SRNL
CITE:

RE: MUNI 6279 (IN 40715)
CART, 

1. E FURNISHED FOLLOWING PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF BANDERA, AGE 42, LOOKS YOUNGER. HEIGHT 5 FEET 6 TO 7 INCHES, STURDILY BUILT BROAD SHOULDER, THICK SHORT NECK, SHARP FEATURES WITH HIGH CHEEKBONES, LARGE PROTRUDING EARS, LONG NOSE WITH PROMINENT MOISTRLS, LIVELY DEEPSET GRAY EYES, STRAIGHT EYEBROWS, LARGE STRAIGHT MOUTH THICK LOWER LIP, FRONT TEETH DISCOLORER. LIGHT BROWN HAIR THIN IN FRONT PARTED ON RIGHT, CLEAN SHAVEN SMALL CHIN, STRAIGHT CARRIAGE DELIBERATE AND SLOW WALK.

2. REPLY TO PARA 1 REF FOLLOWS.
TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: [Redacted]

INFORMATION: OFI, PLAAR, OTC, SR 8, EE 6, RE 2, RG 6

TO: SISUN CART: [Redacted]
CART: [Redacted]
RE: LUND 5125 (IN L155)

1. HAVE NO TRACE LEJAL. HOWEVER MAKING URGENT INQUIRIES.

2. RETURN TO POST DELAYED. HENCE FORWARDING 2 PHOTOS BY RUOUTE (RED 511) WHICH DUE ARRIVE FRANKFURT AFTERNOON 3 OCT. REQUEST FROM FORWARD MUICH BY MOST RAPID MEANS AVAILABLE. SMASH SENDING 2 PHOTOS TO BERLIN THROUGH CHANNELS, SHOULD ARRIVE 5 OCT.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE: 2006

INDEX

SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE
TO: Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
FROM: Chief of Base, Munich
SUBJECT: GENERAL—R2D2.3C:1.1:3upport

DATE: 15 December 1952

DISPATCH NO. 2751-1423

CLASSIFICATION

1. SN/Reports has expressed interest in locating or determining the disposition of certain photo copies of reports obtained from SB C/N files (Cavatina) covering such topics as railroads and the GCB. The reports appear to have been obtained from GIC but there is no indication that they have ever been exploited.

2. Headquarters has listed the following documents as perhaps containing leads to the nature and location of this material:

   - LIS'SA-2941
   - AGSP-1976
   - LISA-3241
   - LISA-3256
   - MERA-3242
   - MERA-3256

None of these documents are in the MDR Registry. It is requested that the Frankfurt Registry be checked to determine if any of the listed documents are on hand there. In the event that they can be located, CSOB would appreciate copies of these documents so swiftly.

3. It is requested that this dispatch be shown to any BIO personnel who were formerly at Karlsruhe and who might have some information on the location of the Cavatina files.

See Attach

Approved by

Dist:

1 - MCR (Attach)
2 - MCR

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3820 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
OECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: METHODS EXEMPTION 3820
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE: 2006

NOMA-25099, dated 23 January 1951.

Attached in duplicate is a photostat of a 21 page report from
SB 9 of OIM/B files loaned to us by CIC. Sent FIS.

NOMA-3842, dated 31 August 1950.

Since the reports could not be photostated here, they were sent
to FIM on 3 November 1950 for additional copies.

NUSA-1976 transmitted the documents mentioned in NOMA-3842.

NOMA-2941, 2 Jan 51.

At acliments were sent to Wash on 12 Jan 51, with note to the
which suggested future relay to MOB only of such documents
as may be considered pertinent.

Handcarried to MOB, 30 December 1952.
THE GERMAN RADIO STATION COLOGNE HAS AN INTERVIEW
WITH STEPAN BANDERA

On Thursday, Dec. 9, 1954, the northwestern German radio station COLOGNE broadcast an interview with the Head of the Governing Body of 20h OUN, Stepan BANDERA, which lasted from 7:45 to 8:13 hours. In his interview the Head of the Governing Body of 20h OUN characterized the present state of the liberation fight of the Ukrainian people, primarily that of the nationalistic underground organization, and outlined the methods and objects of that fight.

In view of the urgency of the problem, we reprint the whole text of the broadcast with the consent of the radio station. It has reserved all rights in that broadcast; the interview or parts thereof may not be reprinted without permission.

The Editorial Office of Sh.P.

Before me there sits a man whom, my listeners, I dare not describe. Few people know how he looks like, where he lives and under what name he goes today. This man is Stepan BANDERA.

Stepan BANDERA has already become a legendary figure of the national liberation fight of enslaved nations; like ABD-EL-KHIM, he is one of today's most dangerous and strongest enemies of Soviet imperialism because he, the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, is backed by 40 million of Ukrainians. BANDERA embodies their striving for national independence.

Since 1941, when he proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine upon the marching of the Germans in the Soviet Union and when UPA, the Ukrainian Insurrection Army, headed by him, took up arms—the Soviet secret service has tried to catch him. However, the Soviets have failed to reach BANDERA. Having remained unidentified, he is living in a secret place.
In 1945, at the end of the War, Stepan BANDERA was confined in a German concentration camp. The insurrection of the Ukrainian people of 1941 was not in line with HITLER's conception of eastern policy. He invited BANDERA to BERLIN for political negotiations and ordered the latter to be arrested there. BANDERA's adherents, the famous BANDERAITES, continued their fight on two fronts—against HITLER and against Russia. Stepan BANDERA has remained their unquestionable Leader.

In 1945 the Soviets made a thorough search after Stepan BANDERA all over Western Europe. Although at that time BANDERA was in a place which belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence, he was not identified. The Soviets have not found him. BANDERA is alive. Some time it may cost Russia dear because the striving for independence of the peoples enslaved by Russia, primarily that of the Ukrainian people, has always been a mortal danger threatening the unity and strength of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian problem has always been the weakest point of the Soviet Union, and it may undermine the very existence of the whole Soviet empire. The speeches made by KHRUSHCHEV, KAGANOVICH and others in summer 1954 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the reunion of the Ukraine and Russia, which accused the West of "supporting the Ukrainian nationalism due to imperialist motives", prove that Russia does not know how to solve the Ukrainian problem, despite the fact that it has gained the victory and in spite of its ruthless terrorism in the Ukraine. Those speeches prove more convincingly than any other arguments that the Ukrainian people continues to offer resistance to Russia, and that this resistance increases. Stepan BANDERA who sits before me is the head, aspiration and conscience of the Ukrainian resistance movement.

I have met with BANDERA in order to put to him a few questions concerning the organization, methods and objects of the Ukrainian liberation movement. Would you be so kind, Mr BANDERA, as, first, to tell me what the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is like and how it acts.
BANDERA: The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists which organizes and leads the fight of the Ukrainian people develops its activity in the Ukraine as well as abroad, primarily in those western countries where the Ukrainian emigration has settled. Between those two parts of the Ukrainian liberation movement there is maintained a communication service across the Iron Curtain, which is based on the courier principle. Armed groups of messengers recruited among members of OUN and soldiers of UPA/Ukrainian Insurrection Army/ are sent from the Ukraine abroad and vice versa; they make their way along secret routes in a way which is known to proper organs only; often they force their way by force of arms from one unit of the Organization to another.

HOPPE: Can you, Mr BANDERA, tell us the details of the communication service between you and your underground groups in the Ukraine?

BANDERA: Before their departure the members of a connecting group receive and study exhaustive verbal reports, explanation of the general situation and individual important events, the tendency of their development, as well as reports on the state, activity and plans of the respective parts of the liberation movement. From time to time leading members of the Organization go to the Ukraine and vice versa along with connecting groups in order to strengthen the personal contact between the Governing Body in the Native Country and that in the emigration, and to carry out special instructions. Those leading members carry most exhaustive verbal informations. Besides verbal reports, the connecting groups also carry in both directions the mail which includes various documents, reports, encoded instructions, originals and copies of important publications, copies of periodicals and the like. Due to extraordinary difficulties, the couriers cannot be sent very often. The starting-bases on both sides are at an above one thousand kilometres distance from each other. This route which often crosses the territory occupied by the Bolsheviks is blocked by numerous refined obstructions in order to make every uncontrolled infiltration impossible.
It is especially difficult to cross two or three frontiers and borderlands with wire-entanglements, depopulated and ploughed zones cleared of forests with electric barbed wire obstructions, mine barrages, masked and concealed alarm devices, flares and a great number of frontier guards and their patrols.

HOPPE: I can imagine what sacrifices are required by the maintenance of your communication with the Ukraine...

BANDERA: The maintenance of the communication between the Native Country and the emigration belongs to the most difficult problems which the Organization must solve in its revolutionary fight and underground activity against Bolshevism. Strong-willed, reliable in the ideological and moral respect, courageous, self-sacrificing and shrewd members of the Organization are picked out in the Native Country and abroad for that service. The members of the communication service are trained and prepared thoroughly for their special tasks. Despite our efforts and in spite of the thorough training, on an average one half of the messengers die during the discharging of their duties. Sometimes the casualties are major. It happens that whole groups of the best fighters for freedom whose training and equipment required much trouble and money are completely annihilated by the enemy. However, the broken communication is repaired by new groups and the destroyed routes are replaced by new ones, but this requires new expenses.

Besides the so-called "living" communication which is maintained by the couriers, the Ukrainian liberation movement has other ways and means by which the part of the Organization in the Native Country and that in the emigration keep in touch with each other. However, the couriers' service is most important because such a communication is the surest and most exhaustive one. News, documents and comments on individual events and tendencies of the development of the situation, which are sent in both directions, are important not only because of their contents. They make possible the proper understanding of news which
are broadcast by radio and sent by the press and various publications across the Iron Curtain in both directions. Thanks to its own information on the processes and events in the Soviet Union which are concealed from the West by the Soviet Government-ZCh OUN is able to comment properly on the official information of the Soviet Government which are disseminated by the press and radio in a distorted and one-sided form.

Therefore, our appraisal of various processes and events of the political life in the Soviet Union differs from the similar appraisal by western observers and politicians most of whom rely on Soviet official news and sources.

On the other hand, the news and comments brought to the Ukraine from the units abroad help the units of OUN in the Native Country to appraise properly the political development on this side of the Iron Curtain and contend against the Russian propaganda.

HOPIT: Mr BANDERA, what do the vast masses of the Ukrainian people think of communism and Russian imperialism?

BANDERA: The Ukrainian people takes up an extremely hostile attitude towards Bolshevism, communism, communist system and regime. It also takes a hostile attitude towards all the kinds of enslavement and exploitation of the Ukraine by Russian imperialists. There is only a small number of Ukrainian fellow travelers of the Bolshevist regime who take upon another attitude towards it. The revolutionary anti-Bolshevik fight of the Ukrainian liberation movement is the true spokesman of the attitude and aspiration of the Ukrainian people. The broad masses of the Ukrainian people support this movement by every possible means and follow its political leaders. In consequence of that the Bolshevik government is faced by a mass passive resistance and active sabotage of its plans and actions in different spheres. It is evident primarily in the field of national and cultural life as well as in the social and economic policy of the Government.
HOPPE: By what means does Russia maintain its power over the Ukrainians?

/To be continued. All rights reserved by the Northwestern German Radio Station COLOGNE/.
THE GERMAN RADIO STATION COLOGNE HAS AN INTERVIEW
WITH STEFAN BANDERA

HOPPE: By what means does Russia maintain its ruling over the Ukrainians?

BANDERA: The ultimate end of the Bolshevik policy is to destroy the peculiar substance of the Ukrainian people in every respect, and to drown the Ukrainian people in the sea of the so-called Soviet people or, rather, in the modern form of the Russian imperialism devouring other people. In this way the Ukraine would allegedly turn into one of the Russian provinces. However, the Bolsheviks dare not speak openly of that end and pursue it in a straight way. On the contrary, they are compelled to apply very complicated means, and even to retreat in some fields. Russia is compelled to do so, on the one hand, by the firm attitude of the whole Ukrainian people in its fight against the Russian imperialism and communism and the revolutionary fight of the Ukrainian nationalistic liberation movement, and on the other hand, by the numerical strength of the Ukrainian people and the universal potential of the Ukraine. The striving for independence of the Ukrainian people has not been broken by Russia either by means of mass liquidation of the leading national cadres or by the unheard-of terrorizing of the whole Ukrainian people, which were carried on by the Soviets from the year 1930 to World War II by means of an artificial famine, mass deportations and executions. Besides the terrorizing all the opponents of Bolshevism, Russia is trying to apply new tactics: to change the striving for independence of the Ukrainian people into Soviet patriotism. Those tactics manifest themselves especially in today's Soviet propaganda which recently began to emphasize the role of the Ukraine as the second in size Soviet republic, to emphasize the grandeur of the Ukrainian people, the weight of the Ukrainian culture.
and the Ukraine and its people in general.

HOPPE: What do you think, Mr BANDERA, about the subjection of the Crimean peninsula to the administration of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, which took place after the year 1945, the demonstrative celebrations of this year of the incorporation of the Ukraine in the Soviet empire on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the PERESTAS-LAV treaty, the nomination of communists with Ukrainian names, loyal to Russia, to high public posts, and today's Russian tactics with regard to the Ukraine?

BANDERA: In this way Russia tries to convince the Ukrainians that the Ukraine and the Ukrainian people could have in the framework of USSR the best opportunity to develop, an opportunity to satisfy its national and political aspirations and even to become a ruling nation. Especially the latter possibility is emphasized by the Soviet propaganda which says that the "great Russian people" is willing to share its hegemony with the "great Ukrainian brotherly people". Behind this suggestion there is a Russian endeavour to connect the Ukraine with the Soviet imperialism, to make the Ukraine propagandize and defend it along with the Russians and to make the fate of the Ukraine dependent on its fate.

The Russian treacherous plans with regard to the Ukraine manifest themselves in the resettlement of the Ukrainian population, primarily that of the youth, to sparsely populated regions of Soviet Asia, which became recently well known. This resettlement is being carried on under the pretext of population of the virgin soil and changing it into arable land. The whole migration is allegedly voluntary. In fact, however, the Soviet national policy which is being realized by this new form of forced resettlement.

Economic plans play a second-rate role in this resettlement. By those means the Soviets try to decrease the Ukrainian youth and to weaken the potential of the population of the Ukraine.
In the new regions the resettled people should play the role of colonizers who, on the one hand, are completely dependent on the Soviet regime and must realize its colonial policy, and on the other hand, they will bring the hatred of the indigenous population upon themselves. The object of this policy is to weaken the national aggregate and the power of resistance in the Ukraine as well as in the colonized lands and to sow dissension among the peoples enslaved by Russia, primarily the Ukrainians and the Turkmen population.

However, Bolshevik Russia will not gain its end. Everything will be against Russia. The Siberian concentration camps and forced settlements will be unable to break the fighting spirit of the Ukrainians and their hate toward Bolshevism and Russian imperialism. Neither will they be able to influence the profound friendship of the peoples enslaved by Russia.

In the hearts of the Ukrainians there is no feeling of hate toward the allied nations. On the contrary, they wish all the peoples to unite in their common fight against the enslaver, Russian Bolshevism.

HOPPE: Mr BANDERA, what are the political objects of your Organization?

BANDERA: The anti-Bolshevik liberation fight in the Ukraine which is being carried on by the nationalist underground organization has already lasted 10 years. The main objects of this fight are:

1. Destruction of the Bolshevik rule;
2. Separation of the Ukraine from USSR and liquidation of the Russian empire on the whole;
3. Liquidation of communism, communist system and regime;
4. Restoration of the Independent Ukrainian State within its national ethnographic frontiers with a democratic system of governing which would guarantee the democratic freedoms in all the spheres of life of all the citizens of the Ukraine, primarily in the sphere of spiritual, cultural, political and social life.
HOPPER: Would you be so kind, Mr BANDERA, as to explain in detail the conception "Ukrainian nationalism"?

BANDERA: Today the anti-Bolshevik liberation fight in the Ukraine is organized and led by OUN, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The conceptions "Ukrainian nationalist", "nationalistic movement", differ from similar terms used in the West. The Ukrainian nationalistic movement has nothing in common with Nazism, fascism or national-socialism. Ukrainian nationalism is fighting against imperialism, chauvinism, hatred among peoples, against totalitarianism, racism, dictatorship and violence of any kind.

The name "Ukrainian nationalist" is consonant with "Ukrainian patriot" who is ready to fight for freedom of his people, to sacrifice for his people everything he has, even his life.

Ukrainian nationalism sets off the idea of independence and a free development of every nation against the so-called Bolshevik internationalism. We fight against the Bolshevik endeavours to impose the Russian rule on other nations. We oppose every form of Russian Bolshevism in every sphere of life.

HOPPER: In what form does the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists carry on its fight in the Ukraine today?

BANDERA: During World War II and in the first years after the War the Ukrainian liberation fight was carried on in the form of partisan warfare of the Ukrainian Insurrection Army, in which the broad masses of the Ukrainian people participated. Since 1949 the military activity of the Ukrainian Insurrection Army has decreased. However, its cadres have been maintained as a skeleton organization of its units for future operations. The revolutionary anti-Bolshevik fight of the Ukrainian people continues in the form of a political underground work. The task of the underground organization is to change the concealed hate toward the Russian-Bolshevik imperialism and the enslavement of non-Russian peoples living in the Soviet Union into an active resistance to Russia.
The Ukrainian liberation fight is a component part of the general liberation fight of all the peoples enslaved by Russian imperialism. In our opinion, Bolshevism is only one of the forms of the traditional Russian imperialism. In our fight against the Russian-Bolshevik imperialism we consider ourselves an ally of all the freedom-loving nations. We offered resistance to the Russian-Bolshevik imperialism in the past, we are opposing it now and we shall oppose it in the future.
Dear Mr. Beam,

This is a peripheral matter relating to the Soviet Union.

A generally reliable Polish emigre source whom we saw on April 28, 1955, citing contacts in the Ukrainian nationalist emigration, tells us that the nationalist leaders BANDERA and STETSKO are presently visiting Paris on a highly confidential mission involving conversations with French intelligence services. Source claims that Bandera and Stetsko are conducting negotiations with these services in connection with a Ukrainian emigre project related to operative work in the Ukraine. Source adds, however, that while obtained from responsible Ukrainians in the emigration, the report should be treated with reserve since the two Ukrainian leaders in question are known to be viewed with disfavor by the French authorities for their past pro-German affiliations, and their visit to Paris seems therefore improbable unless some major considerations have brought the French authorities to review their former attitude.

Sincerely,

Natalie C. Grant
Political Analyst

Jacob D. Beam, Esquire,
Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Germany
FROM: Chief of Station, Berlin

SUPERVISORY OFFICE/OKB/CRIMES

REFERENCE: A. HU-1/27, dated 16 June 1955
B. VIEZ-3871, dated 22 June 1955
C. ZU-08292, dated 17 June 1955
D. KU-15070, dated 19 April 1955

1. Attached herewith are the following reports relative to the two letters sent to ZOB/GUHN during May 1955 as described in reference A:

   a. Translation of ABBASZIN's report, dated 7 June 1955, entitled "ZOB/GUHN Operation "Kaker Against Ukrainian Groups".

   b. ABBASZIN's reproduction of DARREH's letter to the ZOB/GUHN which was intercepted by the anti-FMERA ZOB/GUHN and which ABBASZIN obtained from FODERABENT.

   c. Translation of ABBASZIN's report, dated 29 March 1953, entitled "Turky BORDAMAYEV and UPA Soldiers". This report is an attachment entitled "Turky BORDAMAYEV's Report to the UP" and which ABBASZIN obtained from the UP archives by ABBASZIN, which ABBASZIN again includes in attachment 4 above, as paragraph 3.

   d. Turky BORDAMAYEV's "Protocol" concerning the Slovaks from Bratislava which BORDAMAYEV attached to his cover letter in attachment 4 above.

2. In reference B, paragraph 2, it is requested that Venet submit the enclosure to Headquarters for translation.

27 July 1955

Attached: a/a DIRECT

DISTRIBUTION:

1. A. ZOB/GUHN w/Co. Co. attac.
2. ZOB/GUHN w/Co. Co. attac.
3. Ven w/Co. Co. attac.
4. Ven w/Co. Co. attac.
5. ZOB/GUHN w/Co. Co. attac.
SUBJECT: Yuriy BOROMATYICH and UPA Soldiers

INFO DATE: 29 March 1953

SOURCE: ARKAPAPELIN from Ivan KASHUBA; personal discussions with BOROMATYICH;
Fedir VENGER (at date of report in Salzburg, copy in Salzburg SB Archives)

1. Early in 1947, a group of UPA soldiers under Commander MAR made its way across Slovakia to Munich. In this group was Yuriy BOROMATYICH, who later, at the instructions of MAR, made two trips to Slovakia in order to organize a net to be used for the exfiltration of UPA personnel from the Ukraine and Slovakia to Vienna.

2. BOROMATYICH was in Slovakia in the period 9-25 April 1948. Returning to Germany, he brought with him a group of Slovaks who remained in Salzburg. In Germany, on 30 May 1948, BOROMATYICH gave the SB two reports, copies of which are enclosed. In addition to the group of Slovaks, BOROMATYICH escorted from Vienna to Salzburg and later to Germany, a group of UPA men, whose photographs are enclosed.

3. The SB suspected that MAR and BOROMATYICH were Soviet agents. There is basis for such suspicions. In the beginning of 1950, BOROMATYICH, at the instructions of the SB, went to Vienna and there he allegedly was arrested by the MGB. KASHUBA states that from 1947 BOROMATYICH was a Soviet agent; that there were other such agents in the UPA group which BOROMATYICH and MAR left for Germany. I have obtained the photographs of these UPA men from MGB/ABW but I have not been able to learn their true names or their pseudonyms. This might be accomplished through ZEV/ONU informants.

[Signature]
1. Obtaining the password and contact from Munich from Mr. to one of the Slovaks from Bratislava, I had the opportunity to become acquainted with other Slovaks who were known as trustworthy persons. None of them knew anything about me and I posed as a Pole who was smuggling sugar from Slovakia to Vienna. The persons I escorted to Salzburg intended even earlier to go to the Americans because they were threatened by arrest. And thus, on 21 April, five persons went on their way to Vienna escorted across Moravia by a Slovak. Two Slovak girls went with me; one had an American boyfriend and wanted to go to Vienna; the other had a boyfriend, a member of the Slovak underground in Munich from whom I carried a letter for her in Bratislava.

2. The following persons went from Vienna to Salzburg:
   a. Zlatka BERNHARD or BERNHART
   b. Katarina BERNHARD so PERNHARD
   c. Marija FRANKova
   d. Vladislav HEGEDUS
   e. Eugeniev FAHR or RAEBER
   f. Vojtech HAMPT
   g. Ivan LAMPERT
   h. Josef NURGER
   i. Káro BUKTINS
   j. Wilhelm FTOBDA

3. The following persons came from Vienna to Bratislava:
   a. Zlatka BERNHARD or BERNHART. Born 22 January 1910 in the village of Kroeha. Has lived in Bratislava since 1936 as the wife of a Carpatho-Ukrainian. Her husband was repatriated forcibly and she had an affidavit for migration to America. She decided to leave Slovakia illegally because she feared she would be persecuted because of her husband.
   b. Katarina BERNHARD. Born 10 August 1936 in Horev. Daughter of a peasant from Horev. Married Eugeniev Faier, also a peasant from Horev. In Bratislava, both were evicted from their home in Bratislava, the husband did not want to become a Communist, and went to relatives in Miroslav. Thence, "black" to Vienna. I spent one night with her parents and can live there any time. The parents are good people.
SECRET

C. Marta FRANKOVÁ: Born 12 April 1926 in Humpolec, her mother is Hungarian and her father Slovak. She finished school and speaks Hungarian, German, English, and Russian. Before 12 February 1939, she traveled to Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland as an intelligence agent and had contacts with Minister fnm BURGANSKI. Her boyfriend fled and she decided to leave her mother and join her boyfriend immediately.

D. Vladislav RENK: Born 14 June 1920 at Elntronska, where he traveled by boat on the Danube. Speaks Hungarian, Serbian, and German. Since 1938 has been in Slovakia. Since 1941 he has traveled by boat to Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, and Germany. On 25 February 1947 he was fired because he transported Slovaks by boat from Yugoslavia to Slovakia. He had not lived or worked in Bratislava until that date. On 18 March 1948, he was evicted from his home and was called in by the Seventh Odbor because he transported people. He was allowed to be free but, fearing arrest, he escaped with his wife to Vienna. He wants to work and travel to Hungary for the Americans as an intelligence agent. I have derived many contacts in Bratislava through him.

E. Eugene KAYSER: Born 15 October 1910 in Bratislava. He is Slovak, speaks Hungarian, Hungarian, and English. Lived permanently in Bratislava and worked for the technical firm Siemens. During the period of the Slovak state, he worked in a dynamite factory at Plips, and was in Slovakia from 1944 to 1945. He has worked in a factory office in Bratislava since 1947. He has never been a Communist. He escaped after he was evicted from his home because he is Hungarian. Moreover, he was called to the Seventh Odbor where he was interrogated about his contacts with the Polish consul, Mr. STAREWSKI. After that he left Slovakia because he was threatened with arrest. Fearing that he would be re-interrogated, he decided to flee to the Americans and join their army.

F. Vojtech HALLY: Born 23 April 1910; a tailor; always alone; worked for a firm from which he was fired because he is Hungarian; decided to escape to Americans.

G. Ivan LIAMPERT: Born 15 September 1921 in Roznava, Hungary; remained in Hungary until 1938; served in the army for three months; was repatriated to Slovakia as a Slovak during 1948; worked as a tailor; he doesn't favor the regime and searches for the possibility of going to Canada to work as a tailor.

H. Josef BURÖ: Born 12 June or January 1922, in Humpolec, a Slovak who from the beginning of the war was a Communist but learned Bolshevik reality and joined the Democratic Party in Slovakia. He favors a common Slovak-Slovak state, but wants Slovaks in Slovakia. Participated in the uprising in Slovakia during 1944 but later fled. Was in the Slovak Army from 1941, having served even in the Caucasus. In 1945, he went to work voluntarily with the finance-border police and was located on the Slovak-Czechoslovakia border at Humpolec, 15 kilometers from Uzhhorod. In January 1948 he went for training to Bratislava (as required for every finance guard). Since the Communist coup in 1948, he has planned to escape to the Americans and join their army. He left his uniform in Humpolec on the Austrian border.
SECRET

4. Karl KRETSCH: Born 15 September 1914, at Satov, Moravia; a Czech; speaks German well; worked as a ship's captain on the Danube during 1938-45; during 1936-38, he was in the Czech army as a rahunokory (accountant); wife is Hungarian, and remained behind in Popice, Okres Znoj. During 1936-38, he was in Seekastd and spent nine months in Brno; liked all nationalities and was anti-communist. The Germans wanted to naturalize him. On 15 May 1944, he was ordered to the SNS in Slovakia, and later in the TAZ, where they checked the documents of soldiers to determine if they are collaborators. Later, he was the proprietor of a restaurant in Popice. He fled because in 1945, when he led the organization of the Social-Democratic Party against the CP, the elections showed that the Communist obtained 92% of the votes; in reality, 60% of the votes were Social-Democratic. After the Communist coup, he was told that he must become a Communist and was threatened. He told his party members to remain loyal Social-Democratic. On 10 May, a police friend told him that he would be arrested. On 14 May, the Communists distributed leaflets with National-Socialist ideas and accused him of doing it. Therefore, he and Wilhelm STORKA escaped.

4. Wilhelm STORKA: Born on 21 March 1909, at Táblíčka; a judge from Znoj. In 1935, he was a member of the Austrian party and leader of the National-Socialist party. On 26 February 1945, he had to flee and hide since he was about to be arrested because of his connections with the National-Socialist party. He was under suspicion of planning a coup against the Communists. On 1 March, he returned home and was arrested and interrogated for two days by the Státní Bezpečnost. He was freed but he did not want to go anywhere or talk with anybody. The police wanted to learn from him the trustworthiness of the National-Socialists toward the Czechoslovak government organs. He was suspected of collaboration with the Germans and during the period of the First Republic. On 27 February he was relieved from his duties and was transferred to Karl KRETSCH in Popice, and was found (meaning unknown) with the ruling that he was not to receive any salary.
An
B.A. Stephan Bijlichko
München:
Dachauer Strasse 9, Stiege 2, Stock 2, Redaktion
Deutschland:

Wien 16, Anastasius-Grünasse 78, Krotjuk W.

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CS Classification: 999999-999-9
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R.E. # 2.3-53
Slawa Ukraina!


3. Diese Abteilung interessiert sich in Österreich für folgende Personen:
   1. Nikolaos Kouryoudioglou, Student, 3. 5. 1934 in Griechenland geb., Wien 9, Währinger Gürtel 130/1/13 wohnhaft.
   2. Pisenkij Kurt, geb. 1923, Wien 10, Quarinplatz 10/12, Stiege 2, Wohnungh 10 wh.
   3. Wienerberger Anna Maria, geb. 1918, Wien 10, Landgutstrasse 9/1/5 wh.

4. Agenten der Verwaltung für illegale Aufklärer der I. Verwaltung des K.G.B. sind:
   2. Karl Soukal, oder Manfred Prager, beide Tullnerbach-Lawinen bei Wien, Brenntennaisstrasse 5a, wohnhaft.

S.U.

KARMEN

ICH BISTE UM MÖGLICHST SCHNELLER ERLAUFUNG IHREHER ADRESSE DURCH
Salzburger Nachrichten.
During 1948, the SD-ZGR/OUN in Munich began to build an operational network in Vienna and designated Turk Borodkivich as its organizer and its principal agent. Today, the SD has come to the conclusion that Borodkivich and the majority of his sub-agents were Soviet agents and that the SD, from the very inception, controlled this net and its activities. Because of this control the Soviets, with the assistance of Borodkivich, have been able to infiltrate its agents into West Germany, into the ranks of the ZGR/OUN and to penetrate Czech and Slovak groups.

Borodkivich, about 25 years of age, comes from Stdilavsky, Western Ukraine, where he became closely related with the family of Borodkivich. In 1943, he entered the ranks of SS Division "Galicia" and, in 1944, he fell a prisoner to the Soviets, at the age of 11. According to Khashura, while Borodkivich was a prisoner-of-war, he was recruited by the Soviets and sent to Western Germany. There he entered the service of a French military mission where he served for one year. In 1946, he entered Slovakia illegally and continued traveling until he arrived in the Carpatho-Ukraine where he was captured by UPA (Ukrainian Resistance Army). He was interrogated for a long time and the UPA decided to liquidate him since they suspected that he was an enemy agent. However, he was not shot because Borys (pseudonym), commanding officer of another UPA unit who knew Borodkivich personally, learned about his arrival to the Carpatho-Ukraine and interceded in his behalf. Borodkivich accompanied this UPA unit when it infiltrated to West Germany in 1947.

In April 1948, Borodkivich went to Prague, where he presented fake French documents, in order to fulfill Mr. Khashura's instructions. He also organized a network which would establish contact with the Carpatho-Ukraine. He was told to establish a base of operations in Vienna from where operations into the homeland. He remained in Slovakia until April 1948 and then he returned to Vienna. He returned to Prague in May 1948 and sent the following report concerning his trip:

*During my stay in Slovakia during 9-25 April 1948, I was able to:
  a. Find definitely reliable people;
  b. Obtain information from them;
  c. Locate a place for overnight lodging;
  d. Establish contacts with such organizations.*
(1) A Captain of Czech Commissariat;
(2) A Czech Captain who is commandant of a port in Bratislava;
(3) An engineer in a dynamite factory in Bratislava;
(4) A worker in a radio intercept station in Bratislava;
(5) A SIS (Security Service) sergeant (pdistarschyra) in Trnava.

"I did not speak with these personalities personally; this was affected through a Slovak.

"Aside from this, I was able to recruit a person who, for sufficient payment, is able to travel to Uzhhorod and thereby be our contact with the Carpatho-Ukraine.

"Having such assets at my disposition, I am ready to fulfill the following CSH/OSW instructions:

a. To organize an espionage network throughout the CSH;

b. To establish contact from Munich-Vienna-Bratislava to the Carpatho-Ukraine;

c. To organize a secret radio station.

"To fulfill the first point, I need the following support:

a. One man to translate (who speaks the Slovak language);

I suggest that we use JENKELT, former member of the SS Division "Gusia" whom I know personally and whom I have already investigated.

b. One man for the Munich-Vienna-Bratislava contact: he should have an Austrian pass (passport), should know the German and Slovak languages and should know the border area. I can obtain additional Austrian and Slovak passports.

"If it is possible to find another such person, then it would be better to have him operate the Munich-Vienna or the Vienna-Bratislava section. I have two points with trustworthy individuals in Vienna where our people will be able to eat and stay overnight.

"Concerning the third point: Thanks to my acquaintance with and assistance of personalities of the Slovak underground in the CSH, I was able to receive a place for overnight lodgings and food. I must return to Slovakia in order to check these sites personally."
*In order to fulfill this instruction, I must have:

a. A sufficient amount of money for expenses and salaries of these cut-outs and Slovak informants;

b. A code with which I would transmit my reports and maintain contact with the base;

c. Agreed-upon passwords with the cut-outs and courier pseudonyms;

d. One or two pistols for my personal protection in the event of compromise to myself or any of my collaborators.

I request that a decision be made concerning this affair soonest in order that I may begin as soon as possible. I have already spoken with these Slovaks who await my return; they will give me all the necessary help in establishing contacts with the espionage net throughout the CSR.

Written on 22 May 1948

1. VATILEVKO accepted BORDALEVICH's proposition with minor changes and thus BORDALEVICH went to Vienna in order to continue his work. He recruited the following personalities in Vienna:

   - Vasyl ELOTVOLO
   - Secretary
   - Ukraine Embassy
   - Second Secretary
   - Ivan KARAL
   - Press officer

   * All of them were at that time Soviet agents, including IVAN KARAL who worked both in Vienna and now resides in Munich. Through the contact point at Vienna, there passed UPA men who are suspected of having been recruited by the MI6 even earlier. VATILEVKO sent his couriers through this Vienna contact point to Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine.

2. During 11-16 September 1945, BORDALEVICH disappeared from Vienna. Later, it was rumored that he fled because the Soviets were to arrest him on the Inn River while he was enroute to Salzburg. This report remains unverified after his disappearance, Vasyl ELOTVOLO and his wife, Zorya, wrote to the ZOK/UN in Munich and proposed that they would accept the responsibility of continuing the SB station in Vienna. Although the SB, whose chief then was Ivan KARAL, was a little more cautious than earlier, they accepted their proposal. This collaboration flourished until 1953 when KARAL convinced that the Vienna station was under MI6 control, broke off contact with VATILEVKO.
I (KONFELEIN) and later, Ivan KASHURA, became convinced that the Vienna MGB not only controlled the operations of the Vienna station, but that the MGB suggested to RECONNOTION that he establish the Vienna station. When Myron MATYTSIN accepted this plan, then the MGB infiltrated this station with its own agents. During this time, the MGB received information from HERRMANN concerning the SS operations, the activities of the "Homeland Contact" section and the ZOG/IGN Project in Munich. This information enabled the MGB to study the situation in Munich very carefully and it enabled the MGB to gain an entree into the IGN in the homeland. This was achieved via interception of couriers which passed from Munich through Vienna to the Ukraine.

The MGB did not bother the ZOG/IGN after the SS broke contact with its Vienna stations. However, now the MGB has initiated new action which I entitle, "MGB Project KARAJE?": The reason I have named this follows:

During early May 1955, a letter arrived from Vienna to Stepan (HURLA) HURLA, Bahnhofstrasse 9, Stock 2, Redaktion, Munich, Germany. The return address was: Main 18, Anastasia-Gruengasse 18, M. KASTRAU (HORST). The contents and envelope were typewritten in the German language and bore the direction, "Drug Chud" (Friend Chad). (MGB COMMENT: Chad is Ivan KASHURA's pseudonym.) The contents were signed, "KARAJE." Because the letter was addressed to Stepan, it was directed to the Ukrainskyy Samostyiynyy Nnyborstva (UKRAINSKY), whose task in to disseminate the mail to the BANDERA faction in this building, passed this letter to Ivan KASHURA. I personally haven't read the contents of this letter but KASHURA related the following partial contents:

a. The MGB section, in which KONFELEIN formerly served, ten years ago was preparing for the assassination of Stepan BANDERA. This attempt failed because of a provocation related with the individuals who were designated to execute it. The MGB was strongly concerned about this failure.

b. The MGB has not forgotten this plan and intends to make another attempt to assassinate BANDERA ZUBNVR members via an IGN officer in Berlin.

c. This assassination will take place in the Munich area where BANDERA lives under a pseudonym.

d. The anonymous author informs ZOG/IGN and ZUBNVR that they should not send its couriers to the old addresses and should not use the old recognition signals because the MGB now has them and only waits the arrival of these new couriers in order to apprehend them on the spot.

e. The anonymous author furnishes a list of personalities in the Ukraine who were recently arrested by the MGB.
The anonymous author lists several MOB collaborators in Austria, especially in Vienna, who are supposed to assist in the assassination of BANDERA and the ZPUBR personalities.

This letter also might contain mention of Myroslav MATVIIUK's arrest.

The author also requests that, in order to verify that the letter was received, the addressee should place an ad in the Salzburger Nachrichten or in another Austrian newspaper.

8. The SB and ZCh/OUN Provid analyzed this letter and came to the following conclusions:

a. This letter was written by an MOB officer who has been associated with OUN affairs in the homeland and in the emigration.

b. He knows not only the pseudonyms of BANDERA, MATVIIUK and KASHURA, but also pseudonyms of all SB and ZCh/OUN Provid members.

c. He forwards information which corresponds to 80 per cent of the truth.

d. He was very well oriented concerning the planned attempt at BANDERA's assassination in 1952 which the British and American police in Munich were surveilling.

e. He knows BANDERA's pseudonym and the address where BANDERA has been living for a long time.

f. He must have been a member of an important MOB center, perhaps in Kiev, and now is in Austria.

g. He must have had access to the top secret MOB documents because he forwards true names, addresses, dates of birth and other confidential biographical statistics.

9. The SB does not know what course of action to pursue in this affair. As yet, the SB has not placed the ad in an Austrian newspaper and thereby has not informed the anonymous author that the letter has been received. The SB has decided to await further events.

10. Because "KARMEN" did not receive a reply via the Austrian newspaper, he sent another letter to the same address on 25 May 1955. However, the SB did not receive this letter but it fell into the hands of the anti-BANDERA ZCh/OUN. Although this letter is less interesting than the first, it does throw some light on MOB plans or the plans of "KARMEN". Because I don't have the letter and therefore must rely on KASHURA's word, I make the following conclusions.
a. The SIS's analysis regarding the author, his role with the
MGB and his knowledgeability concerning 20/0UN problems is approxi-
mately true. Either the author, or his cut-out, is very well informed
concerning OWI activities in the homeland and in the emigration.

b. The operation which is covered in these letters is an important
Soviet affair which they plan to carry out; the letters only indicate
that preparations are being made to affect this action.

II. There are only two possibilities which can be surmised in this
operation:

a. The MGB is preparing the basis for the dispatch to the West
of an important MGB officer who ostensibly will execute the assassina-
tion of BANDERA and the ZPUNR personalities. However, at the latest
moment (similar to the KOROLEV case), this officer will not fulfill
this assignment and will turn himself to the Americans or, even
better, to the Germans. He will obtain the right of asylum and,
after some time has elapsed (perhaps 10-15 years), he will take up
an MGB assignment. The Soviets have been preparing for this affair
for the past two years; it is for this reason that the letter mentions
that the assassin will be an MGB official who served in the same
section as KOROLEV. This MGB official has learned how KOROLEV was
able to gain an entree to the West and will follow in KOROLEV's
steps. The moral aspects of such a defection has already been
justified. KOROLEV confessed to everything and has been left in
peace, i.e., nothing threatens him. The attempt on BANDERA in 1952,
which appeared to contain some reality, probably was not intended
to be fulfilled, the intention being to publish their intentions to
the British and Americans. It is for this reason that the author
gives BANDERA's pseudonym and the address where BANDERA lived at
that time and where the assassination was to have taken place in
order to prove that he (the author) truly was a member of that
particular MGB section and was aware of all that was going on.
Perhaps he even was the responsible officer for that particular
project. Thus, when he defects to the West he will confirm the
full aspects of that operation and his confession will have been
checked both by the British, the Americans and the German authori-
ties which surveilled the operation. The MGB officer will not
necessarily be from the Ukrainian section; he only will be assigned
to the German section through the Ukrainian section.

b. The planned assassination of BANDERA and ZPUNR members is
only a pretext and will not take effect. Actually, the aforementioned
MGB officer will be instructed to defect to the West and give the
Americans or Germans revealing information concerning the OWI in the
Ukraine, its personalities, contacts with the Ukraine, etc., which
will completely change the picture concerning the Ukrainian underground
in the Ukraine, and which will force the West to revise its position
concerning cooperation with Ukrainian nationalist agents with regard
to their intelligence or espionage potential, etc. The MGB officers
will give concrete information which he will fortify with concrete
cr
facts pointing out that beginning with such and such a year, all
contacts with the Ukraine passed through the hands of the MGB, that
such and such designated OUN and UHTR members have collaborated with
the MGB since such and such a year, that all W/T channels were con-
trolled by the MGB, that the material which was sent out was an
ordinary MGB trick, that not one OUN member is free, that all have
been liquidated or are in prison, that the split creating the pro and
anti BANDEIKA factions was effected by the MGB, etc. Suffice it to say
that this MGB officer can bring out such revelational material which will
bring about a complete re-evaluation of the situation in the homeland.
He certainly will state information which will be approximately 80
per cent true or which is already known in the West or which can be
believed in one way or another. However, the rest of his information
will be to the advantage of the MGB which cannot be checked and which
will change the attitude in the West toward the OUN.

12. This is only my hypothesis but in my belief it remains within the
realm of possibility. I cannot otherwise explain this refined action which
has been planned by the MGB for the past two years.

13. It also must be mentioned that all the information which the author
provides in these two letters will, after investigation, prove to be correct,
I.e., concerning the MGB collaborators in Austria, the names and addresses of
those collaborating in the assassination attempt, etc. The MGB knows that
now, when Austria has neutrality, nothing will happen to those individuals.
This is in reference to those "written off" (vpadanykh) agents, that is, those for whom the MGB does not have any further need. I believe that the
MGB in Vienna has penetrated every ministry, the police and that the MGB
even has its agent-candidates to take over leading positions in the future
Austrian army. Why should not the MGB risk Jakob KATZ or other minor agents
who today do not represent any asset for the Soviets.

14. Attention should be given to the return address on these letters:
M. KROTH (KROTH). Undoubtedly such a person lives at that particular
address. He probably has lived in Austria for about 30 years, probably is
an Austrian citizen, probably married to an Austrian woman and probably is
the proprietor of some sort of transport business. Whether the author is
using the name and address of this individual with the letter's consent or
whether the latter is playing a role in this particular operation is not
known. Perhaps he is one of the MGB links in this action.

15. In any event, I believe that this affair is extremely interesting
and it would be worthwhile to monitor or control it further. The mistakes
incurred by the anti-BANDEIKA ZCH/OUN should be corrected, i.e., it is necessary
to re-mail the second letter from Austria to Munich. The SB does not know about
the arrival of the second letter. To re-mail this letter in the original
envelope is impossible because it has been mutilated by a member of the anti-
BANDEIKA ZCH/OUN, i.e., he tore off the stamp and postmark and may have even
destroyed the envelope. Certainly the individuals who are aware of this
affair should remain silent; should the BANDEIKAites learn that the anti-BANDEIKA
ZCH/OUN have become knowledgeable then the former will foresake this affair and
we won't be able to monitor it any further.
PRAISE TO THE UKRAINE

SECRET

PRAISE TO THE UKRAINE

1. The grocery wholesale and export and import firm, GEIER & Co., in Vienna 7, Schottenfeldgasse 95, belongs to the AUSTRIAN, Jakob Kitz, born 21 September 1910 in Italy, citizenship unclear, Jewish, single, in Austria registered with the police and lives at Vienna 3, Goloogasse 8, with his legal friend. Jakob Kitz is an illegal Soviet agent. This firm was financially supported by the USSR and is in the process of being liquidated.

2. A Colonel from the division in which ERKINOV served is preparing an attempt from Berlin on BULGAR and members of the ZGR (Notes: Actually not believed to mean ZGR).\[signature\]

3. The division is interested in Austria in:
   a. Nikolai KUBIDEKIOSLOU, student, born 3 May 1919, Greece; Civil figure?
   b. Em. VITZEL, born 1921; resides Vienna 10, Queenposter, Austria.
   c. Anna Maria LEISCHER, born 1919; resides Vienna 10, Landstrasse 27/19, Munich, Austria.
   d. Anna BORGESOFER, born 1919; resides Vienna 10, Queenposter, Austria.
   e. Maria BANOLA, born 1920; resides Vienna 2, Blumenpgasse, Civil figure?

4. The following agents of the sub-division for illegal agents of the 1st section of the GGR:
   a. Maria ALT, born 1920; resides Vienna 17, Ungarstrasse, Austria.
   b. Ida Stelzl, born 1925; resides Vienna 17, Ungarstrasse, Austria.

SUS (Praise to the Ukraine)

Please let me know your address as soon as possible through the Salzburg Nachrichten.
SECRET - 9 -

ENVELOPE:

Postmark: Wien 02
25. 5. 35 - 13

An
Herrn Stephan RICHLICH
München
Dachauer Strasse 9, Stiege 2, Stock 2, Redaktion
Deutschland.

****************************

Wien 18, Augustiner-Gründasse 18, KROTJUK, M.
Chief of Base, Brand.

Chief of Station, Germany

Operational/RAW Trace/ANCIENT

Stefan REUTER

REFERENCES: see CIG, 25 November 1955

It will be appreciated if you will take over the action on reference
since you are more familiar with subject and his activities than anyone in
previously. A CIG trace would only duplicate yours and in all probability be
less complete.

6 November 1955

Distribution:
2 - MOB
2 - CIG
3 - HQ.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3820
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006
TO: DIR
INFO: FRAU, STUT
SUBJECT: \FILE

1. REF INDICATES STEFAN KANDER APPLIED FOR NON-IMMIGRANT VISA TO FRANCE. ALTHOUGH HE OF NO DIRECT INTEREST ANALYSTS CANNOT PASS LOCAL ODACIO'S INFO BEYOND SKETCHY BIOS DATA SINCE MOD FILES REFLECT INFO PRIMARILY OF OP NATURE. ALSO UNABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER SMITH-BANDEIRA AND SMITH-KUBARK RELATIONS ENTER PICTURE.

2. WE PREFER NOT PASS ANY INCOMPLETE INFO, HENCE REQUEST AUTHORIZATION AND ADVISE LOCAL ODACIO THAT HQS WILL FURNISH ODACIO KUBARK TRACES AND RECOMMENDATIONS. THIS MATTER. PLS EXPEDITE.

3. ALSO \FILE REQUESTED BY LOCAL ODACIO OUR INFO AND TRACES TARA-BULIQ-OPQWEETS WHO ARE BEING PROCESSED FOR REGULAR VISA. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION ALSO ADVISE AS IN PAPA 2 ABOVE, THAT HQS TAKING NEEDED STEPS ADVISE ODACIO.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
FROM: KMICIT

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/CI, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI, RC, EC 4, S/C 2

DATE: 30 DEC 55

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MUNICH

ACTION: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/CI, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EC 4, S/C 2

MUNI 2807 (IN 16717)

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/CI, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EC 4, S/C 2

DATE: 30 DEC 55

TO: DIR

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/CI, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, EC 4, S/C 2

ROUTE

REDWOOD - CC - PROVE AERODYNAMIC

RE: A. MUNI 2571 (IN 38241) B. STUT 1870 (IN 39806)

C. DIR 37999 (OUT 50034) D. ENSA 18900

1. ENSA 6349 GIVES FOLL INFO: ACCAVATINA 1, DOB 1 JAN 09, POB

UHRWUR STARYJ, POLAND, CURRENTLY RESIDING BREITBRUNN, AMMERSEE 135.

APPLIED TO VISIT AMCON FOR NON-IMMIGRANT VISA. HE INFORMED LOCAL

ODAICD HE ŻCHOUN/B HEAD. TRACES WERE REQUESTED BY CHIEF CIS PER

EGSA 6349.

2. WE OBTAINED AMCON ACCAVATINA 1 APPLICATION FOR VISA

POUCHED PER REF D) WHICH INDICATES FOLL:

A. HE TRAVELING IN NAME IDEN.

B. DOB 1/9/09; POB JAROSLEV, POLAND.

C. DESTINATION IS JOSEPHRA 51 NEIPSIC ROAD, GLASTONBURY,

CONN.

D. TRIP BEING FINANCED BY SHLOMA PEREMOHA.

E. PURPOSE OF TRIP IS "TO VISIT FAMILY".

F. WILL VISIT U.S. ALONE FOR TWO MONTHS FROM CIRCA DEC 55

TO SEDA 56.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006
30 DEC 55
MUNI 2807 (IN 16717)
PAGE -2-

6. NO PHOTOS SUBMITTED.

3. RECASS 3 AND 6 HAVE NO INFO RE TRIP. AECAPELIN APPRISED BY
HASSANA THAT AECAVATINA 1, GOING BUT GIVEN NO OTHER DETAILS. AECAPELIN
THEORIZES AECAVATINA 1 TRAVELING U.S. IN ORDER COUNTER ACTIVITIES OSP
(BOYDUNYK 1949) WHO NOW U.S. (SEE EGWA 1849). AECAVATINA 1 AND FETZRO
NOW AT LOGGERHEADS AND FORMER REFUSES PERMIT LATTER GO FOR WHAT APPEARS
BE POLITICAL PURPOSES STIR NG ZHOUR/B MEMBERS U.S.

END OF MESSAGE
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: MUNICH
ACTION: Sr. 2
INFO: EE 2, 6/C 2

DATE: 31 DEC 55

REDWOOD LC/IMPROVE AERODYNAMIC
RE: MUNI 287 (IN 46717)
IDENT: STEPHAN POPEL.

END OF MESSAGE

"CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT: NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT."
NO.

AMA - 18210

(MOP) AIR OR SEA MUCH/

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 5, Jan. 1956

SUBJECT: general - Operational/SS/0003/1CDN-AOV/AVATINA

SPECIFIC - AVATINA'S Visa Application for Travel to the United States

Reference: A. MUNZ ZN77
S. DER. 27659

Transmitted under separate cover attachment is a copy of

AVATINA'S application for a non-immigrant visa to the United
States.

Approved: 3 January 1956

Attachment: SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:

WASH w/1 copy att S/C
3- COG w/o att
2- NBS w/1 copy att

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2004 2006

CLASSIFICATION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Jaroslav Popel</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Breitbrunn a. Ammersee 125</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Polish (Polen)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Arrival</td>
<td></td>
<td>28/1/1956</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Place of Arrival</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany, Starnberg</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Visa Type</td>
<td>Non-immigrant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>2 months</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>Michael Popel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address in USA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Breitbrunn a. Ammersee 125</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Place</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Strzy</td>
<td>Strzy</td>
<td>West-Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Lwów</td>
<td>Lwów</td>
<td>West-Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Warschau, Lemberg</td>
<td>Lwów</td>
<td>West-Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Warschau, Krakau</td>
<td>Krakau</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Warschau, Krakau</td>
<td>Krakau</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Warschau, Krakau</td>
<td>Krakau</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Berlin, Gammelsburg, Lemberg</td>
<td>Lwów</td>
<td>West-Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ich reise allein**

(Reise allein bedeutet, dass der Zeuge bei Übersetzung dieser Erklärung im Alter von 18 Jahren alleine verblieben ist.)

**Vermerke**

(Vermerke sind erforderlich, wenn sich die alte Adresse nicht mehr ergeben läßt, oder wenn die alte Adresse nicht mehr in der alten Weise existiert.)

**Ukrainische Freiheitsbewegung**

(Ort: Ukrainerischer Nationalisten)

**Besondere Erklärung vor dem Herrn, Generalkonsul**

(Übersetzung: Besondere Erklärung vor dem Herrn, Generalkonsul)

**Referenzen**

(Referenzen sind erforderlich, wenn die alte Adresse nicht mehr erreichbar ist, oder wenn die alte Adresse nicht mehr in der alten Weise existiert.)

**Joseph Bandera**

(Sidney Road, Glastonbury, Connecticut, USA)

(Mitwirkend an der Vereinigung)

**Jaroslav Benza**

(München, Zeppelinstr. 67, 62, mit Verlag)
ALS FÜHRER MITGLIED ORGANISATIONSVERBAND (D.U.R.) FUHR POLITISCH-GERICHTE VERHÖRTE UND VON JUNI 1934 - SEPTEMBER 1937 IN GEFÄNGNISSE IN BERLIN UND IN KZ. - ORANIEBURG GEFANGEN GENHALT.

BESCHREIBUNG

SCHRIFTSTARICHER MEKKER

STEFAN

POLITISCH

...
5 JAN 1955

MUNICH 8. ROSENBUSCHSTR 6/3
57. NEWISIC ROAD, GLASTONBURY, CONNECTICUT


New York - New Haven

Signature: Stefan Pepel
1. Munich has noted that Stefan Bandera, using the alias of Stefan Voggel, has applied to the Munich Consul General for a non-immigrant visa to the United States for two months, allegedly "to visit family". The U.S. specific destination was given as the home of Joseph Bandera, Glastonbury, Connecticut.

2. Stefan Bandera's agents, as is well known, attempted to terrorize Ukrainians in the camps of post-war Germany, committing violence on the inmates and not stopping at murder. It is known that his adherents have attempted to exact revenge on Ukrainian DF's who have emigrated to the United States on behalf of his organization. Bandera publishes a newspaper in Western Germany and his extremist political organization promotes an avowedly totalitarian ideology. The paper also regularly attempts to stir up national animosities and indulges in unrelenting attacks on the United States--urging its readers not to cooperate with United States authorities. The organization still practices terrorism in the exile community.

3. Bandera and his organization are widely disliked by emigres of many political persuasions and nationalities. It is believed that Bandera wishes to come to this country to conduct political agitation against legitimate Ukrainian organizations with ties with Ukrainian groups abroad, which the agency supports or upon which it looks with favor.

4. The granting of a visa would prejudice the interests of the United States. It would alienate an important segment of emigre opinion, and raise the prestige of an emigre figure whose objectives are opposed to those of the United States. It would create an exaggerated impression of Bandera's power and importance, and demonstrate that vicious attacks on the United States and United States interests by emigres need no bar to securing an American visa. Granting a visa would also impair relationships with the British, who severed relations with Bandera as the result of CIA representations.
5. It is requested that the Office of Security inform the Department of State of the true identity of "Nefas Popel" and of our views on the matter, so that the Department may take appropriate action.

Distribution:
Orig & 2 to Address:
1 - Sec
1 - Col
1 - CIC

SECRET
TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MUNICH

ACTION: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2

MINI 3092 (IN 211412)

REDWOOD AERODYNAMIC

RE: A. DIR 43782 (OUT 61544)
   B. MINI 28148 (IN 42265)
   C. MINI 2807 (IN 46717)

1. RE FIRST SENTENCE REF A, AMCONGEN ADVISES HAS NO WORD FROM ODACID WASH RE DENYING VISA TO AECAVATINA 1 WHO OVERDUE CONTINUE PROCESSING; REQUESTS MATTER BE CLARIFIED SINCE HAS NO LOCAL AUTHORITY DENY VISA.

2. RE SECOND SENTENCE REF B, SEE PARA 2A REF C.

3. RE PARA 3 WILCO ON RECEIPT INFO FROM AECASS 3.

4. FYI: ACCORDING TO AECAV 1 PRESENTLY UNDERGOING EXHAUSTIVE INTERROGATION BY MINI KD 2 RE, IDENTITY AND ACTIVITIES GERMANY WITH VIEW FINDING SOME CHARGE AGAINST HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
TO : Chief, SE
   Attn: J

FROM : Chief of Staff, mission

DATE: ---/---/1956

INFO: COS

SUBJECT: GENERAL—REDWOOD/IC/IMPROVE/ABROAD

SPECIFIC—ABN

1. The enclosed untranslated ARCAFELIN report (Attachment A), dated 30 December 1955, contains Nyro's comments on a situation which affects the ABN, primarily that Yaroslav Semyonko and Serhiy Banderia are at loggerheads for reasons of finance and political prestige.

2. Relative to the above, see Attachment B (for Headquarters only) which is AREFELIN 2's translation of BANDERA's article, UN or ABN, which appeared in the 25 December 1955 edition of the pro-BANDERA ZOC publication, Shlyakh Peremoly.

Approved:

15 February 1956

Attachment: As stated

Distribution:
1 - WASH w/1 cc att A & B
2 - COS w/o att.
3 - MOB w/1 cc att A; w/o att B
hvp
Мирослав ОТРАНКА, який приблизно ще рік працює в АЕН і тим самим добре зрозумів ситуації та організації, розповів мені нейкаво про пріоритети непорозуміння поміж Іосифом ОТРИОКСОМ, президентом АЕН і Степаном Бандерою, головою 3Ч СУН.

Непорозуміння ті носять подвійний характер:
1) суто фінансовий,
2) престіжно-політичний.

Сутофінансові непорозуміння мають такий характер: АЕН не диспоноє ніякими своїми фінансовими засобами, згідно засоби є мінімальні. Воно робота АЕН-у кожного року коштувала приблизно 100.000 Євро, які виплачували все каса 3Ч СУН.

Тих 100.000 були зуміані передовсім на:
a) оплаченням співробітників АЕН, вперше чергу чужинців,
b) оплачення різних віддань АЕН як "АЕН-Кореспонденції", різних брошури, відео т.п.
в) оплачення різних пресових конференцій і подорожей як президента АЕН так ж інших співробітників Центра.

г) адміністративні видатки як приміщення, світло, оплата, телефон і т.п.

Ходне національне представництво, яке заступляє в АЕН до тепер не виєло звідного ефекта на роботу АЕН, а навпаки все підприємницьких національних промислів б'є на каси АЕН і обирають місячно від 290 - 500 Євро.

Степан Бандера стоїть на становища, якщо АЕН має бути інтернаціональною антиколоніальною організацією, то всі національні представництва пропорційно до чисельності кожної еміграції мають внести до АЕН свої грошові засоби. За звичай украйська сторона в АЕН не може більше дати грошей як 20 процентів. Інших 50 процентів — мають внести національні представництва. Ситуація фінансова в 3Ч СУН в останніх років погіршувала і тому Степан Бандера є придушником пороги всіх бюджетних скорочень.

...
Ярослав СТЕЦьКО, який в основі приймає рішення БАНГЕРА, приводить однак зі своїх сториок дуже позитивні протарганути, а саме:

а) серед інших емігрантських груп є ще мало прихильників АБН. Коли до тепер випало все таки притягнути ряд національних представників, то треба робити все, щоб вони втримали при АБН.

Коли АБН буде вимагати від національних представників вносити грошові датки, то такі представники взагалі вийдуть з АБН. Так само відноситься до лідерів національних представників, які є на статі ЛН. Коли ВМ відмовляється від комісійної допомоги, то вони будуть примушені шукати собі працю де інде і не зможуть увійти в АБН.

б) Здобутого ті національних груп, які є заступлені в АБН не є маєть своїх сильних політичних організацій і тому вони не можуть переводити збірки на АБН.

в) Хоча АБН і є міжнародною організацією, то все таки він пропагує найбільше українську справу, а не лежить також в інтересах ЧУ ОУН.

Ці аргументи Ярослава СТЕЦьКО не переконали Степана БАНГЕРА. Він сказав своє тверде "ні". Він дал Ярославові СТЕЦьКОВІ час три місяці, щоб він сам зорганізував свою власну фінансову підтримку. Після тих трьох місяців, щоб до листопада 1936 включно, він не буде фінансово підтримувати АБН, хоча вже в менших розмірах. Натомість від місяця листопада, він буде вносити лише 50 процентів всього бюджету АБН.

Звідки цього Ярослав СТЕЦьКО вже розпочав акцію збирання грошей на АБН. В кожній країні посеред емігрантів, які належать до АБН він встановлює фінансових представників, якими доручає переводити збірки. В інструкції для українських представників сказано, щоб вони в першу чергу переводили збірки серед чужинців, і не обмежували українців, які вже і так складають гроші на ЧУ ОУН, від якого вони отримували якісь безпосередні гроші. Миросям БАНГЕРА твердить, що за місяць грудень ті назначенні, фінансові представники збірали дуже мало грошей. Можливо, що в наступних місяцях їм вдасться зібрати дещо більше.

Які престижно-політичні непорозуміння.

Про ті непорозуміння Степана БАНГЕРА виразно не говорять, але катомість СТЕЦьКО в розмовах з довіреними людьми про
висказується зовсім виразно. Він твердить, що Степан Бандера боїться, що Ярослав Сіпінcko з кожним роком зорганізовує все сильніше стає популярною особою на міжнародному відділенні. Його від- 
відники в Генералі Франка, його відвідувані в Чайн Кай Евак і 
його переписка з Сінаном Рі і іншими політиками - усувають 
Бандеру з тієї.

Того Бандера якось не говорить, однак він хоче всіми силами 
послабити авторитет СПЕШИКА. А він може послабити його тільки 
tоді, коли унеможливить йому роботу, нідмовляючи фінансової 
підтримки АЕНові.

З завданьших на ДНІ грошовий штаб Степана Бандера зібрани 
ОПХ розбудувати видачність у розумінні різних праців на 
чужих зовнішніх та самих зовнішніх розповіді його вірні 
іншіськи на нинішню пору.

Чим закінчиться той комплек: Бандера-Сіпінcko поки що не 
з'ясо- 
но. Фактом є, що АЕН вже виповнює працю Миронова СИРІАНЦІ 
і 
де декільком людям, та рівночасно проводіть до місяця марта 
платні тим працівникам, які залишаються будуть дещо скорочені.
He whose way of thinking is old, from the time before the year 1914, does not understand the reasons of the unprecedented success of the Russian aggression, and the retreat of the West which is also unprecedented. "Natural borders", markets, guarantees, protection against enemy aggression, as aims of the international policy; the interests of a state as the starting-point of that policy, -- these are the categories which nearly do not exist in the international life of the present time.

It is ridiculous to assert that Russia must extend from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean in order to reach security and "natural borders". But it is also an absurdity, though many people do not understand it, to maintain that nowadays all statesmen are guided by the interests of their countries. Indeed, was it in the interest, for example, of Czechoslovakia to reject the American aid in the year 1945 and to call for the Bolsheviks? Certainly not! However, Beneš and J. Masaryk pursued just such a policy.

Was it in the interest of the West to allow Russia to go to the Elbe? The Morgenthau's plan--nearly realized--in the interest of the western countries: to leave Eastern Germany under Russian rule and to deprive Western Germany of its industry, to disarm and to divide it into two separate small states?

Was it in the interest of America to allow Chiang Kai-shek to weaken, and Mao Tse-tung to grow? Was the bisection of Korea, or the action against Signor Bee, in its interest? Were Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam in the interest of the West? Was it in the interest of the West, at the conference at Quebec in 1943, to frustrate, for Stalin's sake, Churchill's plan of invasion of the Balkans? Or to allow Russia to gain a great ascendancy over China? It came about nevertheless, although in America there were military circles which, in their prophetic vision, as early as in 1943 pointed out that the policy "Retreat from Victory"
might result in grave consequences to the Occident, in Europe as well as in Asia. Was it in the interest of the West to help the Bolsheviks in the civil war in Spain in the thirties, which in case of a victory of the "democrats" would have changed into a Russian province with Bolshevik bases in Gibraltar and in Lisbon? It took place nevertheless! One could still ask whether it was in the interest of the West to destroy, one after another, all the strongholds against Russian expansion: Germany and Austria-Hungary in the west, and Japan—in the East. It was done nevertheless.

Everything points to the fact that since 1914 the cabinets of the western countries were under the strong influence of a secret force which thought of its own interests, that is, the interests of Russia, and not of those of their countries.

The same concealed force supported those interests not only in the foreign policy, but also in the home policy of many countries of the West. Let us mention the infiltration of Russian (and communist) influence into the western press, universities, churches, parliaments, state machinery, the most secret offices; let us mention such names as Fuchs, McLean, Burgess, Oppenheimer, Hiss, Rosenberg, Rose, Ruth Fischer, Grünlaeig, Eisler, Gold, Kahan, and others, and then we shall see how strong must be the force which—despite of the sharp eye of the state—managed to fill the command posts of the western world with its people. We shall see what a fatal influence must be exerted upon the foreign policy of many a country of the West by these pro-Russian and pro-communist forces which often disguise themselves as "real democracy". Finally, if we deliberate what an important part is played by communist gangs in the parliaments of Western Europe, we shall realize that the western cabinets are completely anaemic and unable to resist the Russian aggression. We shall understand the paradoxical fact that many a western government often pursues a policy which is inconsistent with the interests of its country, we shall realize that this secret force is a great hindrance to the western governments in...
their policy.

How has it got to such a pass? It came to pass after World War I when along with the European monarchies the old aristocratic ruling elite was swept out of the political arena and replaced by Beneš, Caballero, Seizer republicans, Béla Kun, in France Clemenceau—by Herriot and Blum. It was the leaders of ochlocracy who unsettled the ideological foundations of the state. God was dethroned; the native country was replaced by the conception of class, the conception of duty—by an unlimited right, discipline—by self-will, nation—by the International, patriotism—by material well-being, state—by legalizes anarchy. Europe turned into the sphere of action of demagogues or naive people who were not aware of what they did, or shrewd managers who undermined all the moral and physical foundations of the native nation in states, aimed at a communist revolution or a "world government" of nations, a government of the despotic messiah which had touch with Russia which was spiritually associated with it.

Ivan Dostoevski wrote: "Why do almost nine tenths of the Russians, during their travelling abroad, associate with the European-left circles which, so to speak, reject their own culture? Is it not a characteristic nature of the Russian soul to which the European culture has always been strange?". To some this culture was strange, to others—it became strange. When, thanks to Marx and la Salle, the leaders of the left circles in the West who rejected the entire political, cultural, and religious tradition of the West, gained the upper hand, they naturally began to flirt with Bolshevist Russia which, like tsarist Russia, hated the historic traditions of the Occident.

As a corollary of this, the West split into two camps, and civil war broke out between them: in Bavaria, in Hungary, after World War I, and then in Spain, in France in 1934 and in the fourties, in Italy. Civil war is a token of our time; it will mark the history of Europe (and not only of Europe) in the next centuries. The question is whether or not
the Occident (and the Ukraine with it) breeds new leaders who would begin a fight to the death against the rising tide of ochlocracy which, in union with Russia, intends to raze to the ground the western Christian culture. It is certain: as long as this ochlocracy undermines the life of the West, the latter will be unable to fight successfully against Russian imperialism. To annihilate Russia the West must first of all generate new forces which would bridle Russia's allies at their own home. Quis custodiet potent fas.

It is these new forces of the West that would be allies of ABN. If this Bloc finds allies also among the anti-Russian circles of the Asiatic nations, this will have to be welcomed.

Madrid, Lisbon, those circles of the American, British, German, Italian nation, and the nations of Russia's satellites which are openly against Russia, besides—Formosa, South Korea, Tokio—those are the allies of ABN, allies of those Ukrainian parties whose aim is an independent Ukrainian Ukraine. The Ukraine, whether or not we wish it, is being involved in the fight of the two camps into which the Occident is splitting. Or of them is hostile towards us; it is the camp of the Bolshevik fifth column the West, various internationalists and secret maffia sympathizers. ... and all of them are hostile to the traditional civilization of the West, to its foundations such as religion, nation, native country, morals, social hierarchy, law, and order. It is the camp of Bluma, Mendes, Bavism, Valles, Jomson, Nemi.

Another camp—in the camp of the fighting nationalism—which desires to see a national, traditional Ukrainian state, and not a satellite of one or another International which would turn our country into something like the present Ukrainian S.S.R., "Titocevsky" or North Korea.

To live the Ukraine must create an anticomunist, anti-international, anti-"official", anti-Russian bloc. Not UNO which intends to build a "new world" with Russia, with Khrushchev and Bulganin, but ABN which intends to create a new free bloc against Russia, fighting to
death against it!

ABN is the origin of the bloc. The journey of the head of ABN to Madrid and Formosa has been an important step towards its expansion.
SECRET

TO: Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Base, Munich

DATE: 29 March 1956

SUBJECT: Specified: Operational/1-3/46/1495/403!

1. Transmitted under separate cover for Headquarters files and/or utilization per paragraph 1 of Reference A are the following attachments:

a. AMERICKI 3 statement (forwarded in the original) indicating AMERIKI I's anti-American acts.

b. Statement prepared by XBE based on AMERIKI 3's remarks.

2. Per paragraph 2, Reference 3, HOB requested AMERIKI 3 to provide us with a set of complaints against AMERIKI 1 and a list of his anti-American acts which could be used as a basis for our statement to the Munich Consul. We indicated to AMERIKI 3 that we were not interested in the specifics or evidential details related to the complaints or acts since these were already known to Headquarters and HOB. In view of this, Attachment B is a generalization of all the anti-American acts committed by AMERIKI 1 and no attempt was made to document each incident. Per paragraph 3b of Attachment B, AMERIKI 3 had reference to an AMERIKI 1 representative who was apprehended on arrival in FRANCE and found to be in possession of documents and instructions from AMERIKI 1 to the illegal AMERIKI 1 organization in PARIS. According to AMERIKI 3, this incident was only reported to KUBANK and later investigated by GOHR. Per paragraph 3b, AMERIKI 3 had reference to a group of couriers who infiltrated from the Ukraine in 1949 and reported to AMERIKI 1 rather than to AMERIKI 1.

3. In view of Reference A, Attachment A was not furnished to the Munich Consul.

Approved:

26 March 1956

Attachments: As stated SEPARATE COPY

Distribution:
1- RH w/o copy at "A" & w/o copy at "SH" & W/C
2- CEC w/o at "A" & w/o copy at "SH" & W/C
3- OSS w/o copy at "A" & w/o copy at "SH" & W/C
4- AA w/o copy at "A" & w/o copy at "SH" & W/C

CLASSIFICATION

RHHH
1. В загальній опінії організація СБ належить до типу організації складної науково-технічної і антидемократичної. На виконанні поставлених завдань, відомого цього роду організація, як обережна розв'язуєчи складних економічних, політичних і культурних проблем, відповідає швидкості внаслідок непереваги до інших лівих і т. ін.

2. На своїй організації висилає титульні та якісні впливи, також враги

3. В своїй діяльності організація виконує функції морального, цілює на це моральні і соціальні позитивні завдання, не орієнтує на навіть групові та групові, а в нові сформовані "приватики".

4. Не відповідає усім законам охорони, але використовується більші бойові бойові акції, але діє груповими.
Авангардизм

5. Авангардизм визначається як рух за нові творчі ідеї, який виник у Європі у післявоєнний період і вплинув на розвиток модернізму. Він характеризується використанням алегорії, символізму і абстракції, які відображають ідеї нових часів.

6. На останньому етапі розвитку авангардизму значної ваги здобули портрети і скульптури, які характеризуються використанням нових технік і матеріалів.
SECRET
Attachment B to Z-392A - 1971

SUBJECT: Stefan BANDERA's Anti-Ukrainian Activities.

1. The organization headed by Stefan BANDERA is organized on principles directly contradictory to Ukrainian beliefs; these include dictatorial type of leadership, required submission to and veneration of the leadership, blind fulfillment of orders, intolerance, etc.

2. Totalitarian tendencies expressed by the BANDERA organization are reflected in:
   a. Propaganda of force and terror by leaders of the BANDERA organization (especially by the SB) against other enemies who are members of other enemy parties whose political beliefs are not identical with the beliefs of the BANDERA organization. This force and terror has also been applied against political individuals by the BANDERA organization in an attempt to draw them to the BANDERA organization or in order to have these individuals perform certain activities for the BANDERA organization.

3. In its day-to-day activities, the BANDERA organization bears neither civil nor moral laws. The following items are attributed to the BANDERA organization and typifies the organization's underlying concepts and beliefs:
   a. Utilization of force and terror by leaders of the BANDERA organization (especially by the SB) against other enemies who are members of other enemy parties whose political beliefs are not identical with the beliefs of the BANDERA organization. This force and terror has also been applied against political individuals by the BANDERA organization in an attempt to draw them to the BANDERA organization or in order to have these individuals perform certain activities for the BANDERA organization.
   b. Use of lies, inventions, slander and beating in the ABANDERA organization.
   c. Surveillance of activities of personalities disliked by the BANDERA organization and threatening of these individuals.
   d. Exploiting of personalities from within the organization.
   e. Exploitation (Illusory murder) of personalities in opposing political parties, e.g. the disappearance of Prof. TAPSIK and the liquidations in Mitsnov and in Komberg.
   f. Physical attacks upon and abduction of various enemy figures, e.g. the case of BURLI.
   g. Tampering of private mail from BANDERA organization opponents as well as subsequent publication on such intercepted (stolen) mail.
   h. BANDERA organization appeals to the enemies that certain other newspapers be boycotted by the subscribers; forcible instruction and taking away of such opposing papers from the mail distribution; intimidation of subscribers by various parts of the world (centers of settlement).
that all other means be stolen, destroyed or used to facilitate its destruction. In line with this use of threats and force against individuals who were in possession of opposing views or who were responsible for distributing this paper.

1. Theft by the NKVD organization of property of other organizations, e.g., incident of the Korotkins tribe and the theft of money by NKVD-NKGB from the Jewish settlement.

2. Counterfitting of U.S. dollars and other money by the BND organization (1943-1945).

3. Indications here are some of the anti-American activities of the SS are of the BND organization:
   a. Although the ostensible function of the SS is to work against Communist infiltration of the BND organization, the SS in fact engaged in activities against parallel (spying) and other organizations and agencies personalities for the purpose of engineering, by all means at their disposal, the defection of the BND organization.
   b. All thefts, shipping, falsification, counterfeiting, and other activities mentioned above and moral violations were carried out by the SS and fulfilled upon specific instructions of the SS.
   c. The SS engaged in activities which are directly detrimental to the interests and security of the American government. A case in point was the attempt by the BND organization to neutralize BND installations in Yugoslavia through the code name "Agent." In this case the SS injected into all the activities of individual Americans who were performing duties for OSS.
   d. SS attempted to extract from the security information, using all means available, from individuals who had been employed by the Americans and were then dropped for various reasons. Cases in point: BND officers of OSS, ECUSA, and Mutual.
   e. SS falsifying of the information obtained in a and b above in order to invalidate and hinder the activities of the American authorities in France.
   f. Propaganda of various individuals in the emigration as being "bored American agents."
   g. Attempting to identify the emigration as being "known to agents."
   h. Attempt by the BND organization to complicate the activities of the Americans by identifying certain documents loose in Poland occurred in 1940-51-52, as obtained from the OSS.
5. Activities of the SRO-USA organisation abroad which are contrary to American laws and American principles:

a. The organisation of an underground SRO-USA organisation in the USA which blindly accepts all orders of the SRO organization and the SS in Germany.

b. The recruitment of American citizens into this illegal underground SRO-USA organisation and forcing them to perform activities hostile to American interests.

c. Direction by the SRO organization of this illegal organisation in the USA and directing this organisation to perform hostile acts at meetings of other emigre groups in the USA. Definite attempts to disrupt meetings, provoke riots, use of threats, to prohibit people from attending, etc are all instructions which come from the SS in Germany.

d. In performing the aforementioned acts, the SRO-USA underground organisation utilises individuals who are suspicious and who seem to conduct their activities to the advantage of the Communists. (This makes the SRO-USA organization here and abroad comparable to the OSS in that they do not permit for free expression of thoughts and attempts to sell everyone after their own dictates.)

6. The Americans do not wish to have any truck with anyone who accuses the Americans of killings, we would call attention to his accusations against the Americans in 1944.

7. The following pro-SRO-USA newspapers and periodicals pursue a policy which is recognizably anti-American in that the Americans are blamed for all activities which are not pro-SRO-USA. Among the newspapers who engage in anti-American propaganda, at World War II, are the following:

a. Italick Foreczka (Munich)
b. Ukrainian Suce (London)
c. Ukrainian Miza (Paris)
d. Vyvojna Politika and Wicher OCO (New York)
e. Radio Ukraine (Toronto)
TO: Chief, SE
FROM: Chief of Base, Munich
SUBJECT: General - ENVOYED/LOST/REPORT/ARGUMENT

DATE: 00 APR 1956

TO: Chief, SE
FROM: Chief of Base, Munich
SUBJECT: General - ENVOYED/LOST/REPORT/ARGUMENT

DATE: 00 APR 1956

1. We are transmitting herewith for Headquarters' information and files attachments A-F (listed hereunder). The attachments represent photostatic copies of Munich criminal police interrogation reports (in German), pertaining to the disappearance in Munich, 01/9 1956, of Midshipman ENVOYED, aka SNOW. The material was secured with the assistance of C., with whom we have been in continuous communication regarding this case. According to C. the investigation of the case by the Munich police, conducted in a very vigorous or efficient manner, has thus far remained totally without result and presently seems to be at an almost complete standstill. Please note that no information has been passed to C. concerning the possible Italian IS involvement and the theory that SNOW might be in Italy. In line with Headquarters' suggestion per paragraph 3 of reference, C. has been advised that, to our great regret, we were unable to comply with his request to obtain of information from SNOW; it was suggested to him that he make another effort, via the HV, to obtain a response from SNOW.

2. The following attachments are transmitted herewith:


Attachment E - Interrogation report, dated 20 Jan 56 on Wasyly
ZMOTYK, DOB: 12 Feb 25, PB: WITZLIM, Galicia (USSR), stateless, formerly
Polish citizen, residing: Belgradstr. 152 (baracks B), Munich.

(Approved)

6 April 1956

Attachment: As stated

Metrical Index:
1 - MSS w/o att.
2 - MSS w/o att.
3 - MSS w/o att.

kpp
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

ATTENTION: Allen Affairs Officer

SUBJECT: Eligibility for Admission to the United States of Ukrainians DP's Associated with Stefan Bandera

1. You may recall that the SR Division secured your cooperation in requesting the Department of State to deny a visitor's visa to Stefan Bandera, the head of a Ukrainian organization in Germany, on the grounds of his conducting activities detrimental to the interests of the United States. Since then the United States Consul-General in Munich has frozen the applications for visas of Ukrainian DP's who have, or have had, some degree of association, however slight and indirect, with Stefan Bandera. The SR field case officer responsible for Ukrainian projects has confirmed and documented this fact and has cited specific cases in which the SR Division is interested. It appears that we made our point with the Department so strongly that State is not following its own established policy of judging visa applications on individual basis, and not establishing blanket ineligibility because of political associations.

2. Many Ukrainians in Germany who have been associated with Bandera or have belonged to the group do not wholeheartedly agree with his aims and methods. Many also have been in contact with and have performed valuable services for CIA.

3. The Consul-General in Munich has informed our field case officer that he can take no favorable action on cases of any individuals with associations with Bandera until such time as he receives specific word from Washington that they, like all others, are to be handled on an individual basis. The SR Division is especially interested in expediting the cases of the following, all of whom have been of great service to CIA:

   a. Volodymyr Kerod
   b. Bohdan Podosh
   c. Mykhailo Radko
   d. N. Fedak
Subject: Eligibility for Admission to the United States of Ukraine of RF’s Associated with Stefan Bandera

The application of Mr. Kerod is most pressing of all since he has a wife and children in New York.

4. We would appreciate your informing the Department of our views as soon as possible, so that it can specifically assure the Consul-General in Munich that the established policy of judging visa applications on an individual basis applies to members of the Bandera organization and to those who have, or have had, some degree of association with Bandera. The matter is of utmost importance, in view of the embarrassing effect the freeze in processing the visa applications has had upon members of the Ukrainian group which the SR Division is utilizing in certain valuable operations.

[Signature]

Chief, SR

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Address
2 - Aerodynamic F
2 - SR/3 - Attn:
1 - SR/PP Chrono

SR/PP 10/3959
DECLARATION:

It was stated that I was born on the 1st of Sept. 1909 in JANOSLAM, Poland. I wish to make a correction: my true birth-date is 1 Jan. 1909, and I was born not in JANOSLAM, but in UKRINSI/BUKIEN. Up till 1945 I carried my right name RABERA. The records in my passport contain all the necessary data.

My name as well as my birthplace and date of birth I have changed when the SSVD and NKVD agents started to look for me and following me, when I became the leader of the UKRAINIAN anti-bolshevik independent movement.

This change of my name and my reason for it, I have reported to the state office of Protection of the Constitution in 1954. I personally did not submit this report to the state office of Protection of the Constitution, but I have written an official letter to the proper German authorities, so far, I have not received any information. As far as political reasons it was not advisable to go about the changing of my name in the customary way, hence this would give away my real name to my political opponents.

The UKRAINIAN independence movement has been created already before the war. At the beginning of the DENSO-GERMAN war we announced the independence of the UKRAINIAN, however, this was not recognized by Hitler. The leaders of this movement, to which I too belonged, were arrested and sent to the concentration camps in Germany. I personally was imprisoned in the BUCHENWALD concentration camp and set free again in 1944.

After the capitulation took place, this movement, which was still in existence, was boosted up again. The goals of this movement were the liberation of UKRAINIA from the Russian domination and the establishment of an independent UKRAINIAN State. This movement consists of an underground movement in UKRAINIA.
and of proper as well as foreign units. For time being I am the leader of the foreign units.

In 1945 a segment of this movement, which up till this day goes under the same name, separated from us.

The organization which separated from us is led by LEM KOBIE and has its headquarters in Munich on DACHAUER Str. 9. The split came about because of the different interpretations of the assignments which were issued by this organization in URALIA. Our goals generally are still the same, however, there are no formal contacts between us.

IN REFERENCE TO HIS CASE:

I know KOROVENT personally. I became acquainted with him for the first time in Northern Germany, in December 1953. I believe this meeting took place in BERNBACH. He just came to Germany as a courier from URALIA.

In Germany he became connected with FIEHART, who took care of him. FIEHART belonged to the group which separated from us. Conclusions — up until the arrival of KOROVENT, FIEHART belonged to my group, and only then the split took place in 1954, he went over to the URALIA group. Even though KOROVENT remained with FIEHART, he was impartial on the issues which led to the splitting of the foreign stationed organizations. KOROVENT had instructions to return back to URALIA.

The second time I came together with KOROVENT was in London a propos an organizational discussion. At that time KOROVENT made up his mind to collaborate with FIEHART, because he hoped that this will offer him better technical possibilities to effect his return to URALIA. In the spring of 1955 I have written a letter to KOROVENT and asked him to help me with the preparations for the establishment of connections with the URALIA underground units. KOROVENT informed me thereupon that he was in no position to do anything about it.
On the 8th of Jan. 1956 my family and I were in Tirol, and from there on
the 10th of Jan. 1956, about 5 or 6 o'clock in the evening, we came back again.
On the next day I found out from MIKASHI that KROGTS was in Muslim, that
he personally talked with him, and that, according to the information received
from MIKASHI, KROGTS disappeared and was missing since the 9th of Jan. 1956.
MIKASHI expressed his suspicion, that KROGTS was probably in our hands.
MIKASHI informed PIMANJ, that KROGTS was not staying with him or with
anyone from his organization, and advised him to inform the police immediately
about it.

There is nothing more I can tell you about this case. I wish to state
again that I am in no way mixed up in this case."

PIMANJ is the fellow who is responsible for KROGTS.
Forwarded under separate cover in ADELELIN/21, a translation of a transcript of a Soviet broadcast from Kiev in which ADEVAITEK/1's relatives attack ADEVAITEK/1's emigre activities. ADELELIN/2 obtained a copy of this transcript from SYRONIA/DEVAITEK. A discussion of this topic is found in REA 31-28A, Contact Report #34.

Approved:

Attachment - as stated, under separate cover.

Distribution:

- 2 - SH w/Att, U/S/C
- 2 - COS/G w/Att, U/S/C
- 2 - COG w/Att, U/S/C
- 1 - MOE w/Att.
Recently the correspondent of the 'Committee for Return Home' visited the Stanislav region and had a talk with the sister of Stepan BANDERA and her children. Vladymir Andriyovna DAVYDUK-BANDERA lives with her daughter Myroslava in the village Kosakivka of the Boleslav district. Listen to the talk which the correspondent Marko KOSYHA had with her.

---

DAVYDYUK-BANDERA Volodymyra Andriyovna.

-Is it your daughter?
-My name is Myroslava.
-And your patronymic?
-Fedorovna.

Myroslava Fedorovna. Very pleased to meet you! How are you getting on?

-Please, thank God.
-What are you doing here?
-I do my homework. I have enough to do. My daughter has two little children, and her husband is sick.
-Your husband?
-No, the husband of Myroslava.
-And what are you doing, Myroslava Fedorovna?
-I am a teacher.
-And your education?
-Secondary. I am teaching mathematics and physics in the school.

-What school have you here? A seven-year school?

-Yes. A seven-year school. You seem to be surprised to see that
I am working at an incomplete secondary school although I have no
university education.

-Of course, because one should be a university graduate. How about
a degree?

-I am a correspondence student of the Drohobych pedagogical in-
stitute. In our school only the head master and one of the teachers
are university graduates, and six teachers are correspondence students.

-That's right. Before you complete the institute, there will certainly
be a secondary school at Kozakivka. In what course are you now?

-In the second. The faculty of physics and mathematics.

-A good faculty. Is the study hard?

-Not very hard, but I am engaged in our school and in the komsomol
organization.

-Are you a member of the Young Communist League?

-Yes. I am.

-And you, Vladimir Andreyovna. Are you doing your housework? Have
you much trouble with your grandchildren?

-Ch. I shall have to nurse many grandchildren.

-Where are they?

-One of them, Yarema, is serving in the Soviet army. Zynoviy is still
soon complete the technical school in Stanyslav. Volodymyr has com-
pleted the tenth form and entered the Forest Institute in Lvov. One
of them is a ninth-form boy, and the youngest one - a fifth-form boy.

-At Kozakivka?

-No. With the parents of my husband.

-It seems you are alive and well?

-Thank God, they are well.

-You seem to wonder why I ask you about your grandchildren.

-To tell the truth, I do not understand why.
And what do you think about it? The fact is that the Ukrainian nationalists in the emigration lie to our fellow-countrymen; the Ukrainians, that all the relatives of the nationalists have been liquidated; particularly your brother, Stepan BANDERA, tries to spread those lies.

-It is not true! And some people who think that it is true, are afraid to return home.

-I don't know what they are talking about there; it can do no harm to us. Our children are going to school. If they want to join the Komsomol, we do not forbid them.

-After the end of the war the Ukrainian nationalists did much harm to the people here, and now they are spreading lies about our country. Uncle Stepan, too. It is a shame that he should be called uncle.

-And now, what is the situation here?

-Several years ago all the bandits were caught. Peace has been restored here. Our people themselves... only a bad remembrance of Stepan BANDERA has remained here.

-Let him go to hell, that Stepan BANDERA, even if he is your brother, Vladimir Andriyovna. Eyronслав Fedorovna, tell me something about your work at school! Do all the children go to school?

-All the children of school age go to school. The school was built last year.

-And from where are the teachers?

-They are from different villages of the Stanylav region.

-And the members of CUN in the emigration claim that the people here are not allowed to speak Ukrainian.

-Who forbids them to speak Ukrainian? All the schools are Ukrainian. Such nonsense can be talked only by people who have lost their honour and conscience, who try to deceive others.

-Our fellow-countrymen who are listening to this conversation, will realize once more that the greatest butcher of the Ukrainian people
and liar is... Stepan BANDERA and his adherents.

- They will not only realize it, but return to our Soviet native country. Fellow-countrymen, Ukrainians, don't believe Stepan BANDERA! I am telling this, mother.

- I know only one thing, namely - that all those who have returned home, are living in peace. Many people have already returned home.

- I thank you Vladymira Andriyovna and Lyroslava Fedorovna, for your true words.

- If you meet with Zynoviy in Stanyslav, don't forget to give him our regards.

- I shall do it. Good buy.

x x x

Having visited different districts of the Stanyslav region I returned to Stanyslav where I met with the son of Vladymira Andriyovna DAVYDYUK-BANDERA, Zynoviy. A healthy boy greeted me in a big room of the hostel.

- Your mother sends you her kindest regards.

- Thank you.

- I visited the village Korakivka, sır Lyroslava, and had a talk with them. The talk has been recorded. Our fellow-countrymen will listen to it. She asked me to give you her warmest regards. Have you passed the examination?

- Na! Ha!

- It means that you had learned, and there were no difficulties?

- No, I did not meet with any difficulties.

- And the people in the emigration say that you have been liquidated. (A few sentences could not be understood - monitor)

- To prevent our people from returning home the American and English intelligence services give them money, extra food, and they tell tales. Tell your opinion of that.

- Stepan BANDERA, it is I, your nephew, Zynoviy DAVYDYUK; I am speaking from the city of Stanyslav. I am living in Stanyslav and attending
the technical school. The Soviet government has given me all that
I need for gaining the education. It has enabled me to gain the
education, to make my fortune, and to be useful to my native country.
Don't think, uncle, that the Ukrainian people in the Ukraine thinks
of you and respects you. You have done much harm to it and killed many
innocent people. You have the right case for which the people
fought.

I am a member of the Young Communist League. I shall do everything
in my power in order to help my native country to build a happy
life in which we could work to the glory of our native country and
raise the well-being of our people.

-You, Stepan BANDERA, and your adherents spread...co-operate as
with the American intelligence service against the Soviet regime.
You are trying to undermine the peaceful life of the Soviet people,
but the Soviet government wishes well to the Soviet people, to all
the people who want to work in peace. Take, for example, my family.
My mother lives with my sister Lyroslava. Lyroslava is working as
a teacher; at the same time she is a correspondent student of a peda-
gogical institute. My brother Yarko is serving in the army. I shall
soon complete the technical school. I am going to work in the
virgin lands where all the young people should go.

I can tell all the Ukrainian boys and girls who are living in the
emigration, only one thing: return home. We shall live together with
our people and work for what the nations strive for.

My fellow-countrymen, don't believe such butchers and rogues as
Stepan BANDERA and his adherents who prevent the Soviet people from
returning home.

-I thank you, Zynovy, for your sincere words you have addressed
to our fellow-countrymen. We wish you every success in your studies.
Complete your studies successfully and go to the virgin lands where
you will win a real happiness by your work. Good buy.
TO: Chief of Base, Hanover
FROM: Chief of Base, Mansion
SUBJECT: Letter Intercepted to Stefan GBAER

DATE: 6 February 1957
INFO: COS/G

Action Required: None; for your information.

1. The following is a translation of a letter picked up via CIS coverage of Zappa, Hanover. The letter, which bears no return address, is sent c/o Taros to Stefan GBAER (leaded presumed to be Stefan GBAER) at Hanover. It contains an attached handwritten note, signed "Rudolf," requesting GBAER to pass an enclosed sealed note (translated below) to the "Prosvitnyk" (leader presumed to be Stefan GBAER):

Local, 28 January 1957

Esteemed Prosvitnyk,

Relative to the letter of 29 October 1956 which you received from friend Hart, the interested party (perhapsyou storz) has sent a request concerning a trip to discuss the problems at hand which were discussed at the first meeting.

The fact that they have brought up the request to come to them for the discussions is testimony that the affairs are urgent and that there are possibilities for discussion.

Friend Hart informed the interested party that he will visit them on 2 February 1957. Participating in this discussion will be the same persons who attended the first discussion.

"Friend Hart asks you to send thoughts, opinions, cautions, etc., so that he will have his plan formulated, i.e., what one can demand. How far he can go and on what positions to remain firm.

This situation is to be considered further as the

Sincerely (signed)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006
SECRET

FIELD SYMBOL: EGMA-2922

DATE: 10 Apr 57

SUBJECT: March 1957 AEBATH Progress Report

SOURCE: Letter Intercept

FIELD: AEBATH

ABSTRACT: Att D, Para 8, Page 17.

8 b. A letter to Dmitro MYSKIV (return address: I. DMITRIY, London) is signed by B. ERISHCHIV and encloses an English-language letter dated 19 Mar 57 from the British Foreign Ministry which authorized a visa to England for Stefan BANDERA in the name of Stefan KOPIL. British intermediaries in this affair were Neil McLean (House of Commons) and David Cransby-Gore.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 33212
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008
SECRET MESSAGE

TO: MUNICH FRANKFORT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, F1, F1/OPS, EC 4, S/C 2

TO: MUNICH
INFO: PLAN

REDFORD LOCKCROFT AIRCRAFT/AVIATION

1. HAVE RECEIVED PRIORITY REQUEST UNDER TRUE NAME INDICATING CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST FROM POST 2956 TRACKS ON STEPHAN BANDERA, NO FURTHER INFO.

2. PLZ CHECK MORE FOR MORE DATA SUCH AS LENGTH AND PURPOSE VISIT.

3. MIKE MAY WISH CONSIDER TAKE ADVANTAGE THIS DEVELOPMENT INTERVIEW BANDERA.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 1920
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: MUNICH
ACTION: SR G
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, CE 4, S/C 2

MAR 27 1958

ACTION: RRG/SV/DAT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: DIR
FROM: INFO FRAN
ACTION: MINI 6373

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AERODYNAMIC AECAVATINA

RE: DIR 1958: (OUT 5798) •

1. RE PARA 1 REF, CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST APPEARENTLY PROMPTED BY LEV
   DOBRANSKY INTERCESSION BEHALF AECAVATINA 1 AND 2. THIS DISCLOSED VIA LETTER
   INTERCEPTED FROM DOBRANSKY TO AECAVATINA 2 WHICH REVEALED DOBRANSKY LOOKING
   INTO MATTER VISA FOR BOTH 1 AND 2. DATE OF LETTER 10 MARCH. LETTER FURTHER
   REVEALED AECAVATINA 2 TO PARTICIPATE MEXICAN ANTI COMMUNIST CONFERENCE SCHEDULED
   LATE MARCH 1958 AND THAT HE TO OBTAIN VISA FROM THAT REGION.

2. ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFIED IN LETTER WHEN AECAVATINA 1 AND 2 DESIRE VISIT U.S.,
   IT APPEARS THIS TO BE IN NEAR FUTURE. AECAVATINA 1 MADE NO VISa APPLICATION MUNI-
   AMCONGEN FOR THIS TRIP BUT WILL PROBABLY DO SO WHEN RECEIVES FAVORABLE REPly FROM
   DOBRANSKY. STATE DEPT VISA OFFICE REQUEST FOR POST 1956 TRACES AECAVATINA 1 MADE
   FOR THIS REASON AFTER RECEIPT OF WHICH THEY PROBABLY TO INFORM AMCONGEN HERE GRANT
   VISA WHEN REQUESTED.

3. RE PARA 4 REF, NO NEW TO ADD TO HQS FILES RE AECAVATINA 1.

   SEE NO KUBARK REASON BLOCK VISA.

4. RE PARA 3 REF, WILL TAKE STEPS INTERVIEW AECAVATINA 1.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3829
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006
**CLASSIFIED MESSAGE**

**DATE:** 24 SEP 59  
**FROM:** ACTION INFO DIRECTOR  
**TO:** MUNICH  
**ACTION:** C/SR 3  
**INFO:** COP, C/C1, C/FI 2, C/PP, C/EE 3, S/C 2  

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**ROUTINE**  
**IN 22301**

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1. **ALIAS HERDAHL HAS SUPPLIED WRITTEN STATEMENT SUGGESTING BANDERA BE GRANTED VISA.** GIST IS THAT UPSWING HAS HAD CLOSE CONTACT SINCE MARCH 56 AND HAS CHECKED BANDERA CAREFULLY, THAT TRIP WOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO THE RALLY BANDERA FOLLOWERS, ETC. ALSO INDICATED BANDERA WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS BLACK MARKS AGAINST HIM WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICERS.  

HERDAHL FRANK ADMIT ORALLY THAT IF VISA GRANTED BANDERA WILL KNOW UPSWING MADE IT POSSIBLE AND THAT FUTURE UPSWING OPERATIONS WOULD BE THAT MUCH BETTER. BANDERA HAS GIVEN HERDAHL DETAILED RUN DOWN HIS VARIOUS EFFORTS GET VISA AND FACT HE HAS BEEN TOLD CAN ONLY BE GRANTED WITH WASHINGTON APPROVAL.  

2. **RE CURRENT OP. BANDERA-TEAM NOT YET USSR. HERDAHL CLAIMS AGENTS EAST POLAND, HAVE RADIO CONTACT BANDERA HQS, JUST INSTRUCTED CROSS INTO SOVIET UNION TO PREPARED WINTER QUARTERS.** BELIEVES INFILTRATION WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT FEW DAYS. SO FAR NO INDICATION DIFFICULTY. HERDAHL NOW CLAIMS ORIGINAL PLAN WAS INFILTRATION VIA POLAND (RATHER THAN CZECHOSLOVAKIA) BUT TEAM NOT EXPECTED REMAIN QUITE SO LONG POLAND.  

3. **HERDAHL WILL TRY GET INTEL SAMPLES, WHICH HE CLAIMS CONCERNS MOSTLY INFO RE PUBLIC ATTITUDES, ETC. WILL ALSO PROVIDE LIST ENTIRE UPSWING GROUP BANDERA WOULD BE INTERESTED IN.**

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**DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020 NUNI HAIN WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006**
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**DATE**

**S.E.C.R.E.T.**

**ROUTING**

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**PAGE 2**

**INFO**

**CITE**

**END OF MESSAGE**

C/S COMMENT: * HQSqueried whether samples Bandera PI supplied upsailing past year could be made available HQS.*

---

**COPY**

**REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.**

**COPY NO.**
From Chief of Base, Munich
Approved by: Attachmemt: Translation H11,

TO Chief, FJIA, 

1 - Chief, FJIA, with b/w 2 - CZ, Gwati h/w 

Continu...bri, 

5 October 1959

Chief of Station, Germany

AEROSWING/UPSING/Operational

UPSing Support of Bandera Trip to USA

ACTION ITEMS

See Paragraph 3

REFERENCE

See Paragraph 3

1. Attached is a translation of the UPSING memorandum, noted in the reference, passed to us by WERDAHL. We regret that we are so late in forwarding it, but were holding off in the hope of getting possible additional data orally from WERDAHL, particularly further information concerning the progress of the current UPSING/WEVERA operation into the USSR. As noted in the reference, information has been rather slow in coming and it has not been possible to get together with WERDAHL subsequent to reference to get any more recent information that might be available.

2. It will be clearly apparent from the attached, and from the reference, that WERDAHL has not made a particularly detailed case, most probably because WERDAHL is thinking mostly in terms of the good that the issuance of a visa to BANDERA would do for UPSING's present and future relationship with BANDERA, especially as regards further UPSING/WEVERA joint operations. However, in addition to this aspect of the problem, there is no doubt that WERDAHL feels it should be a simple matter for us to influence the issuing of a visa and that many less desirable and less "exploitable" individuals have been able to get visitor's visas to the U.S. For our part, we have told WERDAHL only that our headquarters is very interested in the matter, especially as regards indications that BANDERA has "reformed" and ideas concerning his future operational usefulness. WERDAHL has stated orally that he is aware of BANDERA's earlier reputation and, as indicated in the attachment, is aware of nothing that has happened, during the period of UPSING's association, indicating that BANDERA still is using his earlier rough tactics. Although he is relatively cautious on the subject, no doubt pending the availability of data on the current joint operation, WERDAHL also feels that, in principle, BANDERA has more to offer operationally than most if not all other Russianophile groups in the West today.

3. We would appreciate any views that Headquarters may have on the possibility that BANDERA may be able to obtain a visa, specifically including comments that we could pass along to WERDAHL. It seems certain that WERDAHL has encouraged BANDERA in the belief that WERDAHL may be able to influence the granting of a visa. Therefore we anticipate that BANDERA will needling WERDAHL, and WERDAHL, in turn, needling KOBEBA with increasing regularity in the very near future. It should be a simple matter to stall for a while with observations about the complex and extensive ramifications of his request, but it would be helpful to have a more or less definite yes or no answer in the not too distant future. Although it is up to Headquarters to decide the equities involved, it seems quite certain that if the visa can be granted, we would be kept very well informed in the future collaboration between UPSING and BANDERA. If the visa is not granted, it seems likely that WERDAHL will slam the door on this aspect of UPSING operational activities in a bit of a huff.

DIAGNOSIS

Presented 3rd 7th 17A

INDEXING NON

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
SECRET
ATTACHMENT TO KGBA-5293

TRANSLATION
27 August 1959

SUBJECT: Visit of Bandera to the USA

At one of the last discussions of our officers with Bandera's OUN representatives Dr. Gregorius Waskowycz and Jaroslaw Beniz, Bandera's wish was expressed that he have a chance to take his long-planned trip to the USA. UPSWING supports this plan to visit the USA for several months for the following reasons:

a. Bandera, who has been known to us for about 20 years, had proved again and again his clearly western political orientation. His strong will not to be inactive in the battle against the common enemy of Bolshevism has placed him at the head of the Ukrainian nationalists. He enjoys considerable popularity among Ukrainians outside of the Federal Republic and within and without Germany he has over half a million followers.

b. Since March 1956 UPSWING has been in more or less close contact with Bandera. His political orientation has been subjected to continuing scrutiny. Also, during this period, no character flaws have been noted. Bandera's claims have been determined to be true.

c. Bandera states that the reason for his proposed trip to the USA is to visit relatives. However, UPSWING would consider it useful if Bandera also had the opportunity, in the course of such a trip, to talk with his nationalist Ukrainian followers in the USA and thereby strengthen and give a new impetus to their battle against Bolshevism. As far as UPSWING knows, the number of OUN members in the USA is about 600. On the other hand, the number of Bandera followers in the USA might be as many as 3 or 400,000. In UPSWING's view, these latter figures speak for the popularity and favor enjoyed by Bandera. So high a number of like-minded can be held together and directed toward a goal only if the leader personally concerns himself with the goal and has contact with his followers. If Bandera's effort to obtain a visitor's visa is turned down, this fact could be propagandistically exploited by Bandera's opponents, especially those with Soviet support, to produce uncertainty in the ranks of Bandera's followers and to damage their unity.

d. Finally, UPSWING would like to point out the possibility to utilize the opportunity presented by a trip by Bandera to the USA to have talks between Bandera and members of the U.S. State Department that might result in alleviating the differences and reservations that may influence the American attitude toward Bandera. Bandera himself would welcome an opportunity to attempt to clarify certain things in such discussions.

For the above reasons, UPSWING suggests that KGBK intervenes in order to enable Bandera and his party to make a three month visit to the USA. Bandera has applied for a visa through the American General Consulate in Munich, using his presently used name Stefan PORK, Travelling with him would be Dr. WASKOWYCZ and Prof. Stefan LERKOWSKI.
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REDWOOD LC IMPROVE

RE MINI 6756 (IN: 373) 6756

NO INFACT

1. ADDITIONAL INFO FROM SUBJ AS FOLLOWS: CIRCA MARCH 1944 BANDERA RECEIVED ANONYMOUS LETTER, THREATENING DEATH, FOR SECURITY REASONS WAS UNDER CONSTANT SG PROTECTION. HOWEVER, FOR UNKNOWN REASONS BANDERA LEFT ZEPPELINS STRASSE OFFICE ALONE MORNIGHT 15 OCTOBER AND DROVE HOME FOR LUNCH. RANG STREET LEVEL DOOR BELL, WHICH BUZZED OPEN BY WIFE, AND THEN HEADED UPSTAIRS TO THIRD FLOOR APARTMENT. ON REACHING SECOND FLOOR, WIFE HEARD SCREAM THEN FELL. CALLED AMBULANCE. BANDERA DEAD ON ARRIVAL HOSPITAL. UNDETERMINED WHETHER TO OF HEAD DAMAGE CAUSED BY FALL.

2. BANDERA PEOPLE SUSPECT FOUL PLAY. POLICE INVESTIGATING... AUTOPSY BEING PERFORMED MORNING 16 OCTOBER. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: #15 OCT SUBJ REPORTED STEFAN BANDERA DEAD. DETAILS WHEN AVAILABLE.
FROM: MUNICH
TO: Secretary of State

NO. 141, OCTOBER 16, 4 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 141, REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 4, BONN, FRANKFURT, PARIS UNNUMBERED.

STEPAN BANDERA, LEADER OUNB UKRAINIAN EMIGRE ORGANIZATION, FOUND DEAD ON STAIRS HIS MUNICH RESIDENCE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 15 UNDER WHAT MUNICH PRESS CALLS MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. SEEMINGLY DIED FROM FALL BUT MUNICH POLICE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY FOUL PLAY. DESPATCH follows.

PAGE

DL-29
UKRAINIAN REBEL DIES IN MYSTERY

Stefan Bandera, the fallen in Munich—Fought Soviet to Free Region

MUNICH, Germany, Oct. 17 (AP)—Stefan Bandera, Ukrainian nationalist leader, died in a mysterious explosion yesterday at his Munich home.

The former Nazi officer, who had led the Ukrainian Nationalist Party, was discovered dead in his apartment yesterday. The cause of death was not immediately known.

Bandera, a key figure in the Ukrainian independence movement during World War II, was a figure of controversy in European politics. He was known for his radical views and was a frequent target of Nazi and Communist officials.

Bandera was arrested by the Nazis in 1941 and spent the war in a concentration camp. After the war, he returned to the Soviet Union and organized a nationalist movement to fight for Ukrainian independence.

In 1944, Bandera formed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which he led until his death. The group was later renamed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and fought against the Soviet Union and Communist forces.

Bandera was widely regarded as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalism and his death was a significant event in Ukrainian politics.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a resistance movement that fought against the Soviet Union and Communist forces during World War II. It was formed in 1943 and was led by Bandera.

The group was known for its brutal tactics and was involved in the torture and execution of thousands of people. It was eventually disbanded in 1950.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DATE: 2004-2005
REDWOOD LC: IMPOVE UPSWING

RE: MINI 6832 IN 37671

1. According to Herdafl, preliminary autopsy findings indicate Bandera did not die of natural causes. Indications he poisoned.

2. Upswing closely following investigation death. Herdafl had operational lunch with Bandera and two aids in October in private room in public restaurant. Bandera seemed in best of health and spirits. Lunch devoted primarily to discussion of upsingg support mounting further ops into USSR. Also discussed status present ops group, which has not reported over two weeks and at last report had not crossed into USSR.

END OF MESSAGE

CS confirms reported death of Bandera. Would advise autopsy results.
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ORIG
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XI
DATE .

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SR/3-PP
11307
19 OCTOBER

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Copy No.

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DATE: OCT 19 1942

TO: DIRECT
FROM: C/FR B
INFO: COP, C/C1, C/C2/C3, C/F1, C/EE 2, 3/4, 2

CIP, D/01 70-17

RE: MINI 6821 (IN 3829)

1. SUGGEST WOULD BE HELPFUL INVESTIGATION BANDERA'S DEATH PASS UPSWING
G1ST-PARA 1 DIR 00682 ** AND PARA 1, DIR 00969*, PLUS ANY FURTHER COMMENTS
HIS MAY HAVE OFFER. ALTHOUGH SECURITY MUST BE CONSIDERED, FEEL RISK
WILL BE MINIMAL IF INFO PASSED UPSWING AND WEARK INFO RE KNOWN RIS USE SPECIFIC
POISON IN PAST, WITH NO REF PREVIOUS RIS CONSIDERATION POISON BANDERA HIMSELF
FEEL WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL SINCE APPEARS TO DATE THAT SUFFICIENT
QUANTITY POISON NOT FOUND AUTOPSY MAKE IT CERTAIN BANDERA POISONED. INFO
FROM R IS CONSIDERATION POISON THAT MAY HAVE BEEN USED, THAT DIFFICULT DETECT, AND THAT COULD HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED
CONSIDERABLY IN ADVANCE BANDERA'S DEATH.

ADVISE

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: AUTOPSY FINDINGS INDICATE BANDERA DIED NOT USE NATURAL CAUSES.

**CABLESHERE-DATE CS&PILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3820 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
У ганбіюному смутку над своїм могилі
Великого Сина України,
Голови Проводу Організації Українських Націоналістів

СТЕПАНА БАНДЕРИ
заклинуємо усе царство і Причислення у землі
них Державах Америки вшанувати Його Світу Пам'ять двомісячною згадкою, з 15, жовтня до 15, грудня 1959 р.
Посиланням праці для спогадів в згадання України твор
ріко найвідомішій у думці Його Святій Папі.

Організація Оборони Народів Свободи
Спілка Української Молоді Америки
Українська Союз Політичних Везін
Т-во Б. Волоць УПА
Т-во Студентів Умані Ім. М. Миколаєвського
Українська Центральна Репрезентація АП АШ

Папа р
Св. Отець

Причина смерті сл. п. Ст. Бандери
Виконувана відома дзвінь велетенської свято, причина смерті сл. п. Степана Бандери, виконана офіційним комунікатом урядової судово-міської комісії, приголомшеним у Львові 8. жовтня 1959 р.
Несвідчений текст загадного урядового комунікату судово-міської комісії, яку він зазнав інших
дозволи, відповідає, що земельний комунікат свідчить, що смерть сл. п. Степана Бандери настана автентичною до
зведения до кінця органічно важливої партії. Це від оторти з
іншою обставинами, що він несвідчить позитивної смерти.
Це стверджено міжнародним газетом у „В'ян Печо Тайнеї” в 28.
The mysterious death of the Head of the International Ukrainian underground-party in Poland.

Stefan Kadlub (29) was found on the stairs of his apartment house,生命times Limitation, yesterday. He was always accompanied by several guards of his party and as usual yesterday, his body guard accompanied him to his home. Shortly afterwards a scream filled a shrill cry in the house.

Until 10, the body of Stefan Kadlub, on the stairs with his face covered, was found on the way to the hospital. The police have undertaken preliminary proceedings, since it has occurred that Kadlub was killed by some agent.

Kadlub married in which under the name of Dr. and first became known by the police about a year ago. When killed, he was reported deals trying to elude the police. Kadlub has a wife and two sons, aged 11, 12 and 14.

Said Kadlub was born in 1909 in Wroclaw-Poland. He graduated from the Polish-Poland War Academy and joined the underground party, in 1927. The underground party has the aim to rule the Ukraine in a democratic way. In 1931 he was the leader of the underground party of the new Ukraine.

In January 1937, Kadlub was arrested by the police and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. In 1939, he was set free by his party leaders and in 1940 he was the head of the Ukrainian underground party. However, in 1941, the Gestapo arrested him and gave him independence and as a result he was sent to the Gestapo concentration camp. In 1942, Kadlub took over again the underground party and the control of the underground party.
Baner's death alarmed all the Ukrainians living in Munich. Everybody still remembers the "Sprengstoff-Attentat" of the leader of the Slovak Underground-Party, Matas GERNAK, in April 1958, which resulted in his death too.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU October 23, 1959

BANER'S LAB OF CYANIDE OF POTASSIUM

MUNICH October 23, 1959

SUSPECT POLITICAL MURDER

Baner, Oct. 19 (AP). The Ukrainian emigrant leader died of cyanide of potassium. After receiving the post mortem information on Monday, the Munich homicide squad stated that investigations are under way to determine whether murder or suicide led to Bandera's death. While the police hinted that Bandera might have taken the quickly acting poison himself, the Ukrainian Information Agency declared its firm conviction that this was a murder.

Thursday last week the emigrant leader entered in his car the courtyard of his Munich apartment house where he lived under the alias of "OPEL." Contrary to his usual practice, he dismissed his bodyguard when entering the staircase. Shortly thereafter he was found lying on the stairs and was brought to a hospital.

The police are of the opinion that Bandera must have taken the poison which works in five or at the most ten seconds, either in the car or on the staircase. It was found in his stomach and there are no other ways of transmitting it. He was declared dead when admitted to the hospital.

The Ukrainian Information Agency suspects that Bandera was attacked in the staircase by several men who might have put the cyanide of potassium in his mouth.

Chief editor of "The Way To Victory," LENIUK, Bandera's deputy, voiced the opinion that the murderer might be sought among the hundred members of a Ukrainian dance and song ensemble which is presently touring the Federal Republic. Leniuk pointed out that an advance group of the artist ensemble was in Munich on the day of Bandera's death. Leniuk further stated that the "emigrant organisation had been warned two weeks ago that an attempt at Bandera's life was planned. Therupon the bodyguard of the emigrant leader was increased, "We are sure they were Bolsheviks," Leniuk said. Bandera was never inclined to commit suicide. On Thursday he was in high spirits and would have preferred to "die fighting."
I recall for your information in an article announcing the death:

"None of the files had been made public by the time the article was
published. The information had been gathered through
interviews with the family and friends of the deceased."

\[\square\]

\[\square\]

Distribution:
- 1 at [place]
- 1 via [place]
- 1 via [place]

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2004-2006
DEMOCRATIC GERMAN REPORT

23 Oct 59

Munich, West Germany, and broke his neck. Subsequent police investigations showed that he had been present with prostitutes. East German newspapers suggested that Streltzer's murder may have been a result of a political vendetta.

On October 15th a mysterious new article appeared in the local Stettin newspaper, notorious Ukrainian Universalism. It described a series of events in the city of Lwów, in July 1921, by this unit.
STEPAN BANDERA, LEADER OF ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS (OUN), DIES FROM CYANIDE POISONING IN MUNICH AT THE AGE OF 50. — HIS ASSOCIATES CHARGE HE WAS A VICTIM OF MOSCOW-DIRECTED MURDER PLOT. — UKRAINIANS THE WORLD OVER SHOCKED BY SUDDEN DEATH OF PATRIOT AND FREEDOM FIGHTER

GREAT REPERCUSSION OF HIS DEATH IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PRESS

MUNICH, Germany, Oct. 16 (AP). — Report Banderas, Ukrainian Nationalist leader, died under mysterious circumstances yesterday at his secluded home here. The police said today that no evidence of foul play had been found.

Mr. Bandera died after allegedly falling on the stairs. There were no witnesses. The chief of the Munich homicide squad said the police were looking into the circumstances.

VICTIM OF CYANIDE POISONING

MUNICH, Germany, Oct. 16 (AP). — Investigation established today that cyanide poison killed Stepan Bandera, anti-communist guerrilla chief from Ukraine. The mystery that surrounded his life continued in death.

His associates charged that he was a victim of a Moscow-directed murder plot.

The body of the 50-year old Bandera was found Thursday on the stairway of his apartment house here. It was one of the many hideouts from which he directed nationalist Ukrainians.

George Lisnky, Mr. Bandera's deputy, said:

"We are convinced he was killed by the Bolsheviks. But the question remains: How was he made to take the poison?"

Russian design leaders who opposed Mr. Bandera's plans for Ukrainian independence but shared his anti-communist views said they, too, were certain he was assassinated, as was his associate, Col. Zygmun Demeniak, in 1939.

REPORT BY BANDERA'S CLOSEST COLLABORATOR

In telephone conversations, one with Stepan Lavaruky, one of the closest associates of Mr. Bandera, and Dr. Yaroslav Okhrontsev, who was a friend of Munich, the editorial office of Svoboda succeeded in finding the following:

On Thursday, October 15, 1959, Bandera left the editorial office of "The Way to Victory" for his home, where he was supposed to be at 97 Zappelnstrasse (central Munich). When he reached home, he summoned his wife, who found him in the lobby. As a rule, he had one or two servants; but at that time he had left them alone and took the doormen of his apartment house.

The door was opened automatically, apparently by his wife. She heard therefrom a scream of a German boy in the hall. When she came out on the corridor, she saw her husband lying on the stairs. In the first floor, blood running from his mouth, nose and ears. He was taken to a hospital, but died in the ambulance car.

STEPAN BANDERA IN UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

"1924: "Stepan Bandera's life was devoted to the struggle for Ukrainian freedom and liberation. In 1927 he became a member of the Ukrainian Military Organization (OUN), and in 1932 he became a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)"

In 1932 he became a member of the Executive Committee of the OUN. In 1933 he became a member of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization and in 1934 its chief and Supreme Commander of the OUN. In 1936 Bandera was imprisoned by the Polish police and condemned to death by two other Ukrainians for alleged complicity in the assassination of Maksym P. Perekhlev in Warsaw. Eventually, Bandera was released and given life for the OUN."

After the German invasion of Poland, Mr. Bandera was arrested and given life for the OUN."

AMERICAN PRESS ABOUT BANDERA AND HIS STRUGGLE FOR UKRAINE'S FREEDOM

The American press gave an extensive coverage to the sudden death of Stepan Bandera. About every N.Y. daily newspaper printed dispatches of the Associated Press from Munich, Germany, about his death. The New York Times, on October 17, 1959, for instance wrote:

"Mr. Bandera, whose guerrilla force once battled both the Soviet and Polish armies, was sentenced to death for complicity in the 1934 assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki, Polish Minister of the Interior. The sentences were commuted to life imprisonment."

The German invasion of Poland in 1939 restored Mr. Bandera to freedom. The following year he broke away from the OUN for his independent Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, headed by Andriy Melnyk. Taking many members of the original OUN with him, he established a new organization with the same name.

Indirect Tribute Paid

"The Soviet press frequently refers to Ukrainian nationalists as "Banderaite." It is an indirect tribute to Stepan Bandera."

American Press about Bandera and his struggle for Ukraine's freedom.
When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Mr. Bandera turned his O.U.N. into a semi-military organization.

"On June 30, 1941, Yaroslav Stepanov, Mr. Bandera's principal political assistant, proclaimed the independence of Ukraine and urged the Ukrainian government in Ban-dera to "freely sympathize" with the German victory.

In May 1943, Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian who had fled to Poland because of his opposition to the Soviet government, was killed by Jews who feared that he intended to liberate their country from the Nazi occupiers.

The word of his death shocked many U.S. officials who had hoped for an end to the fighting in Europe. The death of Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, was a setback to the efforts of the United States to promote stability and democracy in Europe.

Bandera's Death as Reported By a U.P.I. Dispatch

MUNICH, Germany, Oct. 20 (U.P.I.) -- Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, was killed in a street fight in Munich, Germany, on Oct. 19.

Bandera, 53, had been living in Munich since 1939, working as a journalist and writer. He was a prominent figure in the Ukrainian community in Munich, where he was known for his anti-communist views and his support for Ukrainian independence.

Bandera was killed in a street fight with Ukrainians who were opposed to his views. He was shot in the head in his apartment building.

Bandera's death was a major blow to the Ukrainian nationalist movement in Europe, and it highlighted the ongoing conflict between the Ukrainian community and the Soviet government.

The death of Bandera was a setback to the efforts of the United States to promote stability and democracy in Europe. It was a reminder of the ongoing conflict between the Ukrainian community and the Soviet government.
Air pouch

CONFIDENTIAL (Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: Am ConsGen, MUNICH

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

REF: Munich Telegram 141 dated October 16, 1959

October 26, 1959

SUBJECT: PERIPHERAL: Mysterious poisoning of Stefan Bandera, Leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Banderists).

SUMMARY

Stefan Bandera, aka Stefan KOPP, age 50, Leader of the Banderist wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN/II), was found unconscious shortly after noon on October 15, 1959, at the foot of the stairs leading to his apartment at 7 Kreittmayr Strasse, Munich 2. Neighbors reported hearing him cry out before he collapsed and rolled down the staircase. He died shortly afterwards in a Munich hospital. An autopsy was ordered by the Munich Criminal Police Homicide Section.

All of the Munich daily newspapers carried detailed accounts of his death and funeral as an inside page feature article. One of the newspapers, the Municher, a daily tabloid, ran the announcement of his mysterious death as a front page story on October 16, 1959. Each paper reported the preliminary autopsy findings of cyanide poisoning on October 19, 1959, and continued coverage to include detailed descriptions of the 1500 man funeral procession and service carried out under police protection on October 20, 1959.

As yet no official autopsy report has been issued; however, a reliable source has informed the Consulate General that autopsies on October 17 and 18, 1959, established that the cause of death was cyanide poisoning, probably administered in a gelatin capsule with the victim's food. Bandera's body bore no marks of violence. Police officials in charge of the investigation now state that they are "almost sure" that Bandera was assassinated. They are not optimistic about finding the murderer although they have one or two unidentified persons under investigation.

Bouche reaction in Munich has been moderate, but it is generally agreed that he has died a hero's death (Neldentod), the victim of Bolshevik agents. The degree to which the whole Ukrainian emigration felt his death is demonstrated by the fact that his political arch-enemy Mykola LYVSKY (Munich Despatch 379, April 8, 1930), leader of the democratically oriented Ukrainian Nationalists, attended the funeral.

MUNICH, October 26, 1959.
An official of Radio Liberty* told one of the reporting officers that monitors of the station had reported hearing a Radio Moscow broadcast on the subject of Bandera's death. This broadcast was a summary of an article which appeared in Krasnaya Vezda (Red Star), the official Soviet Army newspaper, accusing Bundesminister for Refugee Affairs Theodor Oberländer of having had Bandera eliminated because Bandera knew too much about Oberländer's allegedly unsavory record as a Nazi commander in the Lemberg area of Poland during World War II. Radio Prague and Radio Lvov have echoed this theme.

Although the theory that Bandera actually was the victim of a Soviet plot cannot be discounted, it is also possible, in view of Bandera's own record of strong-arm tactics and ruthless leadership, plus reports of an internal crisis in OUN/B, that many people even within his own organization, would have had a motive for taking his life.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF BANDERA'S DEATH

The death of Stefan Bandera, who used the cover name Stefan Popel and gave his profession as journalist to screen his identity in Munich, was not witnessed by anyone so far as is known. He apparently had spent the morning at his office, eaten a middle-of-the-morning snack of grapes with his secretary, Bugieck Mack nee SCHORN, completed some shopping en route home, reached the first floor of his residence at about noon before he collapsed and fell down the staircase to the ground floor. The stairs to his third-floor apartment are narrow and unpainted and turn slightly to approach each floor. Apparently Bandera's cry as he collapsed brought neighbors to his aid. He was found on the ground floor by a 10-year-old neighbor boy. He had visible head injuries and was bleeding from the nose and mouth.

Bandera's wife had seen him approach the building from their apartment window and waited for him to reach the apartment. When he did not arrive she called his office. She then learned that her husband had been injured and taken to the Red Cross Hospital in Lazarettstrasse, Munich. She was with her husband when he died at about 1:00 in the afternoon. He apparently did not regain consciousness after his fall.

Bandera, whose life was marked by many dangerous activities including several reported attempts on his life recently, was not accompanied at the time by his bodyguards, who had gone to lunch. The Munchner Merkur in its October 17-18 issue quoted the editor of the Bandera newspaper, Mr. Holodynszky LENDYK, as saying "Bandera felt immune to all danger since he had survived the Partisan Wars and the years in prisons and concentration camps."

Translations of some of the best local press accounts of his life story, death, and funeral are attached as enclosures 1, 2, and 3 respectively.

* The Munich radio station supported by RADIO LIB, a privately sponsored American anti-Communist organization.
A chronological history of Bandera's life is attached as enclosure no. 4.

**TENETS AND HISTORY OF THE OUN/B**

The following summary of the tenets and history of Bandera's party, the OUN/B, was prepared by the reporting officers on the basis of materials ranging from newspaper accounts to official records and scholarly works.

The Banderist wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is the revolutionary element of the party. The OUN was founded in the Ukraine in 1929 by the late Col. Eugen KONOVALETS who was assassinated almost certainly by a Soviet agent in Rotterdam, Holland, in 1938. Bandera split with the OUN in 1940 and has in the post-war years claimed a following of several hundred fellow Ukrainian exiles and refugees in West Germany, principally in the Munich area. The Banderists publish a weekly newspaper, Szlich Peremogy (Road to Victory) in Munich.

The OUN/B has imparted an unusual amount of almost 19th century nationalistic revolutionary fervor and militancy to its activities. It is a highly authoritarian organization, similar in its ideology to the Marxist UDPU under BARBIANI, and, although it has little toleration for other parties, it lacks the anti-capitalist views typical of most Marxist movements. Its membership is generally active, conscientious, and patriotic, but lacks good political education and tends toward demagoguery in its extremist ideology. Bandera opposed the party of the democratic LIVICKI, the Ukrainian Government in Exile, and fought against the American Committee for Liberation, a private American organization which tried to unify the efforts of the various exiles from the USSR.

The OUN/B is technically one of the member organizations of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations headed by Yaroslav STARYK, former Prime Minister of the Ukrainian Republic 1917-21. Actually, however, the ABN, which embraces many of the nationality groups of the USSR and the Satellite countries (but no Russians!), is controlled by the Bandera party.

Assassinations are nothing new in the Ukrainian nationalist movement, in the emigration or otherwise. Bandera was himself implicated in the 1934 assassination of the Polish Minister of Interior, for his part in which he was sentenced to death. In Rotterdam, in 1938, Bandera's then chief in the OUN leadership met his death by explosion when a box purportedly containing secret despatches from the Ukraine was delivered by one of his trusted lieutenants. This crime was "almost certainly the work of Soviet agents." Earlier, in 1925, Simon PETLIURA, former leader of the post-1918 Ukrainian Directory, was mysteriously murdered in Paris, possibly by Soviet agents.

According to the rival MELNYK wing of the OUN (OUW/O), Bandera's group carried out a whole series of assassinations in the Ukraine in 1941 (when the two factions were contesting the leadership of the Ukrainian partisan movement under the German occupation). The most notorious of these deeds was the ambushing of the Melyny adherents, SENYK and STTSIBNSUI, on August 30, 1941, at Zhitomir.

Although the facts are difficult to establish, the Bandera group, after World War II, developed a reputation for the use of false denunciations and strong-arm tactics in its competition with other emigre groups in West Germany. Many emigre figures clearly do not personally lament his passing. His death, though, can have only an adverse effect upon the Soviet emigration as a whole because of the demoralizing effect of another real or assumed Soviet political assassination under the noses of private bodyguards and the German police and the fact that Bandera controlled one of the largest, most closely knit, and militant emigre organizations in West Germany.

Because of the personal quality of leadership in the OUN/B and the closely allied Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABB), it is impossible to take for granted that there will be an orderly and satisfactory transfer of power to a new leader. Mrs. Slava STETZKO, wife of Varoslav STETZKO, the ABB leader who flew from Spain to attend the Bandera funeral, told one of the reporting officers that Stetzko would succeed to the leadership. Whether this will occur and whether the OUN/B will retain its force and unity remain matters of speculation. What is certain is that any splintering of a major anti-Communist emigre group, even one having undeniably repugnant features, such as the OUN/B, would be a Soviet psychological victory.

As a footnote to the life and activities of Stefan Bandera it might be mentioned that during the last few months of his life he had been making vigorous attempts to obtain a visa to visit the United States, and the question of his eligibility had still not been settled at the time of his death. On one occasion some months ago, Mr. Midthun interviewed him when he called at the Consulate General in connection with his visa application. His explanation of the means by which the OUN/B would establish and preserve “democracy” if it came to power in the Ukraine lay largely in an unsophisticated assertion that democracy would obviously accompany national self-realization. At that time he promised to send Mr. Midthun some literature explaining the views of his organization, and he later did so. The following booklets, in the Ukrainian language, are being separately transmitted to the Intelligence Collection and Distribution Section (INR:ICD) in the Department:

XX ZYJD IPSS Bes Maski
Kontentratsiïni Tabori b Sobets'kemu Soyuzu
Ukraina Protii Moskvi
Bolshevik i Vizvol'na Borot'ba
UPA b Dokumentax 1942-50
ABN b Dokumentax 1941-56
OUN b Dokumentax 1944-51
OUN b Dokumentax 1929-55

Edward Page Jr
American Consul General

Enclosures:

1. Translation of the article "An Assassination is Rumored", from Münchner Merkur, October 17-18, 1959.
3. Translation of the article "Ukraine Soil Covers Bandera", from the Münchner Merkur, October 21, 1959.

Department pass to:

AmEmbassy, BONN
AmConsGen, FRANKFURT
AmEmbassy, ROME
AmEmbassy, MADRID
AmEmbassy, MOSCOW
AmEmbassy, PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL
AN ASSASSINATION IN RIMICZ. STEFAN BANDERA'S MURDEROUS DEATH.
HE LED THE STRONGEST EMIGRE GROUP.

Translation of an article in the Massachusett Monitor on October 17-18, 1959.

On Thursday at about one o'clock in the afternoon, the occupants of a house on Kredimyjstrasse heard a scream. A heavy body rolled down the stairs from the first floor. A small child found the body with visible injuries to the head. The man with thinning hair and stoopy build is according to the entries in his residence with a journalist — Stefan Pospol. In reality, however, he is the 50-year-old Stefan Bandera, the head of the strongest Ukrainian emigre organization — the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). With this incident, like the assassination of the Romanian emigre leader Mihai Casmak, the death of a leading member of a strong emigre organization in Germany has brought his back as a center of public interest. Stefan Bandera, who had the inspiration of so many Ukrainians behind him who carried on the efforts to secure the independence of their people, had himself become an Anarchist and stood always in the path of danger. In 1909 Bandera was born in the town of Mirobel in southwestern Ukraine. He passed his examination as an agricultural engineer in 1933. He was already, as a student, a member of the Ukrainian military organization (WO), which sought to fight with terrorist means for the independence of the Ukraine against the Poles as well as the Russians. In 1929 he entered the OUN which had assumed the function of the political work organization of the WO. Since then, his entire life has been devoted to the struggle.

He rose comparatively rapidly to leadership of the OUN. Since 1931 he occupied the position of provisional leader of the organization of the western area of Poland. There he was named chairman in 1932 after the arrest of most of his colleagues. His great hours came when he organized the assassination of the Polish Minister of Education HECZKO (the Minister of Interior Bronislav Parmak) in 1934; the motive for this act was connected with the battle for an independent Ukrainian school system within Poland. He was arrested and after two trials in Warsaw and Lemberg, he was sentenced to death. This punishment was later changed to life imprisonment from which he was freed by the entry of the Germans into Warsaw.

THE GOALS FOR UKRAINE

Since the bomb assassination of the former chief of the OUN Colonel Konowalts in Rotterdam in 1936, he has practically been the leader of the entire organization. Bandera was the long-awaited opportunity to reach
reach his goal of a free Ukraine when he proclaimed in the presence of the German officers the independence of his country on the 30th of June 1941. Shortly thereafter he was arrested, because such plans were not in line with those of the national socialist leadership, which no longer wanted to allow support to continue to the Ukrainian nationalists. He was later elected as chairman of the domestic as well as the foreign organization in 1943. Even in the concentration camp bitter warfare between the Poles and the Ukrainians was carried on. In the concentration camp at Auschwitz the younger brothers of Bandera, Alexander and Vasiili were murdered. In Sachsenhausen the battle against the Russian continued, Bandera himself was released from the concentration camp in 1944, but only with the understanding that he was ready to collaborate with the Germans, who at the last minute were prepared to allow an independent Ukraine. At that point, the objectivity and clear-sightedness of the Ukrainian Nationalist leader won out: he declined.

From the beginning of 1945 he was in Berlin, at which time, he dove into the whirlpool of the collapse, coming into prominence again after the end of the war as he sought to build anew the organization in western Europe and America. In those early years, contacts with the homeland were possible and he travelled more and more. But the CN even now is still active there as is illustrated — here one must depend on the testimony of Ukrainians living in Germany — in two prominent trials in which members of the organization were condemned to death. In 1945 Bandera once more tried to create a new type of warfare against Communism when he, in a mountain hotel in the Bavarian Alps, sent an appeal to the western powers.

**His Operations Area Embraced All of Europe**

As suddenly as he had appeared, he suddenly disappeared again. From that time on one heard scarcely anything about him. Even his co-workers are reluctant to discuss his activity. One thing seems clear: that since the end of the war, he has not been in the Ukraine. His scope of activity was all of Europe, and only his wife, whom he had married in 1939, and his three children, made their permanent residence in Krefeld, West Germany.

Bandera led the strongest of all the exile groups. One estimates the Ukrainian-exile population to total almost 4,000,000. The preponderant portion is supposed to have belonged to his membership, even though they were not all organized. Bandera controlled the foreign organization of the CN, into which he had brought the American branch (founded in 1950) under the leadership of the 60-year-old Melnik; the CN foreign organization, since 1954 under the leadership of the 50-year-old Ledzik; and other groups which had previously stood in opposition to him. Twice already has the Ukrainian nationalist leader been confirmed in his office. Today
Today the blue/gold banner of the Ukrainians and the black cross of the organisation with its red field flutters solemnly from the window of his office on Zeppelinstrasse. On Thursday at 12 noon Bender had left this place, an hour later he was dead. He had become accustomed to attacks and assassination attempts. First, in March of this year, someone had attempted to kidnap one of his children. Even more recently, they had again had the premonition that something was in the air: the guard on Bender was strengthened. But he, who had outlived so many of his comrades, felt that his life was charged. With him the Ukrainian national movement — according to statements of the specialists — loses a man who was respected in all exiles circles as an uncompromising ideological leader and prophet.
Translation of an article in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung on October 1959.

Quietly, with hands folded, they stood in the cemetery. Protocol required that the Ukrainian national democrat Idyokij take the lead. Idyokij has for years been the leader of the Ukrainian Government-in-Exile in whose parliament sit together the politicians of the National Democratic Federation, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Peasants Party, the Socialists Party, and the National Democratic Union. The man who was laid to rest here in the Munich Forest Cemetery by his supporters — hundreds of police placed themselves discreetly in the background — was indeed for decades the political opponent of Idyokij. However, as the grave was closed over Stepan Bandera, they placed over his a wreath. Whoever reads the inscription on the tombstone can be convinced that it could not have been given by the agents of political vindictiveness.

On Thursday of last week at about one O'clock in the afternoon the 50-year-old Bandera collapsed with a scream at the entrance of his house in Ertzhammerstrasse in Munich and died on the way to the hospital. The autopsy on the body showed that Bandera died from cyanide poisoning. Was this assassination? Four years ago a similar scene took place in the Munich Forest Cemetery. As happened yesterday, several thousand exiles had then visited the grave of the exiled Slovakian politician Matyas Carnak. A few days before, he had been blown to pieces by a bomb which exploded in a Munich post office.

The danger of assassination hung over Bandera almost daily. A few months ago an unknown person had warned him of an attempt to kidnap one of his children. Consequently, the number of the bodyguard of the Ukrainian was increased. Bandera did not take a step without being watched by two of his own people. In the interest of security he had even taken the cover name of Popel and described himself as a journalist. (On Thursday of last week, however, Bandera had left his bodyguard behind in his printing establishment. He went into town to buy something. As he entered his house at about one O'clock he collapsed.)

One has read often in the last few days that the Ukrainians had feted Bandera as one of their heroes of freedom. That applies to every segment of the one and a half million exiled Ukrainians which he led.
he had brought together in a militant organization spread over Germany, England and America. The democratic exiled politicians of the Ukraine, however, wanted to have as little to do with Bander as possible because he was one of the most radical nationalistic politicians who, if he felt it was necessary, would resort to terrorizing the enemies if they would not agree with his political opinions. It is perhaps also worth noting that Bander’s organization, the OUN, was not a member of the exiled Ukrainian national council /UKNM/, indeed, both the government in exile as well as Bander wanted the same thing; namely, freedom for their homeland but with divergent views as to how this should be done.

Bander was known by every Ukrainian who lived in Polish west Ukraine after 1923 as a man who belonged to a para-military underground organization associated with the OUN and carried out bitter partisan warfare against the Poles. Bander was at that time a young student. The OUN was under the command of Colonel Konovalec who carried on a battle for the freedom of the Ukraine, principally from Prague and Berlin. Like his predecessor Petliura, who commanded the partisan army until 1925 and who fell in Paris, the victim of an assassination, Konovalec was also killed in Britain in 1939 by means of an infarct.

A Soviet Agent had infiltrated the ranks of the OUN and gave Konovalec a package in a Rotterdam Cafe. Ostensibly, the package was filled with secret material from the homeland. In the package, however, a time bomb had been placed.
Far from his Ukrainian home for which he had fought for his entire life, Stepan Bandera was buried yesterday afternoon in the Forest Cemetery after his death through a mysterious poisoning. Over 1,500 mourners, including representatives of Ukrainians in Canada, the United States, Belgium, England, Holland, France and West Germany, paid their last respects. The old blue and yellow Ukrainian flag covered his coffin. About 250 wreaths — including also a wreath from the Federation of Exiles — were brought to the grave. Leading exile politicians from all over the world were expected, and police protection was on hand to thwart possible attempts to disturb the ceremony. Funeral hymns were sung in the Ukrainian language as six co-workers of the dead man bore the coffin to the grave on their shoulders. Placed on pillows were urns containing earth from the Ukraine and from the grave of Simon Petliura, who as national leader of the Ukrainian Republic was murdered in Paris in 1926 (as was Colonel Eugen Konovalets, who in 1939 fell victims to an assassination in Rotterdam). Ten clergy from the Catholic Uniate and two of the Greek Orthodox Church joined the funeral procession. The Vicar General of the Catholic Uniate Church in Munich, Peter Holmazck, conducted the burial ceremony. The wife of Bandera, gray-haired, followed the coffin, and their three children were followed by Ukrainian representatives of Parthian, Romanian, and Bulgarian fraternal organizations. The banner of the Ukrainian resistance movement with a red cross on a black background — symbolizing blood and earth — and the banners of the earlier Ukrainian Republic were carried in the funeral procession.

The president of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABB), Yaroslav Stekolko, gave the eulogy and recalled the murder of Ukrainian nationalists throughout the past years. "Moscow has tried to break us spiritually and in this effort has torn from us the powerful Stepan Bandera. It was thought that the Ukrainian nation would be spiritually destroyed by this act and she would cease her battle for freedom. The murder of Bandera was undertaken by Moscow with the conviction that during a time of peaceful co-existence this crime would have no external conflict as a consequence." As a last gesture the president sprinkled earth from the Ukraine and water from the Black Sea into the open grave. At the end of the burial, which was carried through without any incidents, all the Ukrainians sang their old national anthem.

UNCLASSIFIED
The leadership of the foreign groups of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, of which Benders was the chairman, gave out a communique yesterday, in which, among other things, it was said:

"All supposition that Stepan Benders ended his life through suicide is senseless and without substantial basis. He fell in a battle which is being waged not only for the liberation of the Ukraine and other peoples who are under Moscow's yoke, but also for the freedom of the civilised world, which is being threatened by Russian-Bolshevik imperialism."
CHRONOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY OF STEFAN BANDERA

1909 - September 1, born in Jaroslaw, Poland (also given as Uhryniv, West Ukraine.)

1923 - 1928 - Lived in Stryj, in West Ukraine.

1929 - 1934 - Lived in Lwów (Lemberg) in West Ukraine. Became active in the OUN under the leadership of Col. Konovalets. Rose rapidly in the hierarchy of the Party which carried on terrorist activities against both Poles and Russians in an effort to free the Ukraine. He studied agricultural engineering, passing his examinations in 1933.

1934 - Arrested in connection with the assassination plot against the Polish Minister of Interior, Bronislaw Pieracki and sentenced to death after two trials in Warsaw and Lemberg.

1934 - 1940 - September released from Polish imprisonment by Nazis, after serving his sentence at Warsaw, Wroclaw, and Krakow prisons.

1940 - 1941 - Brief period of freedom and renewed political activity. He joined the two pro-German Ukrainian Support Battalions called Roland and Nachtigall. He tried to set up a free Ukrainian government but was arrested and imprisoned by the Nazis. He split the OUN by forming OUN/B. OUN was under Col. Konovalets' leadership until his assassination in 1938. This branch still exists under name OUN/M under Melnyk, and UHVR in New York City and Europe under Rebet Matla group. Married JAROSLAVA nee BANACH, born September 14, 1917, in Sanok, West Ukraine.

1941 - 1944 - Imprisoned by the Gestapo in Berlin, Sachsenhausen and Dachau concentration camps. Bandera's parents were killed by the NKVD, and his two brothers, Alexander and Wassily, murdered in Auschwitz in 1943.

1945 - present - Lived throughout West Germany, primarily in Munich and Regensburg. Editor for Ukrainian Publishing Co., Munich.

1947 - OUN/B split when Rebet Matla wing broke away to affiliate with UHVR.
Rejected for U.S. visa at Munich on grounds that this was "prejudicial to public interest." (Section 212 (a) (27) of Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952). Several reviews of this case upheld this decision. Resided 7 Kreishayerstrasse, Munich 2, with wife and three children: Natalia, born May 26, 1941, in Sanok, West Ukraine; Andrzej, born May 16, 1946, in Munich; and Anna-Lea, born August 27, 1947, in Augsburg.

ЗЕМЛЯ З УКРАЇНИ ПРИСИПАЛА І ВОДА З ЧОРНОГО МОРЯ СКРІПІЛА ДОМОВИНУ ВІЙТОГО ВОРОГУ І ПОХОВАНОГО В ЧУНІЙ ЗЕМЛІ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО РЕВОЛЮЦІЙНОГО ПРОВІДНИКА СТЕПАНА БАНДЕРИ

Понад 2000 осіб, між ними чоловік представників всіх українських утрупувань, взяли участь у похороні, що відбувається під сильним поліційним охоронім перед можливістю нового бойовиківцяв відхід. 250 вінків від учасників і їх приєднання з усього світу виробили могилу нової великої жертви української боротьби за волю.

Понад 2000 осіб, між ними представники українських епіпіонат не багатьох колонків, зустрілися в основній розмові з Степаном Бандерою під час похорону, що відбувався в Києві, Україні. Вони, як і вище, обговорили досвід України, яка здатна до похорону, виготовлення меморіальних зібрань і прочитання в тексті з Червоної книжки, дву й одним видача меморіальних зібрань на основі їхніх меморіальних зібрань. Меморіал Бандери з "Меморіалу Медведєва", які відбивалися в інших меморіальних зібрань. Меморіал Бандери з "Меморіалу Медведєва", які відбивалися в інших меморіальних зібрань. Меморіал Бандери з "Меморіалу Медведєва", які відбивалися в інших меморіальних зібрань. Меморіал Бандери з "Меморіалу Медведєва", які відбивалися в інших меморіальних зібрань. Меморіал Бандери з "Меморіалу Медведєва", які відбивалися в інших меморіальних зібрань.
The current blacklist, drawn up in Cairo, names 48 American firms. Included are Exxon Mobil Corp., Standard Oil (New Jersey), Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., and 12 other American firms, because they have branches or agencies in Israel. In 1972, when the United Arab Republic, headed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, decided to cancel its contract with United Scientific Co., the Arab League blacklisted the company, and the company was free to go ahead with a reported deal to sell Nas- 

ser, 4,000.

of the conflict at war's end. To avoid Russian agents, it fled to West Germany in 1955, but shocked back and forth in various disguises between Munich and the United States, trying to escape the reach of the Russians, and finally settled in the United States in the late 1970s. After that, using the name Stefan Papel, Bandera lived with his wife and three children in Munich, protected constantly by bodyguards. For months, leaving his apartment, he went back upstairs for something he had forgotten, leaving his bodyguard waiting in the street. A West Germany: The Partition of 1939

For most of his life, Stefan Bandera was an angry, fanatic outcast, dedicated to a lost cause. His cause was Ukrainian independence, and so hard did Bandera struggle for it that Soviet propagandists refer to all members of the Ukrainian underground as "Banderaites." The son of a Ukrainian Catholic priest, Stefan joined the Ukrainian underground in high school, and knew no other occupation. In 1940, when Bandera was sentenced to death for the assassination of Polish Premier Minister Bronislaw Piłsudski (the Ukrainians regarded both Poles and Russians as oppressors), the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, presumably to prevent a Ukrainian nationalist uprising in eastern Poland.

The advancing German army in 1939 released Bandera from a Polish jail, and he slipped across the Soviet border to organize anti-Soviet resistance. Two years later, when the Wehrmacht attacked Russia, Bandera's partisans fought the retreating Russians and hopefully proclaimed an independent Ukraine. The occupying Nazis scorned the idea, and Bandera's men took on the Germans in turn. Tricked into a conference with the Gestapo in 1941, Bandera was arrested and sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Released by Hitler in 1943, he fled to the United States in 1945, but shuttled back and forth in various disguises between Munich and the United States, trying to escape the reach of the Russians, and finally settled in the United States in the late 1970s. After that, using the name Stefan Papel, Bandera lived with his wife and three children in Munich, protected constantly by bodyguards. For months, leaving his apartment, he went back upstairs for something he had forgotten, leaving his bodyguard waiting in the street. A moment later there was a cry, and neighbors heard Bandera yelling, "Asshole, you'll never get away with this!"

Though Munich police said the circumstantial evidence indicated suicide, Bandera's followers were convinced that he had been killed, or overpowered and killed, when his photo was taken. In the funeral announcements, Bandera's coffin, draped with the black and yellow banner of Ukrainian independence, was lowered into a simple grave hailed by an unflagging crowd.
**DISPATCH VIA TELETYPE**

**CLASSIFICATION:** SECRET  
**dispatch number:** EGM 1/5907

**TO:**  
CHIEF, SR  
CHIEF, EE  
CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

**FROM:**  
CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH  
HEADQUARTERS/LICHTBIZ/OPERATIONS

**SUBJECT:** DEATH OF STEFAN BANDERA

**DATE:** 12 NOVEMBER 1959

**ACTION:** NONE, FOR YOUR INFORMATION  
INDEXING CAN BE ADDED BY QUALIFIED NO. 10 DESK ONLY

**REFERENCE:** DIR 01067

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1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM C. J.

CONCERNING THE CAVIRAL AND MUNICH POLICE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF

STEFIN BANDERA /BORN 1909 IN TROSTIANEC/

2. RESULTS OF THE AUTOPSY ON BANDERA'S BODY SHOW THAT BANDERA DIED OF POTASSIUM CYANIDE POISONING. PRESENT INVESTIGATION IS DIRECTED TOWARDS DETERMINING HOW AND BY WHOM THE POISON WAS ADMINISTERED. LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAVE RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUICIDE BECAUSE OF BANDERA'S CHARACTER. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A MAN WHO HAD MAINTAINED HIS OWN INDEPENDENT, FANATICAL COURSE FOR SO LONG WOULD SUDDENLY BECOME SO DESPONDENT THAT HE WOULD COMMIT SUICIDE.

3. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE MEANS BY WHICH THE POISON MIGHT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED. FOR ONE THING, THE AUTOPSY PRODUCED A FRAGMENT OF GELATINOUS MATERIAL FROM BANDERA'S STOMACH. THE EXAMINING DOCTORS THOUGHT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE REMAINS OF A CAPSULE, BUT THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE CAPSULE ORIGINALLY CONTAINED POISON. BANDERA HAD BEEN SUFFERING FROM A COLD WHICH HIS INTIMATES SAY HE HAD BEEN DOSING WITH VARIOUS PILLS, SO THE GELATIN MAY HAVE BEEN THE RESIDUE OF A CAPSULE HE HAD TAKEN. THE POSSIBILITY HAS BEEN CONSIDERED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN GIVEN A CAPSULE OF CYANIDE BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO WAY TO DETERMINE WHO MIGHT HAVE GIVEN IT TO HIM, AND SO MUCH OF HIS TIME HAS BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR BY WITNESSES THAT IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT ANYONE COULD HAVE TALKED WITH HIM AND GIVEN HIM THE PILL WITHOUT IT BEING NOTICED AND REPORTED.


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**Declassified and Released by Central Intelligence Agency**

**Sources:** Methods of Intelligence 1928-1953

**Date:** 22nd June 2006
I BELIEVES IS SIGNIFICANT. WHEN HE WAS FOUND, BANDERA WAS Lying ON HIS FACE IN THE HALLWAY OF THE BUILDING, WITH HIS LEFT ARM DOUBLED UNDER HIM AND HIS LEFT HAND CLUTCHING AT HIS RIGHT SHOULDER. QUESTIONING OF BANDERAS ASSOCIATES REVEALED THAT BANDERA WAS LEFT HANDED AND CARRIED A PISTOL IN A SHOULDER HOLSTER ON HIS RIGHT SIDE. C, I BELIEVES THAT BANDERA WAS TRYING TO GET TO THE PISTOL WHEN HE DIED, AND IF THIS IS TRUE THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOMEONE THERE WHOM HE WANTED TO SHOOT.

5. C THEORY REQUIRES SOMEONE AS A FINGER-MAN WHO TIPPED OFF THE KILLERS WHEN BANDERA WOULD BE COMING HOME.

EFGENIA MATVIYEYKO ALIAS MAK /BORN 6 JANUARY 1916 IN LEMBERG, POL.

THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH HAVE LED TO SUSPECT MATVIYEYKO. MOST IMPORTANT, SHE WENT SHOPPING WITH BANDERA ON THE MORNING OF HIS DEATH AND SHE COULD HAVE ARRANGED TO BRING HIM HOME AT A FAIRLY PRECISE TIME. BANDERA AND MATVIYEYKO VISITED THE 'GROSSMARKTHALLE', WHERE THEY PURCHASED AND IMMEDIATELY ATE SOME FRESH FRUIT. SOME PEOPLE HAVE CONJECTURED THAT THE FRUIT WAS POISONED, BUT C IS AND NO ONE ELSE HAS BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE HOW THE POISON WAS PUT INTO THE FRUIT IN FRONT OF BANDERA. THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE FRUIT COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED IN ADVANCE, AS THE TRIP WAS APPARENTLY SPONTANEOUS, SO NO ONE KNEW IN ADVANCE THAT THE TWO WERE GOING SHOPPING. CABOLT HAS LEARNED FROM HIS BANDERIST INFORMANT /KASHUBA/ THAT EFGENIA'S HUSBAND

MYRON MATVIYEYKO /BORN CIRCA 1919/ BANDERA

WHO WENT TO THE UKRAINE ON A MISSION FOR THE BANDERISTS IN 1951, DID NOT GO VOLUNTARILY. THE BANDERISTS LEARNED THAT MYRON HAD BEEN STEALING ORGANIZATIONAL FUNDS AND MYRON WAS GIVEN A CHOICE OF SUICIDE OR A MISSION TO THE UKRAINE. HE TOOK THE MISSION AND HAS BEEN OPERATING IN THE UKRAINE EVER SINCE, A SITUATION WHICH CABOLT FINDS HARD TO BELIEVE. IT APPEARS MORE PROBABLE TO C THAT MATVIYEYKO REPORTED TO THE KGB AS SOON AS HE ARRIVED IN THE UKRAINE, AND THAT HE HAS BEEN A DOUBLE AGENT EVER SINCE. IF THIS IS THE CASE, IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TOO DIFFICULT FOR THE KGB TO GAIN CONTROL OF EFGENIA, USING MYRON'S SAFETY AS A THREAT. EFGENIA ALSO HAS A BOY FRIEND IN LINZBRUCK WHO WOULD LIKE TO BECOME A LEADING FIGURE IN THE BANDERISTS. CABOLT ALSO SUSPECTED OF BEING AN RIS AGENT. NOTE: ALTHOUGH C DID NOT MENTION THE NAME, 31893 SB. 6-13 XX WE BELIEVE THIS MAY BE.

OSIP ITUSIUKA /BORN 20 MARCH 1906 IN MISZUM, POLAND/

6. C ALSO OFFERED AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY BANDERA WAS KILLED AT THIS LATE DATE. MARKING BACK TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF

GENERAL NIKIFOR HORBANYUK /BORN 13 MARCH 1887 IN FEDORINKA/

C SAID THAT HE WAS TOLD BY HIS BANDERIST CONTACT THAT THE BANDERISTS LEARNED, PRIOR TO HORBANYUK'S DISAPPEARANCE, THAT HORBANYUK HAD BEEN AN RIS AGENT FOR MANY YEARS. ALTHOUGH THE BANDERISTS DO NOT ADMIT IT, C IS CERTAIN THAT THEY KILLED HORBANYUK, AS THEY HAVE KILLED OTHER RIS AGENTS IN THE PAST. BANDERA WAS THEN KILLED BY THE RIS TO Avenge THE DEATH OF HORBANYUK AND TO LESSEN THE DANGER TO OTHER RIS AGENTS IN THIS AREA.
7. Another person being investigated by CAVIRIL, because he stood to advance in the ZCH/OUN hierarchy after the death of BANDERA, is

EUGEN ARTSYUK

ARTSYUK'S LATEST ACTIVITY IS WRITING ARTICLES FOR VARIOUS MINOR NEWSPAPERS PRAISING KRUJSHEV AND DENOUNCING EMIQUE POLITICS.

8. Another unexplained angle to this whole affair is the entrance of

FRIEDRICH MATTHIAS BERGER ALIAS SARTORIUS

(born 20 March 1911 in Schonefeld).

When Berger returned from POW camp a few years ago, he was interviewed by KASHUBA, who made a practice of talking with returnees in order to determine whether they had known any Ukarinian nationalists in the prison camps where they were held. The interview with Berger was quite brief and no contact was maintained. However, shortly after BANDERA'S death, Berger contacted KASHUBA and asked KASHUBA to come and visit him, explaining that he wanted to talk about BANDERA. KASHUBA kept the appointment and was asked by BERGER whether BANDERA'S MURDERER HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AS YET. KASHUBA replied in the negative, whereupon BERGER SAID THAT HE KNEW WHO HAD DONE IT AND WOULD PRODUCE THE KILLER WITHIN A WEEK. KASHUBA thought that this was a lot of TALK AND DID NOT PAY MUCH ATTENTION, BUT CAVIRIL HAS ALSO STARTED AN INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION OF BERGER TO DETERMINE WHY HE HAD INVOLVED HIMSELF IN THE AFFAIR. COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HEARD OF BERGER, BUT IT WAS IN CONNECTION WITH ONE OF HIS FORMER EMPLOYEES, WHO WAS ALLEGED TO BE WORKING FOR THEM. AFTER HAD OFFERED TO ASSEMBLE OR FILE MATERIAL ON BERGER AND THE M/S CASE FOR USE WENT ON TO SAY THAT BERGER HAS BEEN A CONSTANT INVESTIGATIVE TARGET OF THE LOCAL POLICE, BECAUSE HE HAS ACCESS TO A QUANTITY OF GOLD BARS FROM AN UNDISCLOSED SOURCE. THE POLICE INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THAT IF BERGER OBTAINED THE GOLD IN THE FIRST, IT MAY BE PART OF THE LOOT FROM A ROBBERY OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL BANK, WHEN A NUMBER OF GOLD BARS WERE STOLEN.

9. We will report any further information which may produce concerning this investigation, and if Hqs has questions concerning specific points, we will be glad to try to obtain the answers from if such questions do exist, please forward them by flexowriter.

APPROVED BY [Signature]

DISTRIBUTION -
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1/COS/G

BY TELETAPE
1/EE
2/COS/G

TOT-12 Nov/1700

TOR-
REDWOOD AERODYNAMIC
RE DIR 01697 (OUT 69544)

1. RE PARA 1 REF, HIGHLIGHTS AND RELATED DATA AVAILABLE FOLLOWING REFS:
   MINI 6010 (IN 38655), MINI 6011 (IN 38524), MINI 6012 (IN 37507), DPFA 8811,
   MINI 52008, MINI 52010, AND MINI 47907; GERMAN PRESS DEVOTED MANY COLUMNS THIS
   EVENT. CLIPPINGS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST.

2. WIFE ACCAVATINA 11 WITH BANDERA SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEATH. KD-2 ADVISED
   COOPAL THEY INVESTIGATING DEATH, WHICH IN THIS CASE MURDER NOT SUICIDE; AUTOPSY
   REVEALED TRACES CYANIDE. ONE THEORY THAT HE FORCIBLY GIVEN POISON BY UNKNOWN
   ASSAILANTS IN CORRIDOR OF APARTMENT WHILE ANOTHER THEORY IS THAT POISON
   ADMINISTERED IN CAPSULE, APPARENTLY BY ONE OF HIS OWN PEOPLE. KD-2 FAVORS
   LATTER THEORY AND CLAIMS HAVE FIVE SUSPECTS FROM WITHIN BANDERA ORGAN, INCLUDING
   WIFE ACCAVATINA 11. KD-2 REQUESTED COOPAL SUPPORT FROM COOPAL CONDUCT
   INVESTIGATION; RESULTS THIS INVESTIGATION NOT AVAILABLE TO DATE. WILL REPORT
   FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS LEARNED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/B COMMENT: DEATH BANDERA, ENQUIRE REACTION AND AUTOPSY RESULTS.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3829
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006
CIRCA 1 NOV AECAVATINA 12 ALLEGEDLY TURNED OVER PANTHELYMON FURDYGA TO GERMAN AUTHORITIES HILDESHEIM HOPE THIS WOULD SIDETRACK GERMAN INVESTIGATION BANDERA DEATH. 12 CONVINCED BANDERA COMMITED SUICIDE RESULT ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL BY UNIDENTIFIED PARAMOUR. NOTE THIS CONFIDENTIAL THEORY OF AECAVATINA 12, DOES NOT APPEAR OTHER AECAVATINAS DISCUSSING IT. LATE SEPTEMBER FURDYGA ALLEGEDLY SUMMONED BRNL BY KGB FOR TALKS AND TOLD THAT BANDERA PLUS AECAVATINAS 2, 12 AND VOLODYMYR LENYK TARGETS ASSASSINATION OR KIDNAPPING. FURDYGA INSTRUCTED 12 FOR KIDNAPPING WITH AID AGENT RING. FURDYGA ALLEGEDLY KEPT RIS 5W MESSAGES, BRNL AIR TICKET ETC. CONFESSIONED TO 12 BECAUSE CONSCIENCE STRICKEN.

1. WILL TRY CONFIRM FURDYGA STORY THROUGH OR UPswing.

END OF MESSAGE
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT : Stefan BANDERA's Death and FP Exploitation Thereof

1. This memorandum is for your information only.

2. On 15 October 1959 in Munich, Germany, Stefan BANDERA died a victim of cyanide poison. German police investigation has ruled out suicide, but has not yet solved the crime. Investigation and speculation continues.

3. News items giving various versions of his death were carried in many Western European and American publications in October. Coverage in emigre press has naturally been wide and continuous throughout November. The Communist Press inside and outside the Soviet Bloc also mentioned the death prominently, but suggests that the German Intelligence Service killed BANDERA.

4. A factual script on his death and biography was included in our taped Ukrainian program scheduled for broadcast from Athens in October. Because transmissions to one area were temporarily suspended in October, pursuant to the SOMOV-ALLEN talks, this material has not been broadcast. SR emigre agents and case officers discussed exploitation of this murder from many angles, but elected to wait until a full report had been received from Munich. A full report has not been received since the police investigation is still in progress.

5. The SR Division has been reluctant to launch wide-spread FP press play labeling BANDERA's death a Soviet deed for several reasons, among which are the following:

   a. Until the German Police investigation of suspects has been completed, it would be premature to make allegations which the German Police investigation might later contradict, for

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006
example, as matters now stand, pure emigre vengeance might have been the motive for murder.

b. The implication of FIS omnipotence and omnipresence in this unsolved crime is naturally damaging to Ukrainians' morale at home and abroad.

c. SR is formulating Western press articles about BANDERA's death for eventual use. Already planned for inclusion are comparisons between BANDERA's death and the assassinations of the previous figureheads of Ukrainian nationalism, Stepan FETLURIA (shot in Paris in 1926) and Evhen KONVALIETS (handed a package containing a bomb in Brussels in 1938).

6. According to the best available evidence, BANDERA was apparently attacked and poisoned by two unidentified men between the frontdoor of his apartment house and the third floor door to his apartment.

Chief
Soviet Russia Division

cc: DCI
# Dispatch

**Operational Action Required:**

- **Investigation of BANDERA's Death**

## 1.

We have received recently the following information from about BANDERA's death:

"It is certain that the Ukrainian leader BANDERA was liquidated by the KGB. For 15 years the KGB and Department II (MI) have possessed powerful agents who sit in the Ukrainian national movement. The KGB from Moscow and Kiev has had its sights on BANDERA for years. They wanted to wait for the right moment, however, in order to bump him off."

"This operation was directed by Col. 'FIBROGOW' (cover name for KGB officer, Berlin-Karlshorst). In addition this action was also supported by KGB channels from Prague. The technique was very simple. A KGB agent who stood very close to BANDERA alerted him that an interesting personality, who is of interest to the AIS, had defected from the USSR. BANDERA went to a meeting which had been organized with this personality in a restaurant in Munich. He had a discussion with the 'defector,' who was an officer of the KGB. This short discussion sufficed to ignite a drop of poison in the coffee cup, which proved fatal after 10-15 hours. It was not cyanide, but a special poison which had been prepared by the KGB for 'special purposes.'"

"Now the AIS office in Regensburg, which was upset by this, can chase the wind for a long time, when one notes that the AIS, through an agent sitting in this IS office, has placed false clues into the investigation."

2.

We understand from people here who are following the case that CIC played only a brief part in the investigation at the beginning and that the matter is now completely in the hands of the Germans. We would appreciate it, however, if you would find out whatever you can about the CIC part in the case in the hope that some light can be shed on the allegation which makes about the 'agent' in the AIS office.

3.

We do not wish this information to be passed to CIC at this time, either as MARSAN material or disguised. The reasons are: (a) we have no corroborative information concerning the BANDERA case, (b) the allegation itself is too vague to be amenable of much checking at present, and (c) the allegation is so typical that whether or not it was attributed to another source, CIC might think to which we do not wish them to do. However, if you can establish that CIC was, in fact, involved in the BANDERA investigation, we would then reconsider whether or not to pass them the above material.
1. The gist of paragraph 1 of DIR-00682 and DIR-09965 was passed to UPSING on receipt of Reference B. Following is UPSING's reply:

A. According to the autopsy, Bandera's death resulted from potassium cyanide which was detected in the corpse. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of a "combination poisoning," in which first a lethal but hard to trace poison was administered and not until later a non-lethal amount of easily traceable potassium cyanide, in order to cast suspicion on the wrong person. (According to our information, the lethal dose of orally administered potassium cyanide depends on the amount of acid in the stomach. Under normal conditions a lethal dose is about 1 mg per kg. of body weight; however, one case is described in medical records, in which at a less than normal degree of stomach acidity, 30 mg per kg. of body weight did not result in death.)

B. (1) According to information available to UPSING, warfarin is a rat poison of relatively low toxicity when taken by human beings or larger animals. The amount that would be used to exterminate rats is harmless for humans, and even in repeated doses is not dangerous. Since warfarin inhibits clotting, as in the case of drugs used medically to counteract thrombosis - Dicumarin, Dicumarol, Bromacen and Harecam, clot formation is either delayed or does not occur. The first symptoms of an overdose are generally nose bleeding and an admixture of blood in the urine, so that in our opinion it would be very hard to commit an undetected poison murder using warfarin. During an autopsy, bleeding of the mucous and serous membranes could be easily determined.

(2) Warfarin, according to our information is an alkylated phenemethylnaphthalenone in which it is contained in approximately 10 per cent. It is used in numerous purgatives and laxatives and is completely harmless in normal doses. The lethal dose is so high that it could hardly be administered unnoticed. Here too, bleeding of the mucous and serous membranes would be detected during an autopsy.

(3) We have no information concerning Pival.

C. It is therefore UPSING's opinion that neither warfarin nor Pival could have been used in the Bandera case.

2. In view of the fact that UPSING's information is quite contrary to that contained in the headquarters cables cited in paragraph 1 above, we would appreciate any further comments suitable for passing to UPSING on this subject.
До Дру, в Націоналізмі!

Слава Україні!

Волостівські і дружені люди завжди, щоб стати перед цілістю ЧУ ОУН, налаштовані так ж впливові обіцянки на кожного членів. У трактуванні цих обіця-
nь зусієвуть прийняті колонія зібрання, які вже є частиною церквісної діяльності або є у безпечних і в небез-
печен умовах продовжують терористичну боротьбу.

В обов'язкових місцях, де у володарях і організаціях, використані високосприятливі
країни членів, мусить бути залежна від саме завжди, щоб відповідно наше діло було, а не тільки в небезпечних, високосприятливих, які діють на якості ОУН, як на таємничних і небезпекa-
них умовах продовжують терористичну боротьбу.

В організаціях засідати так само, як і в Країні, в місці для них, щоб миттєво видаєть, що засідати відповідно від його власної, але організації не має вплинути на членів, щоб вплинути свої завдання.

В доповіді зазначений дії гідно, щоб відбулося більше членів, організації можливо тільки припустити і матеріальні землі. В одному і другому можна зробити принципів правління терористичної життєдіяльності, як працювати, так і спра

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/3

ATTENTION: 

SUBJECT: Death of Stepan Bandera

REFERENCES:  
A. RDA-45907, std 12 November 1959  
B. RDA-4713, std 10 February 1960  
C. DHR 00682 (DUT 7206), std 31 January 1957  
D. DHR 02965 (DUT 77118), std 14 February 1957

1. In the absence of an autopsy and a complete toxicological report on intestinal contents and all body tissues and fluids, it is theoretical at best for one to consider whether a "combination poisoning" occurred. It is unlikely that two substances of lethal capacity would be administered to one target and, without the complete data described above, it is impossible to say even as a guess.

2. It appears to me the information contained in Reference A is more than adequate to explain the circumstances of death in this case.

3. Certain factors may be considered such as:

   a. Cyanides:

      (1) The average fatal dose of sodium and potassium cyanide is about 0.25 gram (4 grains). However, one-fourth of this amount has caused death. As a rule, only a small part of ingested cyanide is absorbed before death. Therefore, evidence can be found frequently in the remaining intestinal contents.

      (2) They are oxidized in the body to cyanate and sulfocyanate, and excreted into the urine. Therefore, evidence may be found in retained urine.

      (3) The concentrations of HCN found in tissues at death range usually around 0.3-2 milligrams per 100 ml. Therefore, tissue analysis will reveal this.
SUBJECT: Death of Stepan Panders

(4) If cyanide evidence was not found in these circumstances, it is fair to assume the man did not die from cyanide poisoning. However, if it was found, one may feel certain the man died from that cause or would have even if some other mechanism was used.

b. Warfarin, 3-(a-acetonylbenzyl)-4-hydroxycoumarin or 3-a-phenyl-acetonyl-4-hydroxycoumarin. Single doses do not produce poisoning, but successive small daily doses as low as 1.0 mg./kg./day for 5 days are fatal.

c. Fumarin, 3-(a-acetonylfurfuryl)-4-hydroxy coumarin, is used as a rodenticide. Toxicity symptoms similar to those of Warfarin.

d. Pival, 2-pivalyl-1, 3-indandione, used as pesticide and rodenticide. Symptoms resemble those produced by Warfarin.

4. We would agree, in the absence of the type of information described in paragraph 1 above, that paragraph 10 of Reference B is a correct statement.

5. Since References C and D only indicated the possibility of something else for the field's consideration, we cannot regard UPWING'S findings as being contrary to ours.

6. Should the information referred to in paragraph 1 above be made available for study, this office would attempt to provide such other opinion as might then be appropriate.

Chief, Operations Division,
Medical Staff
1. The following comments have been obtained from:

a. In the absence of an autopsy and a complete toxicological report on intestinal contents and all body tissues and fluids, it is theoretical at best to consider whether a "combination poisoning" occurred. It is unlikely that two substances of lethal capacity would be administered to one target and, without the complete data described above, it is impossible to say even as a guess.

b. It appears the information contained in reference A is more than adequate to explain the circumstances of death in this case.

c. Certain factors may be considered such as:

(1) Cyanides:

(a) The average fatal dose of sodium and potassium cyanide is about 0.25 gram (1/4 grain). However, only a small part of ingested cyanide is absorbed before death. Therefore, evidence can be found frequently in the remaining intestinal contents.

(b) They are oxidised in the body to cyanate and sulfocyanate, and excreted into the urine.

(c) The concentrations of cyanide found in tissues at death range usually around 0.3 mg per 100 ml. Therefore, these findings will reveal this.

(d) If cyanide evidence was not found in these circumstances, it is fair to assume the man did not die from cyanide poisoning. However, if it was found, one may feel certain the man died from that cause.

(2) Warfarin, 3-(a-acetonylfurfuryl)-4-hydroxycoumarin or 3-a-phenoxy-4-hydroxycoumarin. Ordinarily, successive small daily doses as low as 1.0 mg/kg/day for five days will produce fatalities. However, an accumulated total of this will frequently produce a fatality in one dose. The previous case had more than that estimated as minimum to produce fatality. Autopsy findings are consistent with etiology of other than the warfarin series for, indeed, with causes of death other than poisoning. Hence, positive diagnosis is impossible unless one identifies the substance as being present.

(3) Fumarin, 3-(a-acetonylfurfuryl)-4-hydroxycoumarin, is used as a rodenticide. Toxicity symptoms similar to those of Warfarin.
(4) Pival, 2-pivalyl-1-, 3-iodobenzene, used as pesticide and rodenticide. Symptoms resemble those produced by Warfarin.

d. It is agreed that, in the absence of the type of information described in paragraph 1 above, that paragraph 10 of reference B is a correct statement.

e. Since references C and D only indicated the possibility of something else for the field's consideration, UPHILL's findings cannot be regarded as contrary to ours.

2. According to ARCAHROHANI/2 it is rumored that cyanide was found in Bandera's colon, indicating that it must have been swallowed a number of hours before he died. Is there any truth to this rumor?

3. It seems strange that the autopsy performed after the death of such an important political figure was not thorough enough to determine definitely the cause of death.

6 April 45

Distribution:
Orig 1 - Address.
2 - OSN, Germany.
1 - RI
2 - SW/3
Random Notes.

The OBERLANDER Affair.

The Soviet press tied in the death of BANDERA with the OBERLANDER affair. So did the Polish. At minimum, therefore, there is a political-action connection between the two matters. To get at the bottom of the BANDERA matter, therefore, it is necessary to determine who pushed the OBERLANDER-BANDERA tie, how it was propagated, etc. This, in turn, requires the study of materials put out in the USSR, Poland, and East Germany on this matter. Also, offices and personalities engaged in this. In Poland, I know, a book came out on OBERLANDER's alleged crimes, etc. Also, some German government organ or intelligence office (West German) should have the findings of the special committee that investigated the charges against OBERLANDER.

Unknown Visitor in Munich.
a. ASCASSOWARY 2 mentioned that an unknown visitor from Sov-satellite bloc visited Bander.
b. AEDOGMA talks re rumor that Myron MATVIYKO had been in Munich.
c. JAS an intel report re RIS officer visiting Bandera in Munich.

The OUN/BANDERA-West German Intelligence Tie.

What do we know about it? What are the Germans say about all this? About Bander's death?

The RIS surfacing of Myron MATVIYKO.
The surfacing of MATVIYKO is directly connected with the BANDERA death. If BANDERA were polished off by the RIS, then the death and the MATVIYKO surfacing are part of the same RIS master operation.

The RIS surfacing of Vasyl KUK.
This matter is directly connected with Myron MATVIYKO and is part of the same RIS master political-action operation.

Mykhailo HORYN'CHENKO. Should be traced, investigated across the board.

FURDGA-FURDYG-ZHCHTYSKY. Who is this Joe?

Role of Ivan KASHURA. Note that KASHURA, head of the SB, believes that BANDERA committed suicide, and butresses that with such fancy talk as BANDERA's love for a maid, etc. KASHURA is tied operationally to MATVIYKO, who is RIS. It is possible that KASHURA is spreading the suicide-love-sickness version in order to cover RIS complicity.

2 May 1968
1. AEXCMA-1 was sent to Munich for DTY and spent several months in late 1959 investigating the death of Stefan BANDER. Due to an illness which cropped up during the course of this DTY, he submitted an 18-page report on 23 December 1959 which summarizes his findings in the matter. This report is forwarded as Attachment A. He told the undersigned, as indicated in the reference, that he would write up a complete report of his investigation when he returned to Paris. As he was about to return to Paris in early January 1960, he submitted three supplementary reports on the death of BANDER. These reports accompany this dispatch as Attachments B-D.

2. In essence, AEXCMA-1 became convinced, as a result of his investigations, that BANDER committed suicide. His convictions became even stronger following his interviews with Adrian FUCHS of the Munich Kripo political investigations squad (these contacts are described in Attachment A). In his first contact with AEXCMA-1, FUCHS told AEXCMA-1 that, in the course of his interviews with about 100 BANDERites and other Ukrainian emigres, someone passed AEXCMA-1's name as an emigre who possibly might know something about the matter. In his second and last contact with AEXCMA-1, he said that an unidentified BANDERite identified ("denounced") as the word used by AEXCMA-1) AEXCMA-1 as the Z0 Bryan member (sic) who was appointed to take charge of the Z0 Bryan organizational commission to investigate BANDER's death and that VolodyMyr DEICHAKIVSKYY was appointed AEXCMA-1's aide. DEICHAKIVSKYY is described by AEXCMA-1 as a former SB (Bander's Security Service) member who lives permanently in Canada and who remained in Munich from the date he came to Munich to attend BANDER's funeral (it is unknown if DEICHAKIVSKYY since has returned to Canada).

Attachments:
A-D = Reports, herewith

Distribution:
2 COS/G with attachments
1 COS/G w/o
1 COS/G w/o
2 COS/G w/o
2 COS/G w/o

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The foregoing is how Soviet journalist Walter Beljaev begins his article under the title of "The Concealed Always Becomes Evident" which was published in the newspaper, FOR RETURN TO THE HOMELAND (Ukrainian-language edition) issue No. 82/371, October 1959, page 4. The sudden death of the leader of the 2ch/CON/H, on 15 October 1959, as a result of potassium cyanide poisoning, as might be expected, started a lot of speculation regarding the causes of this incident. The various versions, which in the beginning were very obscure, later became somewhat more concrete and even plausible.

Having arrived in Munich almost a month after the death of S. Bandera, at the invitation of the SB chief, Ivan Markusha, for the purpose of "privately investigating this affair," I heard the following more or less logical versions.

1. Stefan Bandera was poisoned by Gehlen's German security organization at the request of the Minister for Refugee Affairs, Prof. Dr. Theodore Oberlaender, former participant in the Lvov murders.
2. Stefan Bandera was poisoned by the Communist because he maintained contacts with the Ukraine and until his very last the liberation struggle in the Ukraine. This story had two different angles:
   a. The potassium cyanide was forced on Bandera in the elevator in the building where he lived, and,
   b. The cyanide was in some manner given to Bandera by one of his closest associates who was a Communist agent.
3. Stefan Bandera was poisoned by one time chief of the SS, Tyron Natviyenko, who supposedly had been in Germany for the past six weeks and with whom S. Bandera was reported to have secretly met.
4. Stefan Bandera was poisoned by his former associate and present strong political opponent Mykola Lebed.
5. Stefan Bandera committed suicide by taking cyanide.
Each of these versions had some plausibility and at first there was so much basis for each one that it was possible to accept any one version as the truth.
Let us now examine them more carefully.
1. Stefan Bandera was poisoned by Gehlen's group at the specific direction of Prof. Dr. Osterlander.
   This is the Communist version which was not only widely publicized in the USSR and all the satellite countries, but also in the Communist and pro-Communist circles in the West.
   In order to know why the Communist spread this version, it is necessary to look into the political happenings of at least the past year. As early as late 1958 and early 1959, the Soviet press inducted the newspaper, NOT RETURN TO THE ENGLISH, started an extensive provocation against the Ukrainian Legion, DAGITZ, which, according to the Soviet press, was composed mostly of members of the OUN and was organized...
at the request of Stefan Bandera in collaboration with German counterintelligence, and committed mass murders of Polish intelligentsia in Lvov in June of 1941. In the early articles regarding the NAČTIGAL there was no mention made of Prof. Theodore Oberlaender. The articles were about Bandera, Shukhevich, Hrynoich and others; but exclusively Ukrainians. In the meantime, in the spring of 1959, in addition to the earlier version about the crimes in Lvov, former lieutenant and present German Minister for Refugees, Prof. Dr. Theodor Oberlaender, was mentioned as a "politruk" and "Načtigalist" who, according to the Soviets, was responsible for the murders of Polish intelligentsia in Lvov, although the murders were actually committed by individual legionnaires. The Communists must have brought Oberlaender into the picture for the following reasons: During 1959 the Communist started to put pressures on the Bonn Government to establish diplomatic ties with satellite countries, and especially with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Protests against such ties were made by so-called Landmannschaften from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and by Prof. Oberlaender as Minister for Refugee Affairs. The Bonn Government joined their protests. Therefore the Communists were determined to do away with Oberlaender and started their pressures against him, blaming him for the murders in Lvov.

The Communist agitators were successful also in getting articles against Prof. Oberlaender into the West German press, DIE TAT, 23 September 1959. Undoubtedly also under the influence of Communist agents, on 23 September 1959, the PFM Organization of those persecuted by the Nazi regime (Communist control), brought formal prosecution into Bonn courts against Oberlaender, requesting investigation into his case. In addition, the left wing, socialist press also joined this movement.

However, all attacks made against Prof. Oberlaender were always made in connection with the Ukrainian nationalist legion NAČTIGAL.
Suddenly Bandera dies, and immediately there is the story that he was poisoned under specific orders from Oberlaender who, it is said, wanted to get rid of an inconvenient witness, insofar as he (Oberlaender) was concerned. According to the Soviet Press, Bandera as a participant in the murders in Lvov, would have been able to testify against Oberlaender.

The Communist version is primitive and does not stand up against criticism because: If Bandera was a participant in the Lvov murders, or more specifically the NACHTEGAL, which was organized at his request, then it is clear that he could only have defended Prof. Oberlaender in order to protect himself. Logic would indicate otherwise; i.e., the EOK wanted to do away with Bandera who would have been able to testify in defense of Prof. Oberlaender. In defense of the Soviet version, we have a somewhat obscure coincidence. Since the middle of September German investigative forces (it is still not clear whether they were Gehlen people or the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) were talking about meeting with Stefan Bandera. As a result such a meeting did take place on 14 October 1939 in the Bayerischer Hof in Munich. There were three German intelligence men whose names are not known to me. The following from the Zeh/OUN were present: Stefan Bandera, Yaroslav Bentsal, General Secretary of the Zeh/OUN and Dr. Vas'kovych.

The conversation concerned the cooperation of the Zeh/OUN with German Intelligence, financial subsidy by the Germans, and in particular about the continuation of Zeh/OUN ties with the Homeland. The Germans accepted all the suggestions made by the Zeh/OUN and promised all sorts of aid. Stefan Bandera was very satisfied with the results of the talks.
The organizer of this meeting was Yalavrental who maintains liaison between the Zch/OUH and the Germans. Zenon Pelensky also was supposed to have played a role in this meeting, or at least he had been well informed about the meeting.

The meeting ended about 24 hours before Bandera died with a dinner at the Bayerischer.

All those present ordered from the menus but Stefan Bandera ordered cocoa instead of coffee.

The question arises whether the Soviets knew about this meeting in advance and therefore altered the version of the story on the death of Bandera to coincide with this? Was there a Soviet agent present among the German participants? Did the Soviets learn about the meeting only after the fact, and did they independently announce their own version of the event of Bandera's death? The fact is that the Soviet version takes on a new meaning for those who were present during the German-Ukrainian meeting.

German criminologists discuss any possibility for the cyanide poisoning of Bandera during the dinner, either by the German participants or by any of the hotel waiters or kitchen help.

I am not a chemist, and therefore it is difficult for me to say whether it is possible for potassium cyanide in capsule form to become effective only after 24 hours.

In answer to my question whether the Zch/OUH had complete trust in the Germans who participated in the meeting, the Zch/OUH/SS chief stated that they have absolute trust in two of the individuals but there can be some reservations insofar as the third was concerned. (He—the third man—lives in Munich and considers himself a specialist in Ukrainian affairs.) He was the one who requested such a meeting be held.

As I learned after I started to write this report, there were only two German intelligence men present at the meeting, and not three as Kashuba had told me. This means that either Kashuba did not know how many Germans were present or he purposely gave me false information. A. F.-a, the German political criminal police commissioner,
assured me that after investigation of the above-mentioned Germans, the criminal police completely excluded them from having anything to do with Bandera's death. Besides that, a cyanide capsule would have become effective much sooner than 24 hours later. Therefore, the Soviet account will not stand up to the criminal police investigation report. I personally am of the same opinion.

Now let us go to the second version. Stefan Bandera was poisoned by Soviet agents. There are two versions to this account:

a. Soviet agents forced the capsule on Bandera on the stairs of his home, and

b. one of Bandera's close associates from the ZLIC/UN gave him the potassium cyanide in the form of candy or fruit.

The first version was the one most speculated on by the Banderites. They even talked about two individuals who were supposed to have gotten out of the elevator just about the time of Bandera's death and run away. The Banderites even stated that two such individuals were seen to have been acting as if they were surveilling Bandera during the last few days before his death, even when he drove out to the woods to pick mushrooms. According to the police, however, there was no evidence found (after questioning residents and neighbors) of two men leaving the premises at the time of Bandera's death and there were no signs of violence found on Bandera's body. A neighbor of Bandera stated that he didn't hear any noises or footsteps other than Bandera's. Also, according to the neighbor, there were no signs that the elevator had been in use at that particular time.

The basket of fruit which stood beside Bandera's body witnessed the fact that he had carefully set it down. This basket would have fallen to the ground and the fruit would have been scattered if there had been any struggle.
The German criminal police experts state that there was no act of violence on the stairs. This also was my humble opinion after I had gathered the facts. This version was idly spread by the Banderaites on the first and second days following Bandera's death and they took up various details during the funeral service.

The second version is that Bandera was poisoned by KGB agents in the Zch/OUN by giving the potassium cyanide to Bandera either in some candy or fruit. This version was from the very beginning denied by the Banderaites but, at the same time, most thoroughly investigated by the German police and by me personally.

In order to better understand this version it is necessary to consider the following facts. On the morning of 15 October 1939, about ten minutes to eight, Vasil Ninov'ski (true name Skoda), one of the SS guards, waited by the home of Stefan Bandera. Five minutes to eight Bandera left his home, walked over to the garage and drove out with his car to Zepelinstrasse. Vasil Ninov'ski escorted him all the way to the gate. They entered the building together and Bandera went into his office while Ninov'ski went to the printer's shop where DELA RIBGA was already being assembled. About nine o'clock all the other members began to arrive. Whether anybody entered Bandera's office between eight and nine has not been determined. It seems like no one did. This means Bandera was there alone. Between the hours of nine and 11:30, the following people entered his office:

1. Yaroslav Pankov
2. Dr. Gregory Vashkovych
3. Roman Demytia
4. Bohuslav Nativiyenko (Nativiyenko drove off with Bandera about 11:30 to the market place to buy fruits.)

This means that the four above-mentioned individuals could have figured in the murder. The German criminal police and I personally devoted special attention to them.
Let us work with them individually. The past of Mr. Bentsal is not clear. He was director of the Lvov theaters under the communists. This means the communist trusted him. Why? About a year ago he was visited by an old theater friend from Lvov who urged him to return to the homeland. He brought with him a book about Benders' father whom the communists consider a celebrated artist. Bentsal told the SB about this meeting. The SB planned to have Bentsal meet with the Soviet again in a room where they would install a microphone. However, the courier from Lvov refused to meet in the room, and he talked to Bentsal out on the street where no witnesses were present. Then he returned to Lvov. It is difficult to say whether or not Bentsal told the SB everything that was said during this conversation.

Bentsal's wife, Nadia nee Lototska, is a pharmacist and works in a German apothecary where she has access to potassium cyanide. Theoretically there are possibilities that Bentsal could have been a party to the murder of Benders. For some reason I excluded this possibility from the very beginning. The fact that the KGB tried to get him to Lvov is not sufficient proof that he would have destroyed Benders. The KGB couldn't blackmail him because he has no relatives in the homeland. Eventually they could have revealed his role in the theatre but he could have talked his way out of this.

Dr. Gregory Vashkovych: Neither I personally nor the criminal police could find even the slightest probability that he could have been in touch with the KGB.

The same could be said about Roman Depryts'ky. The SB would sooner be willing to say that Roman Depryts'ky could be an American agent rather than a Soviet agent.

Evhenia Matviyenko - Mak: She was suspected most by the German police and by me.

The following were the reasons. My personal reason: Probably nobody beside me knows that Nykholo Horodets'ky, the brother-in-law of Evhenia Koshulunska Matviyenko - Mak, after the arrival of the communists in Lvov in October 1939, was promoted to commandant of the militia in Lvov. He remained in this position until the arrival of the Germans in Lvov in late June or early July 1941. He went to the east together with the MVD. In 1944 he returned to Lvov and is still there. Nykholo Horodets'ky is a simple cabinet maker.
In addition, I also took into consideration the fact that Veona Natviyeyko had been in KGB hands for some time now. The KGB extracted from her every bit of information which he knew from the date of his birth until his arrival in the States.

The KGB has been playing with her ZAGA three years. How they desired, with her (Natviyeyko's) help, and more specifically with the help of Veona Natviyeyko, to destroy another. Natviyeyko directed her in touch with Veona Natviyeyko and instructed her on how to go about doing this. The result: Natviyeyko would stay.

Veona Natviyeyko was the last person to be alone with Bandera. More specifically: Approximately 13:20 Bandera came home to the office of SHACK FIBREY and asked Evhenia Natviyeyko to go with him to the market to buy some fruit. She refused three times stating that she wasn't in the mood and that she didn't need anything. Bandera insisted, stating that she should at least go to keep him company. She agreed to go only after the other employees kept urging her.

At the market, Bandera bought green tomatoes, pears and plums. As was his habit, he tasted all the produce, with the exception of the green tomatoes.

Bandera was in a very good mood and when Evhenia Natviyeyko began to express her concern about her husband he boosted her spirits, saying that everything was going to be all right and that Myron Natviyeyko, according to his last message, would be in Germany at the latest in 1960.

About 13:30 they returned to Zeppelinstrasse 67, Evhenia Natviyeyko-Jak took the bag of walnuts which she purchased and, walking up the stairs, called to Bandera, "Wait a moment, I will tell Vasili Plotnik'y to escort you home." Bandera replied, "By the time Plotnik'y comes down I will be home. I'll be seeing you." He stepped on the gas and drove off. Forty minutes later he dropped dead on the stairs of his home.
What Bandera did during these 40 minutes is hard to say. Everything points to the fact that he was detained someplace for at least 15-20 minutes, because if he drove directly home he would have been there within 20 minutes. One thing points to the fact that Bandera either returned once again to the market or stopped at some store. Evhenia Matviyeyko-Mak states that, in her presence, Bandera did not buy any dill for pickling tomatoes. However, after he died there were five sprigs of dill found in the basket. This means that after arriving at Zeppelinstrasse he purchased the dill someplace. Where? From whom? Why?

At my request, the SB drove Bandera’s car from Zeppelinstrasse to the market where dill is sold, lingered there for several minutes and drove on to Bandera’s home. The entire trip took 20 minutes. This means that if Bandera was at the market, then there still are 20 minutes missing, or let us say 15 or even 10 minutes.

Evhenia Matviyeyko-Mak is capable of anything. But I do not believe that she personally fed cyanide to Bandera. The German police are of the same opinion.

And now let us analyze other aspects.

a. Potassium cyanide is not a weapon the Soviets use in their fight against their political opponents. If it is proven that Bandera was really poisoned by the Soviets then this will be the first time they have used this means.

b. In view of the present political situation, would the Communist try to do away with Bandera (at this time)?

c. Wouldn’t the KGB have considered the fact that the death of Bandera would instigate the Ukrainian emigres to mobilize their fight against the Communists in the whole world?

d. Would it not benefit the Communists more to play along with Bandera through Evhenia Matviyeyko as they have to date?
All these are arguments in the KGB's favor. However, for the sake of objectivity, I will introduce arguments to show that the KGB could have done this.

a. The KGB were so well prepared for their attempt on Bandera's life that they were sure the cause of his death would never be determined. After the first medical investigation, the doctor in the hospital signed a formal statement of death in which he stated that the cause of death was a stroke. This statement is available. The Zch/GUN leadership accepted this statement, as did the wife of Stepan Bandera. Doubts were expressed only some time later.

b. The KGB considered that the game between Matviyenko and Bandera was ended and, therefore, in consideration of future, more important plans they decided to liquidate Bandera. For some time Bandera had certain doubts about Myron Matviyenko. He began to suspect KGB control. The British intelligence felt that there was a new hand functioning. In the early summer of this year, Bandera received a completely false reply to a question he sent to Matviyenko. This awakened in him even further doubts. In connection with this he used the control question which is asked only in cases where enemy control is suspected. In late September of this year a reply was received to this control question. The reply was in every detail in accordance with the original agreement. This satisfied Bandera but it is not known whether the KGB was convinced that KGB control was not suspected. Further, in addition to this reply a request came from Myron Matviyenko to postpone the conference planned for November until late 1960, and instead to hold a convention of the Zch/GUN with the GUN. Myron Matviyenko announced that he would arrive, along with representatives from his home country, to this big convention.
Benders did in fact cancel the planned conference and began to make preparations for the larger convention. Didn't the KGB consider that since Benders once suspected Myron Matviyeyko to be a communist agent he also would be suspected when he arrived in Germany? In the fight between Benders and Matviyeyko, Benders would win. If Benders were removed from the scene, Matviyeyko would be able to take care of himself, insofar as the others were concerned. Therefore, Benders should be liquidated before the convention and the battle should be conducted with others who will replace Benders, someone who is not as refined as Benders.

Realizing this, he requested that when the SB notifies the homeland about Benders's death, the homeland should be asked whom they would like to have named to replace Benders. To date, there has been no reply. This reply would clarify a lot for us.

There is another question to which I personally find no answer and that is: when and who gave Benders the poison and in what form. Neither I nor the criminal police can discover the criminal. This version should be completely discarded. It must be pursued, but we will perhaps be able to clarify it only after many years, probably after the expected visit of Matviyeyko to Germany in 1960.

The third version was: Benders was poisoned by Myron Matviyeyko who had been in Germany since six weeks previous to Benders's death and with whom Benders had secret meetings.
There is nothing to justify this version. It probably stems from members of the ZCUN in the USA. It is pure speculation by the Zch/OUN opponents. This version cannot stand up to criticism nor can the story that Bandera was liquidated by the people of Mykhailo Lebed, his old political opponent.

Stefan Bandera was liquidated by Mykhailo Lebed with the help of his people in Munich: It is difficult to determine who spread this version. At any rate, General Gehlen's group of the German intelligence investigated this possibility. About a week after Bandera died, the informants of this group who are closely connected with Ukrainian political affairs received letters which contained the following message: "In connection with the death of Bandera, there are being circulated in Munich more or less plausible stories. One of them is that Bandera was liquidated by his one-time colleague and present vigorous political opponent Mykhailo Lebed. In accordance with our information, Lebed heads a group of people in Munich who could accomplish a task of this nature. It is requested that with the exception of his biographic data, you make available to us any information you may have regarding Mykhailo Lebed, especially regarding Lebed's last visit to Germany, whom he met with while here and any other information which would help you to clarify the above-mentioned statement."

There was a p.s. added at the bottom which stated, "how could such a story have originated and who, in your opinion, is behind it?" It was not possible to determine the exact source of this version. It is necessary however to believe that it came from Zch/OUN in revenge for the various stories regarding the
cause of Bandera's death which were being circulated by members of the ZP/OUN, or more specifically, from Karleplate, and which stories did not appeal to the members of the Zob/OUN.

It is not improbable that this version originated with the Soviets who would have liked to take advantage of the situation to stigmatize political mistrust and misunderstandings among the Ukrainian nationalist exile groups and prevent these groups from unifying in their reactions to the news that Bandera was liquidated by the "Moscow-Communist enemy." The majority of Gehlen's informants was of the opinion that the above-mentioned version was typical provocation devoid of any sense whatsoever. They felt that it originated with Soviet groups of blind Ukrainian party followers. All of Lebed's people in Munich are well known. There isn't one among them capable of such an act. Even the SB did not suspect them, and besides, Lebed hasn't been in Germany for more than a year. Lebed may have considered Bandera his political opponent, but he never considered him an enemy and nobody uses cyanide in their dealings with their political opponents.

It is difficult to say whether or not Gehlen's group was satisfied with these explanations. At any rate we can be sure that German intelligence and counter-intelligence will not take their eyes off Lebed when he shows up in Germany. This will especially be true if the German criminal police are unable to establish definitely whether or not Bandera died as a result of potassium cyanide by another party or by committing suicide, and we can expect it will be impossible to determine the true cause.
Stefan Bandera committed suicide by the use of potassium cyanide. This fifth and final version, according to the facts, is the most logical. The following facts support this version.

(1) Bandera's home life had lately become so unbearable that his only escape could have been suicide. His home life was unbearable for several reasons, the most important were: as a result from some very difficult experience in her life, and the fear of constant surveillance, Bandera's wife had practically lost all of her senses. If it weren't for the fact that she was the wife of the leader of the Zch/OUN she would have been in an insane asylum a year ago. All of Bandera's close friends knew about her situation.

(Translator: the rest of the paragraph talks about Bandera's unsatisfactory sex life, his seeking such diversions outside his home and the resultant uncontrollable jealousy of his wife which lead to fights between them.)

(2) Bandera's wife forbids any of their female friends from visiting their home even when accompanied by their husbands. She looked at everyone as a threat to herself. She forbade their male friends to visit them because Bandera would use the excuse of driving them home as an opportunity to get out for some fun. In the past two years Stefan Bandera lived through such hell that it was difficult for anyone to imagine. He used every available opportunity to get away from home. He was always at work at 7:30, or the latest at 8, while all other employees report to work at 9. All the others went home at 1700 while he remained alone with his troubled thoughts until 2200 or 2300, and at times he didn't leave for home until midnight. His wife would telephone him a dozen times to be sure he was actually at work. His wife made all sorts of accusations against him even in front of the children. The daughters favored their mother and the son favored Bandera. These violent scenes made a very strong impression on the children. Bandera could find no way out of this situation. During these
quarrels he always threatened suicide. His wife would reply, "the quicker you do, the better it will be for all of us," and then she usually added, "but you are too cowardly to commit suicide."

(3) Bandera's wife purposely compromised his every move. She made him appear without any character, a despot, a sadist, a liar, amoral and insane.

There were times when Bandera brought several friends "his guards" along with him whom Mrs. Bandera didn't personally know. During such times she would treat them so rudely that he would try to get them to leave as soon as possible (here the author gives specific examples of some of the things she used to do.)

Bandera, who considered himself a hero, and perhaps he was one, and an individual who enjoyed the respect of the organized masses and to whom he was a "god", had to bear the slander and accusations made by his wife who saw him only as a human being, her husband and the father of her children. This was more than he could stand. The people who were acquainted with this situation felt that these tortures (for which he often was personally to blame) were so horrible that any normal individual would have committed suicide long ago.

Bandera faced the problem of either committing his wife to an insane asylum or getting a divorce. He felt that in either case his wife would seek revenge by telling more tales about him. This unhappy, not normal situation turned Bandera into a bundle of nerves. He suffered several headaches which affected his heart. He was also troubled by rheumatism. He lay awake every night. Because of his nagging wife, he couldn't go out with his friends and he found no peace at home. In short, Bandera found himself in a hopeless situation.
He was thus led to begin thinking about suicide. However, he gave this very careful thought, planning to counter this act in such a way that suicide would never be suspected but that, on the contrary, would lead to various interpretations and suspicions that he was liquidated by the communists, thus permitting him to remain a hero. Recent events presented an opportune time for him to commit suicide, specifically:

a. A former member of the Kral leadership Furtyga-Furtyg-Kshechitskij, who two years ago escaped to the west via Poland and Vienna, admitted to the SB that he was sent by the KUB to bring Kashuba to East Berlin. Another group of individuals were also sent to the west in order to penetrate Bandera's group.

b. At the request of the SB, while I was in Paris, I prepared a short analysis on the subject of why the Soviets could start terrorist activities in the west. Having analyzed all the recent happenings in the Ukraine (the court proceedings in Radzyblo, Stanislav and other cities, etc) I came to the conclusion that Soviets might start terrorist activities. I requested that everyone keep alert. Bandera read my analysis.

c. Veriovka's Ukrainian nationalist chorus was in Munich at that time and Soviet diplomats from Bonn were present. Therefore this was a good time to commit suicide and place the blame on the Soviets. Bandera knew that nobody would suspect that he might take his own life. Bandera began to avoid his bodyguards. It appears that Bandera considered suicide several days earlier because he had been bidding farewell to his guards at the entrance to his home and entering the elevator alone. Here he would hide behind the elevator and watch to see if the bodyguards did actually leave.
He chose not to commit suicide in the office so that he wouldn't inconvenience the employees and members of the Zch/OUN. He didn't choose his home, in order not to inconvenience his wife, although she was the cause of his hopeless situation and also saw that she could not testify to the fact that it was suicide.

It is a fact that Bandera had a violent quarrel with his wife that very morning. He threatened suicide and left home to go to the office before 8 a.m.

Bandera employed the use of potassium cyanide which he always carried on his person and which, after his death, could not be found either on his person or in his home. Considering the above, I concluded that it was suicide by use of potassium cyanide. Motive: his unbearable marital situation.

If anyone proves to me that the situation was other than that which I have summarized above, I shall never again take any interest in either political or intelligence work. However, I am certain that no one will prove me wrong. I think that the German commission which is composed of professional individuals will come to the same conclusion, even though all the information that was available to me will not be available to them. It was not in the KGB interest to have Bandera liquidated at this time. On the contrary, Bandera's death interfered with KGB plans for compromising the Zch/OUN.

The KGB was successful in getting Bandera to postpone the Zch/OUN conference and plan for a big congress of the Zch/OUN in 1960. A major group of OUN members from the Ukraine headed by Myron Matviyenko were supposed to arrive for this congress. Only part of this group (about 15 individuals) were supposed to return to the Ukraine. The others including Myron Matviyenko were to remain in the West. Whether or not, in view of the latest development, the KGB will be able to continue its game of sending a delegation from the Ukraine to a congress is difficult to foresee.
1 January 1960

Subject: The Death of Stefan BANDERA and Incidents at Radio Free Europe, TEOPE and Zeppelinstrasse

Source of Information: Personal Comments

1. The unexpected and unexplained death of the head of Zch/OUN, Stefan Bander, has stirred up much speculation among his friends as well as his enemies. To date, the exact circumstances of his death are not clear. While my private investigations and the investigations by the German criminal police seem to point up the fact that Stefan Bandera committed suicide because of marital circumstances, the Zch/OUN is trying desperately to prove that Stefan Bandera was murdered by the Soviets.

In support of the Zch/OUN version and the recent efforts to poison employees of RFE with atropine: This effort to poison RFE employees with atropine gave the Zch/OUN a good argument. It supposedly offered proof that Soviet and Satellite intelligence organizations were employing the use of poison in their fight against their enemies.

Further activities bolster the Zch/OUN accusations that Bandera died at the hands of his enemies. Here I have in mind the bombing of the former TEOPE building and the bombing incident of the Zch/OUN building at Zeppelinstrasse 67. All this supposedly factually proves that the Soviets carried out an act of war against the Zch/OUN, the NTS, TEOPE and RFE.

My personal thought regarding these matters is as follows. All these incidents are independent of each other and concern completely different matters.
a. Regarding the poisoning of the employees of RFE. This is a typical example of American careerists in Europe which stems from their mentality of "how to make a mountain out of a molehill." The Czech intelligence, or perhaps even Yaroslav Nemets personally decided to send a fly into RFE. The American administrators of this establishment tried to turn the fly into an elephant. However, their efforts left only a bad taste. What I believe in connection with this and what I do not believe:

(1) I believe that the Czech intelligence officer in Salzburg, Yaroslav Nemets, could have made contact with an employee of RFE or infiltrate one of his own agents.

(2) I believe that the employee could have been working for both sides; i.e., play along with the Czechs for the benefit of the Americans.

(3) I believe that this double agent received from Nemets atropine with instructions to put it in small doses into the salt shakers in the RFE cafeteria.

(4) I believe that this atropine was not supposed to kill anyone of the members but only to produce delirium tremens; and also that it was designated for a large number of the salt shakers and not only for two of them.

(5) I believe that the above-mentioned agent, having received this atropine and appropriate instructions on how to proceed, reported this fact to his chief and turned the matter over to his control. Here the matter should have ended. Instead, purely for political reasons (to wit, from the conviction that one must make a mountain out of a molehill), the Americans realizing what kind of poison they have to deal with told the agent to put it into only two of the shakers and when the poison was put into the shakers, the salt shakers were confiscated and the propaganda-activities against Czech intelligence was initiated by the Americans. The Americans stated that they told the truth but they didn't tell the whole truth. They publicized the matter in fantasy form.
The benefits could be such: Take advantage of the opportunity to get FF play against the Communist Czechs, and prove to HFS financiers that HFS broadcasts most harmful to the Satellites since the Czechs tried to poison employees of the institution.

The harmful aspects: American intelligence opened itself to criticism that it was seeking sensations. I do not intend to state what steps I would have taken in this situation but I would not have stopped this game so readily and in such fashion.

b. Regarding the TooP Bombing. First, a few comments about TooP. TooP, created by the NSB, is financed by the Americans. It is guided by the Communists, more specifically, by the KGB. If anyone thinks differently, then they will sooner or later become convinced that they were wrong. The TooP bombing incident is in no way, except merely coincidentally, connected with the death of Stefan Bandera and with the poisoning incident at HFS.

The two largest rival organizations in the West are Zch/OUN and NSB. The difference is that the Zch/OUN for some time now is financing its own activities, while the NSB takes its money from anyone it can, chiefly from the Americans, then from the British and perhaps also from another third source.

The NSB like the Zch/OUN claims that it carries on its activities in the USSR, that it maintains contact with a net in the USSR, has at its disposal cadres in the West willing at any time to go to the USSR, etc. In short, the NSB claims to be one of the greatest emigre threats to the KGB, that the Zch/OUN in comparison with the NSB means nothing. That also is the opinion of the majority of the American patrons of the NSB.
And now suddenly the KGB murders not an NTS leader but the less dangerous Stefan Bandera. There are suicides here and suicides there, but most of the world press is convinced that Bandera was murdered by Communists. If that is true, then it means that the Zch/OUN and Bandera were a greater threat than the NTS and, God forbid, the American financiers will be so convinced and will redirect their aid from the NTS to the Zch/OUN. Therefore the NTSniks decided to plant a bomb in the empty Zch/OUN building and in this way prove that they are no lesser threat (to the KGB) than the Zch/OUN.

This is so obvious that it is not necessary for one to be a counter-intelligence man in order to understand what is really behind it. The NTSniks wanted to prove that the NTS is no less a revolutionary organization than the Zch/OUN and that their organization is as much a threat to the KGB as is the Zch/OUN. However, the NTS obviously was lacking in other new ideas because they repeated one of their old songs which is so familiar to us all.

In the past year (or perhaps even in the early part of this year) an attempt was made against the NTS radio and that took place after the radio was moved to another point, actually two days later. After the move to new luxurious quarters, a bombing incident took place in their old building. It occurs that no one is ever harmed in these (TSNK and NTS) bombings.

Please believe me, if the KGB were to take any action, it would do so at a more appropriate time, not two days later, and the desired results would be obvious. I considered the stink bomb placed at the Zch/OUN building several hours earlier was to serve the NTS purpose: That is to prove that the KGB places harmful bombs in their (NIS) buildings but only smokes out the Zch/OUN with stink bombs.
ATTACHMENT C to EGM 48874, 4 January 1960

SUBJECT: The Visit by the Oberkommissar of the German Criminal Police, Adrian FUCHS

From conversations with Ivan KASURA it was evident that the police investigations of BANDERA’s death were being handled by a young, very energetic Oberkommissar, Adrian FUCHS. I also learned from KASURA that FUCHS had interviewed at least fifty people regarding this matter. Adrian FUCHS telephoned on 8 December 1959 and asked me whether he could visit me and talk about the subject of BANDERA’s death. I agreed, and on Thursday, 10 December 1959, my first conversation with FUCHS took place in my home.

Mr. FUCHS told me that from conversations with various individuals, he learned that I was a friend of S. BANDERA and that I could express some opinions regarding his death. I told Mr. FUCHS that I was in Munich at that time and that I had been living in Paris, France, for some time now, but that I could discuss with him and analyze with him the various statements regarding BANDERA’s death.

I told him of the five versions known to me (see my other report), and we analyzed these various versions. Noting my objectivity in this regard, FUCHS told me that he was convinced that not only the members of the SB—KASURA and MUDRYK— but also all members of the Zoh/UUN leadership were keeping certain facts from the Criminal Police; facts which could bring to light the true cause of BANDERA’s death. He stated that
suicide was undoubtedly involved, and that for obvious political reasons, the Banderites didn't want this fact to become known.

Further, the German Police have facts which indicate that the Banderites forbade certain individuals to reveal any facts of S. BANDERA's case. The police questioned this, and they came to the conclusion that statements made by these people tended to bring to light the facts in this case. These individuals are Dmytro MOSKIV, Sephan LENCAVSKY, and Vasily KINOVSKY. Besides this, BANDERA's wife was very talkative at first and revealed certain facts (as for instance, the fact that BANDERA always carried cyanide on his person). She later stated that she could not verify this fact. It was evident that the Zob/OUN had forbidden her to talk.

FUCHS was so impressed with our three-hour conversation that he told me this talk gave him more satisfaction and more facts than the one hundred conversations he held with other individuals and that it convinced him his analysis to date was correct. He told me that I could easily replace a member of the commission engaged in the investigation of BANDERA's death.

FUCHS met with me again on 17 December 1959, at which time he was more reserved. At first, I didn't know the reason, but later KASHUBA explained. During the second interview of BENTSAL, BENTSAL noticed on FUCHS's desk a sheet of yellow paper on which was written in German the fact that M. KORZAHAN of Paris was head of the commission investigating the circumstances of BANDERA's death. It also listed Volodymyr DZUGAUKIVSKY of Canada and KASHUBA of Munich as members.
Later FUCHS asked BENTSAL whether KORZHAN was head of the commission investigating the circumstances of BANDERA's death, and whether DETOTAKIVSKY and KORZHAN were members of the commission. BENTSAL replied that he was not a member of Zch/OUN, and he didn't know whether or not I was a member of this commission.

At another time, FUCHS plainly told me that the German Criminal Police Commission had become convinced that BANDERA committed suicide. The commission had not established the motive, but they were on the right track. He stated that it appears, in spite of the denials of members of the SS and other members of the Zch/OUN leadership, that S. BANDERA had a difficult home life and that he spent much time in the company of other women. Although I didn't give him any definite details, I assured FUCHS that in my humble opinion the police were on the right track and that it was necessary to investigate further.

I reassured him that BANDERA's home life was unpleasant, especially as a result of his association with other women. FUCHS promised to visit me after completion of the investigation of all the details, but to date I have not heard from him.
ATTACHMENT D TO EWA 48874, 4 JANUARY 1960

SUBJECT: Ivan KASHEBA’s comments regarding BANDERA’s last moments of life.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Ivan KASHEBA

In support of my arguments that BANDERA committed suicide, I add the following:

Ivan KASHEBA told me years ago that there were two Jewish families living in the house where BANDERA lived. One of the families maintained a young German nursemaid for their two children. S. BANDERA was in love with this young girl and spent many a sleepless night just thinking about her. He used every occasion to meet her and talk to her, and as Ivan KASHEBA said, it was possible that he met with her secretly at night without the knowledge of his wife or her employer.

It is a fact that BANDERA’s wife learned about this flirtation and treated this girl with much contempt. On the morning of 15 October, BANDERA’s wife quarreled bitterly with him over this girl. Because of this quarrel, BANDERA left home fifteen minutes earlier than he had planned. His wife shouted after him, “Just wait; when you get home for lunch, I’ll finish my prayer for you.”

It is also a fact that BANDERA died by the door of this Jewish family, and the young German nursemaid was the first to come into the corridor, and as a trained nurse, she began to wash the blood of BANDERA. BANDERA was still half alive and held her hand tightly. It is possible that he purposely chose to die on her doorstep.

Stepan LENCHAŠKY knows a lot about this love of BANDERA for the nursemaid, but he does not wish to talk about it. He didn’t even tell KASHEBA about it.
Справа: Іван КАШУБА про останині моменти з життя БАНДЕРИ.

Джерело інформації: Іван КАШУБА

В доповнення до моїх аргументів, які я привів не доказ того, що Степан БАНДЕРА попросив самогубство, додатково не годим таке: Іван КАШУБА тому діє таки сказав мені, калек а домі, де жива Степан БАНДЕРА на першому поверсі жива дві жінки та один. В одній з тих родин мешкає троє маленьких дітей і та жінка відому замовлення та молоду неіцьку свою за нічи для догляду і виховання дітей. Степан БАНДЕРА був в любові з тією жінкою і справді не відповів на своє життя. Якось занимався у ній звісно життя і життя жінки і перед господарами та хлібом.

Справді, якщо БАНДЕРА той факт підпільника і з той го припинити звичайно виникли вони жону, а БАНДЕРА робив на безперервній дослід. Також в dni 15. корабля, той як у тоз відомо, що жінки зробила БАНДЕРА з програю та сонці певну звавчику. БАНДЕРА працював її також і також, звавчику на 15. корист міськ військ, що вони пилинав. Жінка ся підозрюва за ними "Гайда, ту прийде на обід, то я Тобі не довірю свою "молитву".

Фактом також є, що БАНДЕРА звав тримання під держава того життя, на жаль жінки вони брали перед, що і ж понесена сестра-медика, вони почала замовлю під кріз з усі та, а що відповідно БАНДЕРА не був на під життя і тримавях овильно за руку. Можливо, що він свідомо вибрав собі місце смерті якраз під держава того похі.

Про ту любов БАНДЕРИ до боми захоп дуже богато Степан ЛЕВ КАВСЬКИЙ, але він іншого про те не хоче говорити. Навіть КАШУБІ не каже усього того.
On October 15, 1939, Stefan PAMERA, anti-communist Ukrainian nationalist leader whose entire life was devoted to the struggle for Ukrainian freedom and liberation from Moscow, was found dead on the stairs of his residence, a victim of foul play. This was only one month after he received an anonymous letter threatening his death. An autopsy by the German police revealed death by cyanide poisoning. It is widely believed that he was a victim of a Moscow-directed murder plot the circumstances of which were comparable to those surrounding the death and assassinations of previous leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, Simon PETLURA (shot in Paris in 1926) and Ivan KONONIETZ (handed a package containing a bomb in Brussels in 1928).

The assassination of PAMERA was very important to the Soviets because, among other reasons, he was the most famous living Ukrainian anti-communist nationalist whose death would shock and demoralise anti-communist Ukrainians both in the Ukrainian SSR and abroad. PAMERA symbolised Ukrainian deep-seated opposition both to the Soviet regime and to domination of their area by the Great Russians. The movement he represented has been conducting partisan and propaganda warfare against the Soviet regime since 1934.

May 12, 1960

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES: METHODS: EXEMPTION: 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES: DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE: 2004, 2006
RE: TRANSPORT HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

TO: BORN
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/EE 3
INFO: COP, ADDR/A, C/CA, C/C1, C/F1 2, C/SSR 3, C/WE 2,
S/C 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS BANDERA ARTICLE PROMULGATED BORN. SINCE ARTICLE CONTAINS ASPECTS NOT PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED GERMANY SUGGESTS UNATTRIBUTABLE RELEASE TO FRENCH PRESS FOR LATER PICKUP GERMANY. HOLD PENDING PUBLICITY AND REISSUE CONCURRENCE.

2. THE RECENT OUTING OF A SOVIET DIPLOMAT FROM BORN BECAUSE THE DIPLOMAT WAS REALLY A SPY BRINGS TO MIND THE DEATH OF STEFAN BANDERA. THE TWO INCIDENTS MAY IN FACT BE RELATED. LEVINOV, THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT, WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WORKING AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE. ON OCTOBER 15, 1959, STEFAN BANDERA, ANTI-COMMUNIST UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST LEADER WHOSE ENTIRE LIFE WAS DEVOTED TO THE STRUGGLE FOR UKRAINIAN FREEDOM AND LIBERATION FROM MOSCOW, WAS FOUND DEAD ON THE STAIRS OF HIS MUNICH RESIDENCE, A VICTIM OF FOUL PLAY. AN AUTOPSY BY THE GERMAN POLICE INDICATED DEATH BY POISONING.

3. THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGENCY KGB HAD ATTEMPTED ON SEVERAL PREVIOUS OCCASIONS TO MURDER BANDERA. IN JUNE 1957, FOR INSTANCE, THE KGB ATTEMPTED TO...

COordinating OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2008
USE THE NOTORIOUS FORMER GERMAN SS GENERAL OTTOLOD BERGER IN AN OPERATION AGAINST BANDERA BUT THIS ATTEMPT FAILED. THE KGB BOTH IN MOSCOW AND KIEV WORKED HARD ON THE BANDERA CASE, BUT DETAILS WERE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT BY KGB BERLIN-KARLSBAD.

THE SOVIET OFFICER IN CHARGE CALLED HIMSELF COLONEL PAUL. THE TECHNIQUE USED WAS VERY SIMPLE FOR THE EXPERIENCED ASSASSINS OF THE KGB, BUT THE ACT REQUIRED PLANNING.

WHILE NOT EXACTLY PATIENT, THE KGB IS PRESENTMENT IN ITS PERIODIC TASK OF MURDERS OPPONENTS OF THE SOVIET REGIME. IN THE CASE OF BANDERA, THE KGB MANAGED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME TO PLACE ONE OF THEIR AGENTS AS A TRUSTED SUBORDINATE OF BANDERA. AT THIS TIME THIS AGENT TOLD BANDERA ABOUT AN "INTERESTING SOVIET DEFECTOR", AND AGREED TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN THE ALLEGED DEFECTOR AND BANDERA. OF COURSE, THE DEFECTOR TURNED OUT TO BE A KGB OFFICER ASSIGNED TO CARRY OUT THE ASSASSINATION PERSONALLY. WHENEVER POSSIBLE THE KGB PREFERENCES TO HAVE THEIR MURDERS HANDLED BY STAFF MEMBERS. DURING THE MEETING WITH BANDERA, THIS OFFICER DEPILY SPIT A DROP OF ESSENTIALLY PREPARED "RELATION ACTION" POISON IN BANDERA'S COFFEE. HE MAY ALSO HAVE TOUCHED BANDERA WITH A HARD-TO-DETECT SKIN-CONTACT POISON OFTEN USED BY THE KGB. NEXT DAY BANDERA DIED.
4. NOT SATISFIED WITH HAVING ELIMINATED BANDERA, THE KGB NEXT TOOK OPERATIONAL STEPS TO LEAD THE GERMAN POLICE INVESTIGATORS ASTRAY. ALTHOUGH IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT DISCOVERY OF POISON IN THE CORPSE, VARIOUS MISLEADING EVIDENCE WAS PLANTED TO INDICATE THAT BANDERA COMMITTED SUICIDE RATHER THAN HAVING BEEN ASSASSINATED. THE NEXT KGB OBJECTIVE IS TO Ensure THAT THE KGB AGENT ON BANDERA'S STAFF IS CHosen TO succeed BANDERA. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHETHER THIS AGENT LOSES HIS NERVE AND FLIES TO THE EAST WHEN HE READS THIS ARTICLE. IF HE DOES NOT, HE WILL SOON BE ARRESTED.

5. THE ASSASSINATION OF BANDERA WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS A ROUTINE TASK FOR THE KGB, WHICH SPECIALIZES IN POLITICAL MURDER. BANDERA WAS THE MOST FAMOUS LIVING UKRAINIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONALIST WHOSE DEATH WOULD SHOCK AND GENERALIZE ANTI-COMMUNIST UKRAINIANS BOTH IN THE UKRAINIAN SSR AND ABROAD. BANDERA SYMBOLIZED UKRAINIAN DEEP-SEATED OPPOSITION BOTH TO THE SOVIET REGIME AND TO DOMINATION OF THEIR HOMELAND BY THE GREAT ROSSIANS. THE MOVEMENT BANDERA REPRESENTED HAS BEEN CONDUCTING PARTISAN AND PROPAGANDA WARFARE AGAINST THE SOVIET REGIME SINCE 1934, EVEN WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION.

END OF MESSAGE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
КГБ призялося до вбивства
С. Бандери

(Досвідоченний)

До 1 травня 1932 р. Капустинський національний університет у Києві, що здійснював підготовку до революції, був першим в Україні, де він змінив назву до КГБ УССР. Перший закритий режим у СРСР був сформований у КГБ УССР.

Віктор Капустинський, що був звільнений з інформації про революцію в 1932 р., у рамках революції КГБ УССР було затримано багатьох людей, що відбувалося в Києві.

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КГБ призначалося до вбивства
С. Бандера

Збиток Катушинський вирушив до Київського 16 жовтня, із тим же дня, відбувся в Києві в обідні дзвінки, який міг бути блідним або чорним м'яком. Він міг бути змішаним змішаним з іншими відчуттями.

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TO

Chief of Station, Germany; Chief, RE; Chief, WE; Chief of Base, Frankfurt

FROM

Chief, Munich Liaison Base

Subject

Operational/Liaison
Death of Bandera, R-R

ACTION REQUIRED

Please reply

REFERENCE

DIR 01018

According to reference there was a possibility that Demidov might have additional information concerning the death of Bandera. Kindly advise us whether or not he did provide such information and if so, we would appreciate clearance of pertinent portions which we can pass to UPHILL.
НДЕРИ

Верхніх СБ, затягувачі вилу на іноді вела з нею на слізі інфо
ції, які в середньому це мало кого втік. На о
місці відомих, як то Волхові,
а Ковель, і загальних величезних нав.
навоно, відомих на місця відомих, як то Волхові,
а Ковель, і загальних величезних нав.
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а Ковель, і загальних величезних нав.
навоно, відомих на місця відомих, як то Волхові,
а Ковель, і загальних величезних нав.
Тинь Б

Стаття поданого в Галутянській організації "Громадянського інформаційного центру", що діяла в громадському секторі, видання "Промінь", вийшла "Степан Камів".

Вона зазначала, що "Степан Камів" - це не лише ім'я, але й інший член громадського руху, який відстоював свої ідеї.

Також зазначалося, що "Степан Камів" був активним учасником "Громадського інформаційного центру".

Відомо, що "Степан Камів" був активним учасником "Громадського інформаційного центру" з 1909 року. }

Якщо ви маєте будь-які запитання або хочете подальше відомості, будь ласка, звертайтеся до мене.
Михайло Матвієнко
1. Attached herewith are copies of a cover letter and a sample of a Stepan Bandera letter which was sent by an unidentified sender to the editor of:

2. The covering letter indicates that the sender is offering these letters to various newspapers on a first come first serve basis, but he makes it clear that he wants two to three hundred dollars for each letter.

3. Obviously will have no part with this scheme, but Headquarters or the Canadians may be interested in determining the identity of this peddler who gives his banking address as:

Account number 7017
Bank of Montreal
173-175 Yonge Street
Toronto, Canada.

APPROVED

ATTACHMENT: H/W

DISTRIBUTION:
A-2015 w/att
L-23 w/oo/att
1-201 w/oo/att
2-201 w/oo/att
Інформація про те, що ГОД прийняла рішення вийти з ООН, була розповсюджені в усіх різних печери та зв'язках, що відбувається у всьому світі. Це призвело до розгону організацій, які були засновані на основі ООН, і відкривши низку нових ринків. ГОД вирішила, що вони не можуть керувати своєю діяльністю у рамках ООН і вирішила активізувати свої ресурси.

Організанізація відзначила, що відключення ГОД від ООН є результатом кількох факторів. Перш за все, це відбувся процес децентралізації, який став особливим в контексті глобалізації. ГОД вирішила, що вони мають відсторонитися від ООН, щоб зосередитися на своїх основних цільових сферах діяльності.

Завдання ГОД було та залишається виконувати, але в рамках своєї індивідуальної компетенції і без парадоксу збігання ролей. ГОД вирішила, що вони мають відсторонитися від ООН, щоб зосередитися на своїх основних цільових сферах діяльності.

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SECRET

ATTENTION: [Redacted]

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Assassination of Stefan BANDEIRA

1. In a letter dated November 1959, reported as follows on the death of BANDEIRA:

"It is certain that the Ukrainian leader BANDEIRA was liquidated by the KGB. For 15 years the KGB and Department II (CE) of the UB have possessed powerful agents who sit in the Ukrainian national movement. Violent CE games were run above all on the territory of Poland and the Western Ukraine which cost your intelligence service, as well as the British, very much. The KGB from Moscow and Czechoslovakia has been watching BANDEIRA for years. They wanted to await the right moment, however, in order to bump him off. It has happened. This operation was directed by the KGB through Berlin-Karlshorst. It was directed by a good "friend" of Hertha LIEBEMANN, Col. "HEGROOKU" (this is a cover name). In addition this action was also supported by KGB channels from Prague. The technique of the operation was very simple. A KGB agent who stood very close to BANDEIRA alerted him that an "interesting personality," who was of interest to the American IS, had defected from Soviet Russia. BANDEIRA went to a meeting which had been organized with this personality in an unknown restaurant in Brno. He had a discussion with the "defector," who was an officer of the KGB. This short discussion sufficed to squirt a drop of poison into the coffee cup, which proved fatal only after 10-15 hours. BANDEIRA saw this only for the first and simultaneously last time in his life. He was dead the next day. It was not cyanide, but a special poison which had been prepared by the KGB for "special purposes." Now the American IS office in Brno, which was upset by this, can chase the wind for a long time, when one notes that the KGB, through an agent sitting in this office, has played false clues into the investigation. This investigation is being checked on most thoroughly by the KGB. The liquidation of BANDEIRA took place at the right moment..."
for the KGB. This is because an extremely important KGB agent will be "promoted upstairs" in the BANGERA bank or even will take over the position of BANDERA.

2. The above information was transmitted to COS/G in January 1950 for possible follow-up on the CID Regensburg angle. There the matter died.

3. ... has not been queried in detail about this matter since... You may wish to take up the subject during discussion with ...
Department of State

| DEC 1961 | FROM | U.S. Mission BERN |
| 220-00 | TO | Central Intelligence Agency |
| 11-120 | COPY NO. | 30 |
| 11-120 | SERIES | A-117 |
| 11-120 | DIPLOMATIC STAFF | A-12 |
| 11-120 | POLITICAL STAFF | A-122 |
| Paris, U.S. Embassy, Bern, Augsburg, and Munich |
| DATE | OCT 13, 1961 |

FROM: Kurt Blank, Chief of East German Council of Ministers Press Office, as having declared that: “These disclosures show clearly that ruling circles in East Germany have not spared even political and physical murder in carrying out their criminal war goals of sharpening situation further instead of contributing to negotiations for a German peace treaty.”

CONCLUSION: Staging of press conference suggests that East German regime itself may have organized assassination of Bandera, since from very beginning of case East press has consistently rejected that Bandera had been ordered by West Germans in order to remove inconvenient witness to wartime crimes of ex-SS chief Richard Gudrun. East Germans evidently
plan to keep these alive, since Moser provided account of press conference
contained statement by a Lt. Col. Mall of Ministry of State Security that
there would shortly be further disclosures regarding connections between Gehlen espionage
service and other espionage organizations in East Berlin."

Since West German judicial investigation of Benda's murder has not been
completed, it is also possible that East German press conference may have been
staged in order to put on record a documented East German version of circumstances
of Benda's murder. In this fashion East Germany might hope to minimize impact of
possible later disclosures in West substantiating western press speculation about
direct East German/Soviet responsibility for Benda's murder.

Source:

[Signature]

AUDI WOHNEN, DATE, EMB
Lübeck, 12. Mai 1933.

Sehr geehrter Herr Professor, 


Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

[Unterschrift]

---

O. W. mit Schen

Verlaßt das Haus vorüber, Frau vorüber; fahre über den See.

Alfred Demesay

---

Geben Sie mir, bitte, die Nachrichten aus dem Ausland. Ich möchte wissen, wie die Lage in Europa sich entwickelt. Ich bin neugierig und interessiert an der aktuellen Entwicklung der internationalen Politik. Wie steht es um die Lage in Italien, Spanien und Deutschland? Wie gehen die Wahlen in Frankreich vor? Ich benötige die Informationen, um meine Meinungen und Meinungen zu bilden.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

[Unterschrift]
Bandera kämpfte für die Freiheit der Ukraine

Staat der Tod des russischen Emigrantenführers vor der Aufklärung?

Von Alfred Havel (München)

United Nations Personnel -
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On October 16, 1969, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on October 16, 1969, the Ukrainian National Memorial Committee is sponsoring a demonstration commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the assassination of Stepan Bandera, a founding father of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations by the Russian secret police.

The source indicated that a memorial service will be held on October 18, 1969, at 12:30 PM, at the Central Park Band Mall and after the service, there will be a parade to the Soviet United Nations Mission at 67th Street and Third Avenue, New York City, where a protest rally and demonstration will be held.

The source further stated that many anti-Communist emigre groups have been invited to participate and have accepted, among whom is the Hrvatski Domobran (Croatian Liberation Movement). The source stated that approximately 2,000 persons are expected to participate in the protest rally and demonstration.

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2004 2006
During the past several months there have been numerous anti-Soviet demonstrations in Canada in protest of the Soviet government's persistent attitude regarding Valentin MOROZ, who is on a hunger strike in a Soviet jail.

Recently the Soviet Embassy provided information to our Department of External Affairs indicating that one 'Steven' BANDERA is planning a violent act - possibly the kidnapping of a Soviet diplomat in Canada. BANDERA heads the Committee for the Defence of Valentin MOROZ in Canada. He is the son of Stefan BANDERA, Ukrainian emigre leader, who was assassinated by the KGB in 1959. According to the Soviets, BANDERA is being funded and instructed by a 'Ukrainian extremist group in Munich' which is headed by an individual named STETSKO.

My Headquarters would appreciate any information you are in a position to provide concerning STETSKO's group. We are speculating that his organization is either the German wing of the Committee for the Release of Valentin MOROZ or the Ukrainian Society for the Study of Asian Problems (U.S.S.A.P.) which is located in Munich.

Yours truly,

Assistant to Liaison Officer

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Assassination of Stefan Bandera

1. This memorandum has been written in an attempt to determine whether there is sufficient information to support KGB agent Bogdan Nikolayevich Stashinskiy's claim that he assassinated Ukrainian emigre leader Stefan Bandera in Munich in October 1959. German authorities convicted him of the crime in 1962 and sentenced him to eight years' hard labor.

2. This memorandum also attempts to point out contradictions between his story and the numerous versions and rumors circulating at the time.

3. Information on Stashinskiy's claim that he also assassinated another emigre leader, Lev Rebet, in 1957 is included only insofar as it affects the establishment of Stashinskiy's bona fides.

4. On 15 October 1959 Stefan Bandera (aka Stefan Popel), Ukrainian Chief of the Foreign Section of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (ZCH/UON), was assassinated in Munich. Results of the autopsy on Bandera's body showed traces of potassium cyanide poisoning, but it was never established that the cyanide was the cause of death. The autopsy also produced a fragment of gelatinous material which the examining doctors thought might have been the remains of a capsule. There was no proof, however, that the capsule originally contained poison. According to those close to him, Bandera had been taking various pills for a cold. When Bandera was found, he was lying on his face in the hallway of his apartment building, with his left arm doubled under him and his left hand clutching at his right shoulder. Questioning of Bandera's associates revealed that Bandera was lefthanded and that he carried a pistol in a shoulder holster on his right side.

5. On 12 August 1961 Bogdan Nikolayevich Stashinskiy (aka Josef Lehmann, Siegfried Draeger, Hans Joachim Budeit), Ukrainian, born 4 November 1931, in Borshovsy, USSR (then in Poland), defected with his wife from East Berlin to West Berlin and told American authorities that, under orders from the KGB, he had assassinated Bandera, as well as Lev Rebet, a leading Ukrainian emigre who had died in 1957 apparently of a heart attack. Stashinskiy, a KGB non-staff agent...
employee since 1951, said that in both assassinations he had used a weapon which fired a poisonous liquid into the victim's face. This liquid gave off vapors which were fatal when inhaled by the victim but which left no trace. He said the weapon used against Rebet had a single barrel, whereas the weapon used against Bandera was double-barreled.

6. After the initial Agency interrogation of Stashinskiy in Frankfurt/Main in August 1961, the conclusion was drawn that he would not be valuable operationally as a double agent, that he was not a bona fide defector and not the individual he purported to be. Because the assassinations had occurred on German soil, Stashinskiy, on 1 September 1961, was turned over to German authorities, who charged him with espionage activities and viewed his accounts of the assassinations with skepticism. The report of the interrogation of Stashinskiy by the German Criminal Inspector, the Chief Police Commissioner, and Security Group officials on 12 September 1961 stated that Stashinskiy's quiet, sure and precise statements with regard to events preceding the assassination, the lapse of time, and the description of the localities and the execution of the deeds led to the general conviction that Stashinskiy could, in fact, be the murderer of Rebet and Bandera. The German police investigation preceding Stashinskiy's public trial at Karlsruhe in October 1962 also unearthed documents and witnesses to corroborate most of Stashinskiy's story. Stashinskiy was convicted and sentenced to eight years' hard labor.

Stashinskiy's Account of the Bandera Assassination

7. In early 1959, after he had successfully assassinated Lev Rebet (12 October 1957) by firing a poisonous liquid into his face as Rebet ascended the stairs to his office in Munich, Stashinskiy was informed that Moscow had assigned him the task of assassinating Stefan Bandera as well. Stashinskiy made several trips to Munich from East Berlin/Karlsruhe during which he located Bandera's residence and tried to determine a pattern of Bandera's activities and movements.

8. During one of these trips Stashinskiy attempted to gain access to the front door of the building in which Bandera had an apartment on the third floor. In this attempt he used a key bow, stem and collar, plus five different bits, which the KGB had provided him. None of the different bits fitted the lock and, when Stashinskiy tried to use force, one of the bits broke off and dropped into the lock housing in the door. When Stashinskiy then tried to use the aluminum key of his own room in East Berlin in the lock, this bit also broke off and dropped into the lock housing. Stashinskiy still decided
to assassinate Bandera during this trip but changed his mind when Bandera caught a glimpse of him when he was still some distance away. Stashinskiy said he felt that Bandera would be prepared to take evasive action; he therefore did not carry out the assassination. Acting upon instructions from Moscow, Stashinskiy then went to the canal near the Hofgarten in Munich, fired both barrels of his weapon into the air, and threw the weapon into the canal in the same general area where he had discarded the Rebet murder weapon.

9. In June 1959 Stashinskiy again flew to Munich, armed with four keys which the KGB had made according to Stashinskiy's specifications. Although all of the keys partially moved the bolt, none of the keys unlocked the door completely. Stashinskiy therefore purchased various files from Woolworth's and filed down the keys where he noted pressure ridges. On his next visit to the Bandera apartment building, one of the four keys opened the front door. Stashinskiy entered the building and located Bandera's apartment. He noted that the name "Popel," the alias Bandera was using, was written on a piece of paper and attached to the door with Scotch tape. Stashinskiy then returned to East Berlin to await the arrival of the weapon from Moscow.

10. By 14 October 1959 the weapon had arrived and Bandera had returned from an extended vacation in Italy, so Stashinskiy proceeded to Munich by air armed with the weapon, the gauze compresses and yellow tablets which were to protect him from the poison fumes, as well as documentation in the name of Hans Joachim Budeit. In Munich he stayed at a new hotel located on Senefelder Street.

11. The following day, 15 October 1959, Stashinskiy took the yellow protective pill and went to the Ludwig bridge near the German Museum to observe the Ukrainian emigre office on Zeppelin Street. He noted that Bandera's car was parked near this office. At circa 1130 hours he saw a man and a woman come out of the office, get into Bandera's car and drive in the direction of the Mariahilf Square. He was not close enough to identify the individuals but decided the man must be Bandera. He then took a streetcar to the area of Bandera's residence at 7 Kreitmayer Street and took a position on Massmann Square. At circa 1300 hours Bandera drove past Massmann Square in the direction of his residence. Stashinskiy noted that Bandera, who was usually accompanied by a bodyguard, was alone in the car.

12. After Stashinskiy saw Bandera drive into the driveway to the garage, Stashinskiy, using the key he had prepared, entered the apartment building and walked up the stairs between the ground and second floor stair landing to wait for
Bandera. Stashinskiy then heard the voices of two women taking leave of each other on the second or third floor and could hear that the departing woman was using the stairs instead of the elevator. In order to avoid suspicion by loitering on the stairs between the landings, he walked down the stairs and began to play with the elevator button. The woman walked past behind him and out of the building. As soon as she disappeared, Stashinskiy turned to move back up the stairs.

13. Almost as soon as he began to move, Stashinskiy heard a noise at the front door and saw Bandera entering the door with the aid of a key, which was on a key ring together with other keys. He was carrying several packages of vegetables and fruit in his right hand and was trying to extricate the key from the door with his left hand. Bandera had also spotted Stashinskiy, so Stashinskiy saw that he could wait no longer and moved in the direction of the front door. He held the murder weapon, concealed in a newspaper, in his right hand, the safety released. As he walked past Bandera, who was still trying to extricate his key from the lock, Stashinskiy took the door handle with his left hand, as if to assist Bandera, and asked him, "Doesn't it work?". By this time Bandera had succeeded in pulling his key out of the lock and as he answered, "Yes, it works.", Stashinskiy fired both barrels of the murder weapon simultaneously into Bandera's face at almost pointblank range. When Stashinskiy saw Bandera lurch rearwards and to the side, he walked out of the apartment building and closed the front door. Although he did not wait to see Bandera drop to the ground, Stashinskiy said he was certain that Bandera did not scream or otherwise call for help.

14. Stashinskiy then crushed the antidote vial in the gauze compress and inhaled the vapors, after which he took a circuitous route to the canal, discarding the key en route, and threw the murder weapon into the canal at almost the identical spot where he had discarded the Rebet weapon. He then checked out of his hotel and took the next train to Frankfurt/Main. On the following day he flew to Berlin. On route he read about Bandera's death which had already been reported in the newspapers.

15. On 4 or 5 December 1959 Stashinskiy was awarded the "Order of the Red Banner" by KGB Chief Aleksandr Shelepin in Moscow for the Bandera assassination.

Evidence Supporting Stashinskiy's Story

16. Although the German police were skeptical about Stashinskiy's story, the following information supported
Stashinskiy's account of the assassination.

a. The German police found bits of two keys in the housing of the front door of the Bandera apartment house.

b. The police located the woman who had passed behind Stashinskiy while he faced the elevator in the Bandera apartment building. She was a maid who had been employed by a German couple in the building. She remembered the night in question and recalled seeing a man waiting for the elevator, but since she had only seen his back, she could not identify him. According to the police records, she had made the same statement on 17 November 1959 when questioned about her observations after Bandera's death.

c. The guest register of the Hotel Salzburg on 1 Senefelder Street contained an entry that a Hans Budeit had rented Room No. 32 from 14-16 October 1959. The registration slips at the Hotel Stachus, where Stashinskiy said he stayed during the Rebet assassination, showed that a Draeger had occupied Room 303 from 9-12 October 1957. Stashinskiy said he had used documentation in the name of Siegfried Draeger during this period.

d. Flight manifests showed that on 13 October 1957 a Draeger flew to Berlin from Frankfurt.

e. The police confirmed through Zch/OUN employee Yevgeniya Matviyeyko-Mak that Bandera had driven home alone on the day of the assassination. Yevgeniya Matviyeyko-Mak said that at 1130 hours she had accompanied Bandera to the market to buy some fruit. When they returned to the office at 67 Zeppelin Street about 1230 hours, she had asked Bandera to wait while she called a guard to escort him to his home. She said he replied that, by the time the guard came down, he would be home, and he drove off. Forty minutes later he was dead. The residents of his apartment house, including Bandera's wife, confirmed his arrival at his home around 1300 hours.

f. Stashinskiy was able to identify Bandera and Rebet without hesitation from 50 photographs. The police commented that certain individuals in the photo collection resembled the victims.

g. During a reconstruction of the Bandera and Rebet assassinations carried out by the Munich police
with Stashinskiy on 22 September 1961, Stashinskiy showed a very good knowledge of Munich and of the area of Bandera's residence, as well as the route to the Hofgarten and the canal in which he said he had disposed of the murder weapons.

h. During the police interrogation of Stashinskiy, he said that circa 1130 hours on 13 October 1957, after his attack on Rebet, he saw a radio patrol car near Rebet's office in Karl Square. The police confirmed that a patrol car had been parked in that area at the time specified.

i. According to the account of the Bandera assassination in the book KGB The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents by John Barron, German authorities detected flakes of glass on Bandera's face from the crushed poison ampule. There was no mention of this in the police reports in the Stashinskiy and/or Bandera files.

j. Yuriy Nosenko, a KGB official who defected in early 1964, confirmed that Stashinskiy had assassinated Bandera. Nosenko's comments also supported some of Stashinskiy's statements of the events leading to his defection. Nosenko said that Stashinskiy was an agent, not a staff member, and that he returned to Moscow after having successfully completed two assassinations. He was personally met by Shelepin and received a decoration—either the Order of the Red Star or the Order of the Military Red Banner—for killing Bandera. Stashinskiy was given an apartment but soon began to detect that he was being surveilled. He also found a microphone behind the baseboard in his apartment. Nosenko said Stashinskiy also knew that in Beriya's time assassins were caused to disappear so there would be no danger of compromise. He therefore thought the KGB was planning to liquidate him and he decided to defect. (According to Stashinskiy, he had become disillusioned with the Soviet Union prior to finding the microphones. He said this discovery only confirmed that his decision to defect was right.) When Stashinskiy received a letter from his German wife that their child had died, he requested and received permission to go to East Berlin for the funeral. His case officer, Yuriy Aleksandrov, was ordered to accompany him and to stay with him. In East Berlin Stashinskiy was also surveilled by East Berlin staffers. However, one night Aleksandrov ran into some friends and left Stashinskiy, who took the opportunity and fled to West Berlin, taking his
wife with him. Nosenko said that, for this error, Aleksandrov was expelled from the KGB and from the Party. Nosenko said he knew of no measures or letters by the Central Committee regarding Stashinskiy's defection, nor did he know of any countermeasures taken in the various departments of the KGB.

Contradictions

17. Autopsies performed on 17 and 18 October 1959 showed potassium cyanide in Bandera's stomach, although it appears that the autopsies were not complete enough to determine whether Bandera had received a lethal dose. Stashinskiy said that, when he heard that the German police had found poison in Bandera's body, he doubted this and asked that inquiries be made in the KGB laboratory. Several days later he was told that the liquid in the weapon he had used contained no provable poisons, neither potassium cyanide nor any other common poison. He said he did not feel there was any reason for the KGB to deceive him, particularly since he would have had to employ altogether different protective measures and antidotes if cyanide had been used. He also claimed that his KGB handler in Karlshorst had indicated his pleasure upon learning that the police suspected potassium cyanide since this indicated that the police were off the track. Stashinskiy said he later heard through his handler that rumors were extant in emigre circles to the effect that Bandera had eaten or snacked at the Zeppelin Street office just before returning home.

18. According to the police, Bandera was found lying on his face. Stashinskiy said that, according to a built-in feature of the weapon, he should have fallen backwards or sideways.

19. Stashinskiy said that Bandera was carrying several packages or bags of vegetables and fruit, and he specified red tomatoes. According to the police investigation, Bandera was carrying a chip basket full of green tomatoes, on top of which, wrapped in a piece of newspaper, was some cabbage. When he was questioned about this discrepancy, Stashinskiy said that he had seen something red and assumed it was tomatoes. He pointed out that by that time he was so excited that he was not in a position to observe exact details of the course of events. In this connection, Yevgeniya Natviyeyko-Mak said that Bandera had purchased grapes, plums and green tomatoes at the market. As was his custom, he tasted everything but the tomatoes.

20. Stashinskiy maintained that when Bandera arrived at his residence on 15 October he parked his car inside the
21. Stashinskiy said he was sure that Bandera had not screamed. According to the police reports, witnesses variously reported hearing a scream, sounds of a heavy body falling down the stairs, or a scuffle. According to the "Ukrainian Weekly," Bandera's wife heard the scream of a 10-year-old German boy who lived in the building and who found the body. When she ran into the corridor, she saw her husband lying on the steps of the first floor, blood running from his mouth, nose and ears. He was taken to the hospital but died in the ambulance on route. According to another report, Bandera's wife said she saw Bandera approach the apartment building and waited for him to reach the apartment. When he did not appear, she called his office and learned that he had been taken to the hospital.

22. The press reported that Bandera's wife said Bandera had rung the bell to their apartment and she had pushed the buzzer to open the front door. Stashinskiy said he did not know whether Bandera had rung his apartment bell, but he was sure there was no buzz to open the door because Bandera was using his key.

23. In September 1961 the canal was drained and searched but the murder weapons were not recovered. German officials stated that the canal is cleaned annually.

24. In the Agency debriefings Stashinskiy said he had assassinated Rebet in the fall of 1958 (Rebet was found dead in October 1957). In later German police reports, Stashinskiy confirmed that he had assassinated Rebet in October 1957. Stashinskiy also said that he murdered Rebet on the stairs to the second floor. When the police told him that Rebet was found on the landing of the third floor and asked Stashinskiy if he were still sure that the assassination had taken place on the stairs to the second floor, Stashinskiy said he was.

25. Although Stashinskiy told Agency interrogators he did not carry out the first assassination attempt against Bandera because he feared that Bandera would take evasive action, he later told the German police that he did not carry out the assassination because he felt certain inhibitions when he caught sight of Bandera and an inner voice told him
not to assassinate him. Stashinskiy told Agency officials that, at the time he came to the West, he did not feel his past actions were criminal. They were patriotic acts committed in the name of the state. He said he now realized that the German law took a different view. He said that although he did not want to go to jail he would have to suffer the consequences.

26. Flight manifests did not show anyone traveling from Frankfurt to Berlin on 16 October 1959 under the name of Budeit, Stashinskiy, Draeger, or other alias Stashinskiy said he had used in the past.

Allegations and Theories

27. On 14 October 1961, after Stashinskiy's defection but before his confession of the crimes was made public, the East German press reported that Stefan Liebholz, Ukrainian, told journalists in a press conference that he had been recruited by the West German Intelligence Service (BND) near the end of World War II and that his first assignment for the BND was to organize the poisoning of Bandera. He said Bandera was to be liquidated because he had been working for British intelligence and refused to transfer his network to the BND. Liebholz said he had been unable to carry out the murder and the task had been given to another agent, Dmitriy Miskiv, a member of Bandera's group. Liebholz said Miskiv was subsequently murdered by the BND.

28. The Bandera organization was convinced that the article was a fabrication. It was well known in the Ukrainian community that Miskiv was in Italy at the time of Bandera's death, and the Munich investigation of Miskiv's death concluded that he died of a cerebral hemorrhage induced by overindulgence in liquor and women.

29. The Agency also knew from Stefan Liebholz, a KGB agent since 1929, that in early 1957 he had been given the assignment by the KGB, of poisoning Bandera, using a poison which could not be detected and which could be administered considerably in advance of Bandera's death. Agency officials believed that the Soviets learned in advance that the West Germans planned a press release about Stashinskiy, and that this advance warning came from a Soviet penetration of the BND who had been arrested and was undergoing interrogation (presumably a reference to Heinz Felfe). This enabled the Soviets and East German authorities to produce Stefan Liebholz, who fabricated the story that the BND had executed the Bandera murder.
30. Five theories for Bandera's assassination were investigated by the German police and by M. Khorzhan, an emigre, who arrived in Munich from Paris almost a month after Bandera's death at the invitation of Ivan Kashauba, chief of Bandera's security service (SB), for the purpose of privately investigating the assassination.

a. The Communist press claimed from the beginning that Bandera was poisoned by the BND at the request of the Minister of Refugee Affairs, Professor Dr. Theodore Oberlaender, because Bandera knew too much about Oberlaender's participation in the Lvov murders of Polish intelligentsia in June 1941. Although the German police, Khorzhan, and Bandera's emigre organization rejected this theory, they noted that two German intelligence men, one of whom was Heinz Herre, had met and had had dinner with Bandera and two of his colleagues, Yaroslav Bentsal and Dr. Gregory Vashkovich, on 14 October 1959 in the Bayerischer Hof in Munich. The group had discussed Zch/OUN cooperation with German intelligence, financial subsidy by the Germans, and the continuation of Zch/OUN relations with the Homeland. German criminologists discounted any possibility for the cyanide poisoning of Bandera during the dinner, either by the German participants or by any of the hotel waiters or kitchen help. They also believed that a cyanide capsule would have become effective much sooner than in 24 hours.

b. Bandera was poisoned by the Communists because he maintained contacts with the Ukraine and led the liberation struggle in the Ukraine until his very end. This story had two angles:

(1) The potassium cyanide was forced on Bandera in the elevator in the building where he lived.

   (a) Members of Bandera's group said there were two men who got out of the elevator in Bandera's apartment building just about the time of Bandera's death and ran away. After questioning residents of the apartment building and neighbors, however, the police said no evidence was found that two men left the premises at that time, and the police found no signs of violence on Bandera's body.

(2) The cyanide was given to Bandera by a close associate who was a KGB agent.
(a) This theory was denied by the Bandera-rites but was thoroughly investigated by the German police and by Khorzhan. Of the five Zch/OUN employees who were known to have had contact with Bandera the morning of 15 October, the one considered most likely was Yevgenia Matviyeyko-Mak, who was the last person known to have been with him before his death. Khorzhan’s theory regarding Yevgenia Matviyeyko-Mak was that her husband, Myron Matviyeyko, former SB chief on assignment in the Ukraine, had been in KGB hands for some time. He theorized that since the KGB had been playing with the Zch/OUN for years, they now desired to destroy Bandera with Matviyeyko’s and Yevgenia’s help. KGB couriers got in touch with her and instructed her on how to do it; in exchange, Matviyeyko would live. Although Khorzhan felt that Yevgenia Matviyeyko-Mak was “capable of anything,” he said that neither he nor the police believed that she had fed Bandera the poison.

(b) The other Zch/OUN individual of interest was Yaroslav Bentsal, who maintained liaison between the Zch/OUN and the Germans and who organized the 14 October meeting with the BND. Bentsal had been in contact with a KGB official who tried to get him to return to Lvov, where Bentsal at one time was director of the Lvov theaters under the Communists. According to Khorzhan, this position meant that the Communists trusted him. Bentsal’s wife was a pharmacist who worked in a German apothecary where she had access to potassium cyanide. Khorzhan said he had excluded Bentsal from the very beginning “for some reason.”

(c) According to a source, some of the KGB’s sources were very close to Bandera, and one source worked for some time in the SB. This individual came under suspicion by the SB several times. This source also said that Bandera’s assassination was handled by KGB Department 9, which contained a section dealing with Ukrainian nationalists, and that the section chief received an award for the assassination. He said it may have been a joint operation with Department 13, or with the Illegals Department.
c. Bandera was poisoned by Myron Natviyeyko, who supposedly had been in Germany for six weeks prior to the assassination and with whom Bandera was reported to have secretly met.

(1) Khorzhan said that there was nothing to justify this version, that it was pure speculation.

(2) According to unsigned "random notes" in the Bandera file, an Agency source (PNCASSOWARY/2) mentioned that an unknown visitor from the Soviet Bloc had visited Bandera (no time period given), and that an Agency official had an intelligence report which stated that a KGB officer was visiting Bandera in Munich.

(3) The police were not able to explain what Bandera did for the 40 minutes between the time he dropped Yevgenia Natviyeyko-Mak at the Zeppelin Street office and the time he arrived home. If he had driven directly home, he would have been there within 20 minutes. Khorzhan said there was some evidence that Bandera either returned to the market or stopped at some store. Yevgenia had stated that she did not see Bandera buy dill for pickling the tomatoes; however, after he died, five sprigs of dill were found in the basket. At Khorzhan's request, the SB drove Bandera's car from Zeppelin Street to the market where dill was sold, lingered there for several minutes and drove on to Bandera's home. The entire trip took 20 minutes, leaving 10-20 minutes still unaccounted for.

(4) According to an Agency source, Bandera received an anonymous letter threatening death about a month prior to his assassination. For this reason and normal security reasons, he was under constant SB protection. However, for unknown reasons Bandera drove home for lunch alone on 15 October. Bandera was also reported to have begun to avoid his guards.

d. Stefan Bandera was poisoned by his former associate and strong political opponent Mykola Lebed.

(1) Khorzhan was unable to determine the source of this theory, but he considered that it was possible that the Soviets had taken advantage of the situation to instigate political mistrust and misunderstandings among the Ukrainian nationalist emigre groups and to prevent these groups from unifying in their reactions.
to the theory that Bandera was liquidated by the "Moscow-Communist enemy."

(2) Khorzhan said the majority of the BND informants was of the opinion that this theory was typical provocation devoid of any sense whatsoever. They felt that it originated with Soviet groups of blind Ukrainian party followers.

e. Bandera committed suicide by taking cyanide.

(1) Khorzhan favored this theory and gave as the motive Bandera's "unbearable marital situation," especially as a result of his association with other women. SB chief Kashuba had told Khorzhan that Bandera was in love with a young German maid of a family who lived in the same apartment building as Bandera. Kashuba also said that on the morning of 15 October Bandera's wife had quarreled bitterly with him over this girl. (Khorzhan cited other evidence of Bandera's unbearable home life.) Kashuba claimed that Bandera had died in front of the door of the family for which this maid worked. Khorzhan also claimed that Bandera's wife at first said that Bandera always carried cyanide on his person. She later said she could not verify this fact, and Khorzhan said it was evident that the Zch/OUN had forbidden her to talk. The police found no cyanide either on Bandera's person or his house.

(2) Unsigned "random notes" in the Bandera file commented that SB chief Kashuba was tied operationally to Myron Matviyenko and it was possible that Kashuba was spreading the suicide-comesickness version in order to cover KGB complicity.

(3) Khorzhan stated that Veriovka's Ukrainian nationalist chorus was in Munich at the time of Bandera's death and that Soviet diplomats from Bonn were present. He claimed that therefore this was a good time for Bandera to commit suicide and place the blame on the Soviets. Khorzhan said Bandera knew that nobody would suspect that he might take his own life. For this reason, Khorzhan claimed, Bandera began to avoid his bodyguards.

(4) The German Criminal Police Commission was also convinced at first that Bandera had committed suicide but eventually came to the conclusion that it was not in Bandera's character. The commission
also was not certain that there was a sufficient
quantity of poison in Bandera's body to have caused
death.

31. In addition to the five theories outlined by Khorzhon
and the police, the BND considered the possibility of a "combi-
nation poisoning" in which a lethal but hard to trace poison
was first administered and, not until later, a non-lethal
amount of easily traceable potassium cyanide, the purpose
being to cast suspicion on the wrong person.

32. In early 1960 Agency source Michal Goleniewski fur-
nished the following information on Bandera's death: Bandera
was liquidated by the KGB, who had had its sights on Bandera
for years and who was waiting for the right moment to assassi-
nate him. The source said the operation was directed by the
KGB through Berlin-Karlshorst and was supported by KGB channels
from Prague. According to this source, a KGB agent who was
very close to Bandera alerted him that an interesting perso-
nality, who was of interest to US intelligence services, had
defected from the USSR. Bandera met with this "personality"
in an unknown restaurant in Munich and, during a short dis-
cussion with this "defector," who was a KGB officer, a drop
of poison was squirted into Bandera's coffee cup. According
to the source, the poison was not cyanide but a special poison
prepared by the KGB for "special purposes," and this poison
proved fatal only after 10-15 hours. The source said this
was the only time Bandera ever saw this man; Bandera was dead
the next day. According to the source, the KGB played false
clues into the investigation through an agent sitting in the
American intelligence office in Regensburg.

33. It is possible that Goleniewski may have confused
some of the details of the Bandera assassination with the
September 1957 alleged attempted poisoning of Captain Nikolay
Khokhlov, a former KGB officer who defected in Frankfurt,
Germany, in February 1954 rather than carry out his KGB
assignment to assassinate Georgiy Sergeyevich Okolovich, a
leader of the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS).

a. On 15 September 1957, while participating in
an NTS convention in Frankfurt, Khokhlov became ill
and later collapsed. He was taken to a Frankfurt
hospital where his condition was diagnosed as acute
gastroenteritis. After several days he broke out in
hemorrhagic skin lesions, his hair fell out, and his
mouth and throat were so inflamed that he could not
eat. The impression of the German hospital staff was
that he probably had been poisoned and the poison may
have been a thallium derivative of arsenic. When
treatment was to no avail, he was transferred to the
US 97th General Hospital in Frankfurt on 27 September in critical condition. Under special treatment his condition gradually improved, and he was discharged on 8 October 1957.

b. According to a press statement by the head of the US Army Hospital, the poison used was probably thallium and/or other chemical agents. A conclusive determination was not possible because no specimens of hair, skin, etc. from the early period of his illness were available for study. However, on 3 September 1965, a member of the Agency's Medical Staff, who was in Frankfurt in 1957 and personally handled Khokhlov's hospitalization for the Agency, said that the Army hospital found no evidence of poisoning by thallium or other chemical agent, and the press release issued by the commanding officer of the hospital was due to pressure exerted by the Agency to strengthen an Agency propaganda play of the incident.

c. In early 1964 Yuriy Nosenko told Agency officials that the KGB had poisoned Khokhlov by putting something in his coffee, and Nosenko added that "his hair even fell out."

d. In December 1961 Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn said that a friend of his in Moscow had told him that the KGB had used a Soviet female translator in the UN to administer the poison to Khokhlov. Although it was never established that Khokhlov actually was poisoned, it was considered unlikely that the KGB or any other service would come as close to killing a man as Khokhlov claims in order to establish his bona fides in the West. The special, delayed-action poison mentioned by Goleniewski would appear to fit the Khokhlov case rather than the Bandera assassination.

34. Goleniewski also commented that Bandera's liquidation took place at the right moment for the KGB because an extremely important agent would be "promoted upstairs" in the Bandera movement or would even take over Bandera's position. The assassination also put the KGB in a position to ruin Oberlaender's reputation by alleging that he, because of fear, had killed this "dangerous witness."

a. Bandera's position was filled by Yaroslav Stetsko, leader of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), of which Bandera's organization technically was a member; however, according to the files, the ABN was actually controlled by the Bandera party. Stashinsky said he was assigned in 1959 to establish a pattern of Stetsko's
activities and he assumed that Stetsko was the next to be assassinated. His KGB handler told him, however, that Moscow would probably not approve an assassination of Stetsko because he was not that important.

Conclusion

35. There appears to be more evidence in the files to support Stashinsky's claim that he assassinated Bandera than any other theory. However, the question of the alleged cyanide in Bandera's body remains unresolved. Even if Goleniewski's claim that a special poison was put into Bandera's coffee cup is accepted, this question still remains unresolved because Goleniewski specifically stated that the poison was not cyanide. It is also difficult to see what the KGB could have gained by Stashinsky's confession. Stashinsky himself served two-thirds of his eight years' sentence; he was released in 1967. He was given iron works training by German authorities and resettled under another name in another country.

Distribution:

CI/R&A/O

1 - CI/R&A/T (via C/CI/R&A)
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SUBJECT: ALEKSANDR NIKOLAYEVICH IVANOV

1. WE APPRECIATE YOUR ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE TO THE OPR LEAD ON
ALEKSANDR NIKOLAYEVICH (IVANOV). WE THINK YOUR PLANNING COVERS
MOST VIABLE POSSIBILITIES AND WITH SOME LUCK CONTACT WITH SUBJ WILL
BE ARRANGED. WE SUGGEST ASKING APPROPRIATE KYEVRAK COLLEAGUES
WHETHER THEY BY CHANCE HAVE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH SUBJ.

2. RE YOUR REQUEST FOR BACKGROUND INFO ON STEPAN ((BANDERA)):1

A. FOR BRIEF PERIODS OF HISTORY THE UKRAINE HAS BEEN
INDEPENDENT AND AMONG MANY UKRAINIANS THERE HAS BEEN A STRONG SENSE
OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY. IN RECENT YEARS, FOR THE MOST
PART, THIS HAS NOT INVOLVED ACTIVE ASPIRATIONS FOR SEPARATION.
HOWEVER, THIS WAS THE CASE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO WWII, PARTICULARLY IN
THE FORMER WESTERN OBLASTS OF THE UKRAINE WHICH HISTORICALLY HAD, AT
TIMES, BEEN UNDER POLISH RULE.

B. STEPAN BANDERA (BORN IN 1909 IN JAROSLAV, POLAND), WHICH
IS NOW A PART OF THE UKRAINE, BECAME ACTIVE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF
UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS (OUN) IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE IN 1929. THE OUN
CARRIED OUT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST BOTH POLES AND RUSSIANS IN
AN EFFORT TO FREE THE UKRAINE. IN 1934 BANDERA WAS ARRESTED IN
ASSOCIATION WITH AN ASSASSINATION PLOT AGAINST THE POLISH MINISTER OF
INTERIOR AND WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH. THIS SENTENCE WAS LATER CHANGED
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND IN 1940 HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON.

C. DURING THE PERIOD 1940-1941, BANDERA RENEWED HIS
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. HE JOINED ONE OF THE TWO PRO-GERMAN UKRAINIAN
PARTIES.
SUPPORT BATTALIONS OF THE OUN. BANDERA THEN SPLIT THE OUN AND ASSUMED LEADERSHIP OF ONE Faction. (The other faction was led by one "MELNIK") BANDERA tried to set up a free Ukrainian government but was subsequently arrested and imprisoned by the Nazis in 1941. He was interned in several concentration camps from 1941 to 1944 when he succeeded in reaching the West. Throughout WWII and a short period thereafter, the BANDERA faction continued active resistance fighting in the Western Ukraine. The MELNIK faction faded from the scene after the war. Despite the BANDERA faction resistance, the Soviet authorities were finally able to establish firm and effective control over the region in the late 1940's.

D. Although BANDERA's faction was effectively dealt with inside the Ukraine, BANDERA, now in exile in Munich, continued to call for Ukrainian resistance to Soviet rule. In this status he obviously represented a major thorn in the side of the Soviets and was received as a threat to Soviet authorities. The Soviets decided that he had to be dealt with and finally in 1959 the KGB succeeded in murdering him. (The assassin stalked BANDERA for several weeks in Munich. One day BANDERA, who had sent his bodyguards to lunch, went home after having done a bit of shopping at a local vegetable market. The lone KGB agent was waiting inside the apartment building entrance when BANDERA arrived at the apartment. As soon as BANDERA came through the apartment building front door, arms full of food parcels, the agent fired both barrels of a cyanide gas gun into BANDERA's face. BANDERA was dead within minutes. The assassin successfully made it back to the USSR, was highly decorated, but fled to West Berlin for fear of his life after learning that the KGB often murders its assassins to maintain non-complicity in assassinations it orders.) From the Soviets' point of view, BANDERA was an unequivocable traitor and threat to the Soviet state itself. Many Soviets, especially from the Western Ukraine, regard him as a national hero and conceivably some Ukrainians still think of him as a hero even today.

3. Regret that sum of HOS INFO on IVANOV was given in Ref B. However, HOS DPS officer who is of Ukrainian descent, and who coincidentally is brother of C/O who debriefed BANDERA's KGB assassin upon his defection to the West, suggested one possible approach to IVANOV. Once he is located, he suggests that station officer/access agent reflect some family relation, i.e., aunt. SECRET
SECRET

DIRECTOR 45-4-02p

COUSIN, ETC. WHO IS UKRAINIAN. STATION CONTACT WOULD THEN SHOW SYMPATHY TOWARD THE UKRAINIAN CAUSE, PERHAPS SOME KNOWLEDGE OF BANDERA, AND LATER ON WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE IVANOV WITH RUSSO-UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM LITERATURE. WE HAVE A FAIRLY COMPREHENSIVE LIBRARY OF RUSSO-UKRAINIAN, AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE LITERATURE ON THE UKRAINIAN SITUATION, PAST AND PRESENT, FOR STATION'S USE.

GOOD LUCK IN LOCATING IVANOV. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT YOUR EFFORTS IN THE DIFFICULT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF WILL BE FRUITFUL. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR ANY CLUES AND INFO FROM OUR FILES AS TO WHY IVANOV MAY BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT. (PER REF 8, CONNECTION MAY BE IVANOV'S FATHER.) WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR INITIAL CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT OF IVANOV.

FILES: 087-888-002, DECL GARD DRY HUN 4-62, ALL SECRET.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
1. There is little doubt that Stefan BANDERA is extreme rightist in his political outlook. By nature he is a political intragentic of great personal ambition, who, using his party as a vehicle of ambition, has consistently and often openly, since April 1925, opposed all political organizations in the emigration which favor a representative form of government in the Ukraine as opposed to a non-party, COM/BANDERA regime. (TS/CIA 20096, MEM-A-770).

2. The subject has been accused, tried, and convicted of complicity in the murder of a Polish government official. There has been no proof that he was the man who actually did the killing but the fact remains that he had been involved in the plot. Also involved in the plot was Mieczisław LEJEŚ (CAS-16042), who is the foreign secretary of the UNM, who was sent into the emigration, and who is part of the organization (ZPHTY).

3. The COM/BANDERA has been accused of acts of terror against Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians.

a. During the war years, at the time that BANDERA was incarcerated in a German concentration camp, there sprang up in the Ukraine a number of fighting units. Some of those units united under the names of Taras BULBA-BROUVETS, COM/KONSTY and COM/BANDERA. Since it was apparent to all that there should be a unified command, all three commands tried to unite, but COM/BANDERA, being possibly strongest in number, decided that it should lead all others. It was at this time that there was considerable fratricide committed. However, there is that the whole general staff of Taras BULBA-BROUVETS was liquidated by COM/BANDERA, as well as a number of those who backed Colonel Andriy KONSTY - among the latter the COM/KONSTY leader, STIHIN-STEPI, and SOKPY-STEPI. Although we have little to document this, the rumor is so persistent in its recurrence that we feel justified in bringing it to light. It must be noted, however, that BANDERA himself could not have possibly been implicated, since, at that time, he was imprisoned by the Germans.

b. In the emigration, the COM/BANDERA SB (Security Service) has been accused of terrorism. Again, there is little doubt as to this but so far the Americans have not been able to get enough evidence for court trial of any of the SB outside of the Gulai case. The General Gulai case is a very recent one about which there has been a great amount of cable traffic. At this time it is difficult to say whether the COM/BANDERA SB was responsible for this. From the evidence which has been presented it would appear that the attack on General Gulai originated spontaneously during a drinking party of three fanatic members of the COM/B.
SECRET

a. There is little doubt that the SB has perpetrated a number of crimes against suspected Soviet agents, political opponents and innocent DP's who might have refused to cooperate with OUN/BANDERA. Whether BANDERA can be blamed for this directly is questionable but if we proceed on the basis that a leader is responsible for those under him, then BANDERA is guilty.

b. With the exception of the General GULAI case, it is difficult to document many of the accusations.

c. Many of the blistering accusations against OUN/B have been supplied by one, Peter YABLOK, who also supplied arguments used by Fred Forrest in "The Bow Leader" (10 Sept. 51) against ABN, and some "facts" for Dr. Dallin in his vituperative attacks, not only against the OUN/B but, by implication, against the Ukrainian liberation movement as such. YABLOK stated that George F. Kennan "invited" him to write an article for "Foreign Affairs". (DCM 3202)

YABLOK claims that at one time he had been in the OUN/B SB. Previously he may have been engaged in espionage and smuggling in Canada, the U.S.A. and South America for the Soviet espionage system. (DFB-7772)

4. Politically, as evidenced by its editorials, OUN/B stands as follows:

a. First and foremost there must be an independent Ukrainian state. Even though communism is overthrown there is no guarantee that there will be a Ukrainian state if the integrity of the Russian empire is maintained. Anyone who even remotely seems to back an undivided Russia is subject to attack. Because the U.S. has not voiced a policy friendly toward the non-Russian peoples of the USSR, it too has been attacked on a number of occasions. This stand, however, is not peculiar to OUN/B but is one which has been accepted by all the significant parties in the Ukrainian emigration, as is evidenced by their editorials on the URDP, (Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party).

b. OUN/B feels that the Ukrainian people as a mass have not matured politically to a point where they could enjoy a democracy. For this reason, BANDERA feels, as does apparently the entire party, that only they should have any say in the government, e.g. a future Ukraine - if there is one - should be run exclusively by OUN/B.

c. Any group or individual who does not agree with the policies of OUN/B is subject to editorial attack even to physical attack.
The following pertinent information was taken from SDB-38095.

3. The OUN/Bandera is an emigre organization of anti-communist, anti-Russian, Ukrainian nationalists who strongly favor the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Most of the members of the group are Galician Ukrainians who were Polish subjects from 1920 to 1939. Under Poland, Ukrainian nationalists became particularly strong primarily because the Poles treated the Ukrainians as an inferior race; the Poles brutally denied them cultural autonomy; their chances for professional advantages were severely curtailed, particularly in the Polish army and civil service; all manner of Ukrainians were arrested and beaten for opposing in any way the complete Polonization of this ethnically Ukrainian territory. The Poles erroneously believed that the Galician Ukrainians represented a loyal Soviet fifth column in their midst. In actual fact, all of the Galician Ukrainians were in violent opposition to communism and wanted above all else to be part of a liberated, non-Russian Ukrainian state.

After 1928, persecution of the 40 million Ukrainians within the Soviet Union also began, much along the same lines as in Poland but more in earnest. Since the rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism in the early part of this century, the Russians have treated the Ukrainians as a disloyal group ready to use every opportunity to free itself from Russian domination. Polish and Russian anti-Ukrainian policies only served to strengthen the national consciousness of the Ukrainians. Realizing that the aspiration for national independence was uppermost in the minds of a majority of Ukrainians, the Third Reich promised at the beginning of World War II that the Ukrainians would be freed from Soviet domination and would have their own state. This promise accounts for the welcome the Germans received initially when they arrived in Ukrainian territory. The German promise also accounts in part for the tremendous number of Ukrainian deserters from the Red Army during the early stages of the war.

The OUN, which had resembled a secret fraternity of revolutionaries from its birth in 1929 until June 1941, now came out in the open, seized the radio station in Lvov and announced the creation of a free Ukrainian state. The Germans who had promised
INFORMATION
SECRET

We immediately arrested the perpetrator, namely Stefan BANDERA, Eugene STYTEKO, Stefan LEMANSKY, and several other UON leaders who spent the next three years in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In simple terms, the Germans wanted from the Ukrainians only food and supplies for their armies and forced labor for their factories. The Germans used all means necessary to force the cooperation which the Ukrainians were unwilling to give. Thus by summer 1941, a battle raged on Ukrainian soil between two ruthless exploiters and persecutors of the Ukrainian people, the Third Reich and Soviet Russia. The UON and the partisan army were created in 1942 to fight bitterly against both the Germans and the Soviet Russians. The UON extended its activity even into the populous areas of the far eastern Ukraine where nationalism had been partially lulled to sleep by the First and Second World Wars.

At the end of the last war many members of the UON came to Western Europe in order to avoid capture by the advancing Soviets. The UON reformed in Western Europe with its headquarters in Munich. It simply came to the attention of American authorities when the Russians demanded extradition of BANDERA and many other anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists as war criminals. Luckily the attempt to locate these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few far-sighted Americans who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding. From 1943 to 1946 members of UON and of UPA arrived from the Soviet Ukraine to Western Germany on foot. They traveled to and from Germany prisons. Some of them brought conclusively confirmed that the UOM and the UPA were continuing the fight against the Soviets, with the weapons and ammunition which the retreating German armies had left behind. Over 35,000 members of the Russian secret police (MVD-MGB) have been killed by UON-UPA since the end of the last war. In other words the main activities of the UON in the Ukraine cannot be considered detrimental to the United States.

The relationship of the OUN/Bandera in the emigration to the OUN in the homeland is debatable. The three principle leaders of OUN/Bandera have not been in the Ukraine since 1941. A decade of evolution in the Ukraine has rendered the ideology and principles of organization of those who left ten years out of date. It is therefore quite understandable that most of the members of the OUN/Bandera in the emigration have been disillusioned with their own nationalism because they think as the Galician nationalists thought prior to 1939. Since the beginning of the Korean war the OUN/Bandera has published articles in its press which criticize the United States rather violently for what OUN/Bandera members deem to be a blind or non-existent policy toward the Ukrainian resistance movement. The OUN/Bandera reasons that the United States government should show some interest in an anti-Soviet nation of 40 million people within the Soviet Union which has carried out military opposition to the Soviet regime for the last ten years. If members of the OUN/Bandera feel any bitterness towards the United States it is usually only for the above reason...
PROCLAMATION ACT OF THE RENIAL OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE

1. By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, under the leadership of Stepan BANDERA, proclaims the renewal of the Ukrainian State, for which generations of best sons of Ukraine laid their heads. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which, under the leadership of the Creator and Leader Eugene KOLOVAL, waged in last decades of bloody Muscovite-bolshevik enslavement - a stubborn struggle for liberation, calls the whole Ukrainian people not to lay down arms until a Sovereign Ukrainian Government is established on all Ukrainian lands. The Sovereign Ukrainian Government guarantees to the Ukrainian people order, universal development of all its forces, and satisfaction to all the needs of the people.

2. In the western lands of the Ukraine a Ukrainian Administration is being established which will subordinate itself to the Ukrainian National Government which will be established in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. The Ukrainian National-Revolutionary Army, which is being formed in Ukrainian territories, will continue fighting the Muscovite occupants for the Sovereign United State and for a new and just order all over the world.

Long live the Sovereign United Ukrainian State.
Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.
Long live the Leader of OUN, Stepan BANDERA.
Glory to the Ukraine.
Glory to the Heroes.

City of Iași, June 30, 1941. 8 PM
The Chairman of the National Assembly
Tarasly Stetsko/m.p.

W 2 COMMENT: This is a literal translation of the proclamation issued by STETSKO on the date and at the place issued above. Because of this proclamation, both STETSKO and BANDERA were imprisoned by the Germans.
The following, which is part of SCOB-41225, may serve to clarify the relations between OUN/BUANDERGA – UHV (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council):

The widely-publicized feud between the representatives of the OUN and the UHV abroad started in 1947 and reached a climax during the second half of 1948 when the representatives of the UHV were summarily expelled from the Bandera enclaves OUN group, which relegated to itself exclusive authority not only to act as the major voice of the Ukrainian resistance movement but also to direct the movement in the homeland along ideological and military lines dictated by Stefan BANDERA. Polish couriers who arrived from the Western Ukrainian headquarters of General Tarsus CHUPRIIKA in late 1948 revealed that the homeland leadership had no indication that a serious split, beneficial only to the Bolsheviks, had taken place in the emigration. Interrogation of these and other members of the underground who arrived in Western Europe at a later date in general confirmed the contentions that the thinking of Stefan BANDERA and his immediate enclaves supporters in the emigration had become radically outdated in the Ukraine. Since BANDERA had not been in the Ukrainian SSR proper since the early 1930s and not even in Galicia since his arrest by the Germans in mid-1941, he was unable to participate in the evolution of the movement on home soil after 1941. During the period 1933 to mid-1941, when BANDERA was the supreme leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement based in Southwestern Poland, leading Galician nationalists of the period considered it proper that the Greek Catholic (Uniat) Church should become the official state religion of an independent Ukraine. Since neither the Uniat Church nor any Christian morality has universal acceptance in the Soviet Ukraine, the leaders in the Ukraine rapidly decided, after 1945, that sponsorship of any particular religion would handicap rather than facilitate the growth of the movement among eastern Ukrainians. BANDERA's thinking on this point had not been as advanced as that of the homeland leadership. Until 1941, a totalitarian, one-party government was advocated by the Ukrainian underground, which at that time still adhered the example set by the Germans. The movement was also anti-Semitic and favored the deportation of several racial minorities, including the Poles and Russians, from Ukrainian soil. Both of these attitudes were abandoned during the Second World War, although BANDERA and several of his enclaves followers have firmly disapproved of such changes in ideology. BANDERA and other enclaves Ukrainian nationalists who still favor the pre-1943 tenets of the movement are at odds with the evolution in their homeland on yet two other important ideological issues. When BANDERA led the
movements in Southeastern Poland only ardently idealistic Ukrainian patriots were accepted into the movement. Materialists or persons with Marxist leanings were considered undesirable. During the Second World War this tenet was discarded as extremely unworkable in the Eastern Ukraine. BANERA still believes in the correctness of the pre-1943 position on this point. BANERA has also adhered to the doctrine that the movement should combat by all available means every Soviet-Russian innovation or institution in the Ukraine. In 1950 the homeland leaders pointed out that, among other things, kindergartens, sanatoriums, and schools were Soviet-Russian innovations and that it would be ridiculous for the movement to combat what the population found desirable.

It is clear from this and other original documents from the Ukraine that the attempts of BANERA to direct the movement from abroad have irritated the leaders in the homeland. It is also reasonably clear that the members of the OUN who were sent west in August 1944 as ambassadors of the movement were still considered in July 1950 to be just that.
Stephan BANDERA was born in 1909 in the town of Trostianed, near Stryj. His father was a Greek Catholic priest. He attended elementary school in Sokal and high school in Stryj. While still in high school he became a member of UVO, a veterans' organization of Ukrainian nationalists from the First World War. In 1928 or 1929 he graduated from high school and went on to the Polytechnic in Lviv where he studied agriculture. In 1929 he did not attend the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Vienna which brought about the consolidation of UVO and three other minor nationalist groups. UUN was born at this Congress. By late 1930 or early 1931 BANDERA had become head of the homeland executive committee of the UUN. KONOVALETS was the overall Chief of UUN at this time, although he was in the emigration. This was the period in Eastern Poland (1929-1934) when the younger generation of Ukrainian students took over most of the prominent positions in the homeland UUN. In June 1934, one day after the assassination of the Polish Minister of Interior, Pilsudski, BANDERA was arrested. He was first sentenced to death and then the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. His trial took place in 1935 after which he was committed to the Holy Cross jail where he remained until 1939. It is alleged that his sentence was commuted to avoid an uprising of Ukrainian nationalists in Eastern Poland and the Ukraine. BANDERA's closest collaborators during this period were Tetsko STETSIO, Andrii LEDUK, Mikhail YAREV, and Iurii SPOLSKY. The circumstances surrounding BANDERA's escape or release from Polish prison in 1939 are not clearly known.

Once free, BANDERA resumed his leadership of UUN in the homeland. Officially, Col. Andrei MELNITZ had succeeded to the title held by KONOVALETS until the latter's assassination. MELNITZ, however, was in the emigration and BANDERA in Cracow. BANDERA was offered a position in MELNITZ's exiled Provisional UUN (PUN). This offer BANDERA turned down since it would have placed him in a position subordinate to MELNITZ. In early summer 1940 the UUN split and BANDERA became the overall chief of the greater part of the organization. During 1940 UUN organized these western regions occupied by the Germans and sent couriers and organizers into the Eastern Ukraine. When the Germans attacked Russia, many members of the UUN followed the Germans' advance eastward. BANDERA remained in Cracow. The Gestapo invited BANDERA for a conference which apparently was a ruse to arrest him. At any rate, BANDERA was taken to Berlin and placed under house arrest there. He was shortly transferred to the Prinz Albrechtstrasse Gestapo jail reserved for important political prisoners. (Vолодько STACHY, now a member of the ZP UUN, was also in this jail at the same time as BANDERA). In 1942 BANDERA was transferred to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp; in 1944 he was brought to Berlin where the Germans attempted to negotiate with him. BANDERA was however adamant and the negotiations came to
SECRET

According to the information used to base his refusal to collaborate with the Germans on the fact that the Germans had dissolved the independent Ukrainian government proclaimed at Lvov in June 1941. Partly through the intervention of LIKHOD and BRINKHOF, BANDERA escaped from the Germans and disappeared. At the end of the war he was in the Austrian Tyrol. In the summer of 1945 he came to Southern Bavaria where he has more or less been to this time.

In 1939 BANDERA married. His family is with him in Germany. He is said to have three or possibly by now four children.

Former friends of BANDERA characterize him as follows: self-important, clever, fond of jokes, socially very cordial, unintellectual, mediocre as an orator, and preoccupied with problems of power politics in the emigration.

A breakdown of BANDERA's official titles would run something as follows:

1932-39 Chief of the homeland executive of OUN
1939-August 1943 – Providnik (leader) of OUN and chairman of the Provid
1943-45 unofficially Providnik
1945-51 Providnik of the foreign elements of OUN (ZCh)

It will be noted that BANDERA has never held any official title or membership in UPA or the UNR. His claim to membership in the "Council of Three" (Biuze Providu) has been refuted by the homeland on the grounds that the Biuze Provid ceased to exist in 1946, after the death of two of its original members (KUNYER and POLOHUB). It should also be noted that the title Providnik OUN officially went out of existence in 1945, when it was decided that all policy matters concerning the party would henceforth be decided by a council of equals (the Provid) instead of by a single leader. The evolution of the Ukrainian underground in the last five years in the direction of decentralization of executive power has not been fully accepted by BANDERA who has shown unmistakable evidence that he desires to return to the status-quo of 1941 when he held the unchallenged position of "Provid".

This information has been culled from: BLOG: 2; LII-767; T/7850-555; LII-941; 120-0-12-89y3 IC9; Q4-1039; T9/01A 2865; and MEMA-799.
Stepan BANDERA was born in 1909 in the town of Trostiane, near Stryj. His father was a Greek Catholic priest. He attended elementary school in Sokal and high school in Stryj. While still in high school he became a member of UNO, a veterans' organization of Ukrainian nationalists from the First World War. In 1928 or 1929 he graduated from high school and went on to the Polytechnic in Lvov where he studied agriculture. In 1929 he did not attend the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Vienna which brought about the consolidation of UNO and three other minor nationalist groups. UN was born at this Congress. By late 1932 or early 1933 BANDERA had become head of the homeland executive committee of the OUN. KONONOVALETS was the overall Chief of OUN at this time, although he was in the emigration. This was the period in Eastern Poland (1929-1934) when the younger generation of Ukrainian students took over most of the prominent positions in the homeland OUN. In June 1934, one day after the assassination of the Polish Minister of Interior, PIERAGE, BANDERA was arrested. He was first sentenced to death and then the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. His trial took place in 1935 after which he was committed to the Holy Cross jail where he remained until 1939. It is alleged that his sentence was commuted to avoid an uprising of Ukrainian nationalists in Eastern Poland and the Ukraine. BANDERA's closest collaborators during this period were Yarozyv STEFIIKO, Mykola LIERED, Mykhailo TAMIN, and Yarozyv SPOLTSY. The circumstances surrounding BANDERA's escape or release from Polish prison in 1939 are not clearly known. Once free, BANDERA resumed his leadership of OUN in the homeland. Officially, Colonel Andrei MELNYK had succeeded to the title held by KONONOVALETS until the latter's assassination. MELNYK, however, was in the emigration and BANDERA in Cracow. BANDERA was offered a position in MELNYK's emigre Provis of the OUN (PUN). This offer BANDERA turned down since it would have placed him in a position subordinate to MELNYK. In early summer 1940 the OUN split and BANDERA became the overall leader of the greater part of the organization. During 1940 OUN organized those western regions occupied by the Germans and sent couriers and organizers into the Eastern Ukraine. When the Germans attacked Russia, many members of the OUN followed the Germans' advance eastward. BANDERA remained in Cracow. The Gestapo invited BANDERA for a conference which apparently was a ruse to arrest him. At any rate, BANDERA was taken to Berlin and placed under house arrest there. He was shortly transferred to the Prinz Albrechtsstrasse Gestapo jail reserved for important political prisoners. (Volodymyr STACHIV, a member of the APU/UHVR, was also in this jail at the same time as BANDERA). In 1942 BANDERA was transferred to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In 1944 he was brought to Berlin where the Germans attempted to negotiate with him. BANDERA was however adamant and the negotiations came to nothing. Allegedly he based his refusal to collaborate with the Germans on the fact that the Germans had dissolved the independent Ukrainian Government proclaimed at Lvov in June 1941. Partly through the intervention of LIERED and KUBINICH, BANDERA escaped from the Germans and disappeared. At the end of the war he was in the Russian Tyrol. In the summer of 1945 he came to Southern Bavaria, where he lived after that time.
A breakdown of BANDERA's official titles would run something as follows:

1932-39 Chief of the homeland executive of OUN
1939-August 1943 Providnik (leader) of OUN and chairman of the Provid
1943-45 Unofficially Providnik
1945-51 Providnik of the foreign elements of OUN (ZCh)

It should be noted that BANDERA never held any official title or membership in UPA or the UHWR. His claim to membership in the "Council of Three" (Biuro Providu) was refuted by the homeland on the grounds that the Biuro Providu ceased to exist in 1946, after the death of two of its original members (MAINEY and VOLHEIM). It should also be noted that the title Providnik OUN officially went out of existence in 1943, when it was decided that all policy matters concerning the party would henceforth be decided by a council of equals (the Provid) instead of by a single leader. The evolution of the Ukrainian underground in the direction of decentralization of executive power was not fully accepted by BANDERA, who showed unmistakable evidence that he desired to return to the status-quo of 1941 when he held the unchallenged position of leader.

BANDERA also disputed the new program of the OUN adopted at the Third Congress of the OUN held in the Ukraine in August 1943 in which the basic Marxist philosophical and political tenets of the OUN had been critically reviewed. In that program extreme elements of ethnocentrism and romanticism were replaced by a greater concern for social and economic questions to win the population of Eastern Ukraine. BANDERA who did not participate in that evolution of the OUN because of his imprisonment in a German concentration camp, condemned it as a move toward socialism.

He maintained that this course was fallacious and that it should be reversed. He also objected to internal democracy in the OUN as allegedly harmful in an organization engaged in clandestine activities.

The platform of the Third Congress of the OUN was defended by those members of the OUN who participated in the anti-Nazi underground in the Ukraine. BANDERA's views gained support by the majority of the OUN cadres who, like himself, were detained in German prisons and camps and had not come into contact with the masses of Eastern Ukraine. These differences caused two splits in the OUN in 1946 and in 1954. Those who were opposed to BANDERA created in 1954 a separate political organization under the same name of the ZCh OUN. In 1956 the new name of OUN-z (za kordonoM - abroad) was adopted.

From the very beginning of the internal rift in the OUN both BANDERA and his opponents were trying to win approval of their policies from the leadership (the Provid) of the OUN in the Ukraine. On several occasions the Provid under Roman SHUHAKHYCH corroborated the new program of the OUN and called on both sides to come to an understanding. Under pressure BANDERA gave up the leadership of the ZCh OUN in August 1952 but later reneged. Similarly in 1953 he agreed to join the Collegium of the Three.
(Lev REBET, Zynowij MATLA, Stapan BANDERA) appointed by the Provid in the Ukraine to act as a temporary leadership of the ZCh OUN, but after several months of discussions with REBET and MATLA he refused to cooperate. Thus all efforts to heal the rift proved ineffective.

Until his death in 1959 BANDERA occupied position of the head of ZCh OUN. According to the official documents of ZCh OUN and in the opinion of his adherents BANDERA was also head of "the whole" OUN.

On October 15, 1959 BANDERA was murdered in the staircase of his house in Munich by Bogdan STASHINSKY, a confessed agent of the KGB. Two years earlier, on October 1957, STASHINSKY assassinated Lev REBET, also in Munich. In 1961 STASHINSKY defected to the West. After his confession he was tried by a West German court and sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment. His present whereabouts is unknown.
Please do a complete Do name trace on the following:

1) Stefan Bandera, no DPOB. A Ukrainian emigree who allegedly was killed by the KGB in Munich in 1959.

2) Myrosalv (or Myreslav) Prokop, DOB: 6 May 13

3) Also check on Myroslav Prokop who was born in 1919.

I would like to know if Myroslav or Prokop, or both, are common Slavic names. The reason for the request has to do with Nazi war crimes.

Thanks, mob.

DECLASIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2004-2006
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Acting Chief, FPL Group

ATTENTION:

FPL Group

FROM:

Chief, Information Services Group

SUBJECT: Stefan Bandera

Myroslav Prokop, DOB: 6 May 1913

Myroslav Prokop, DOB: 1919

REFERENCE: OGC Request for Traces via FPLG Two-Way Memo dated 13 January 1987 (U)

1. Stefan Andreyevich Bandera, aka Stefan Popel, aka Michael Kaspar, aka Stefan Donat, aka Hubert Bula, was born 1 January 1909, in Trostianec, near Stryj, USSR, alternate DPOB: 1 September 1909, Jaroslau, Poland. Subject became a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) while still in high school and by 1932 he was Chief of Propaganda for the OUN. Bandera was anti-Russian, anti-German, and anti-Poland and one of the most important Ukrainian nationalist leaders of his time. (S)

2. From 1932-1934 Bandera was assistant chief of the OUN and head of the underground activities in Poland. He was arrested in 1934 and charged with ordering the assassination of the Polish Prime Minister. At his trial in 1935, he was sentenced to death and the sentence commuted to life in prison. He was committed to Holy Cross jail in Warsaw and remained there until freed by the Germans in 1939. In 1939 Subject became head of the Ukrainian Nationalist Revolutionists (OUN/R). The Germans arrested Bandera in 1941 for resisting German restrictions on Ukrainian nationalists, imprisoned him in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse Gestapo jail, and then transferred him to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 1942. He escaped from the Germans in 1944 and joined the Ukrainian Resistance Army (UPA) which had been reorganized to show the military nature of the organization and to inspire members to obtain their goal of Ukrainian independence by using denunciation and ruthless terrorism whenever they felt it was necessary. Bandera lived in...
West Germany from 1945 until his murder, by a confessed agent of the KGB, on 15 October 1959. (S)

3. According to information dated December 1951 from a Russian language monthly periodical, Subject was reported to be "Hitler's professional spy". This claim was never substantiated and there is no information in the Directorate for Operations files to indicate that Bandera was ever involved in Nazi war crimes. (S)

4. Myroslav Prokop, DOB: 13 May 1913, Peremyshl, Western Ukraine, a member of the OUN/Bandera Directorate, was arrested by the Polish police in October 1933 and sentenced to seven years in prison for his OUN activities (NFI regarding these activities). This sentence was later commuted to four years. After his release he was sent to Germany, arrested by the Germans, and held in a concentration camp until the end of World War II. Subject immigrated to the U.S. in 1949 and became a U.S. citizen in 1958. (S)

5. According to information dated December 1960, Subject claimed membership in the Association for Free Ukraine Inc., the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council. (S)

6. There is no indication in the Directorate for Operations files to indicate that Prokop (DOB: 1913) was ever involved in Nazi war crimes. (U)

7. There are no Directorate for Operations records on a Myroslav Prokop, DOB: 6 May 1913. The files do contain U.S. Army European Command Counterintelligence records dated March 1951 on one Myroslav Prokop, aka Turner, aka Lang, aka Thiele, DOB: 13 June 1913, Nacwai (sic), Czechoslovakia, who was a suspected Czechoslovak agent (NFI). (S)

8. The names Myroslav, Myroslav, and Prokop are all common Slavic names. (U)

9. According to information provided to this Directorate by DDA/IPD, as of 9 December 1986 there is no indication that Stefan Bandera, Myroslav Prokop (DOB: 1913), or Myroslav Prokop (DOB: 1919) has ever been the subject of an FBI/PA request. (U)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel
FROM: Non-Disclosure Litigation Officer
DO/IPS/FOIA, Privacy & Litigation Group
SUBJECT: Nazi War Crimes Investigations: Stefan Bandera and Myroslav Prokop
REFERENCE: OGC-87-50179

1. An extensive search of the files and indices of the Directorate of Operations surfaced the following information in response to the specific questions posed by the OSI in reference. (U)

2. Stefan Bandera aka Stephen Bandera was murdered by a confessed agent of the KGB on 15 October 1959, and therefore is of no further interest to OSI. For your information only, Bandera was imprisoned by the Gestapo from 1941-44, and there is no indication in DO files that he was ever involved in Nazi war crimes. (S)

3. There is no information in DO files which indicates that Myroslav Prokop, DPOB: 13 May 1913, Peremysl, Western Ukraine, was ever involved in Nazi war crimes. Concerning his immigration to the U.S. and his naturalization, the only information available in DO files is that he immigrated in 1949 and became a U.S. citizen in 1958. Prokop was arrested by the Polish police in October 1933 and spent four years in prison. Following his release he was sent to Germany, was arrested by the Germans, and spent the remainder of the war in a concentration camp. (S)

1. Attachment

7019 Attachment
DO/IPS-87-50179
DO/IPS-SecDoc
10 February 1987

SECRET